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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Many social psychological studies on intergroup 
relations show that people have a tendency to evaluate the 
ingroup more favorably than the outgroup. This phenomenon 
is called ingroup bias. Tajfel and Turner define ingroup 
bias as the tendency to favor the ingroup over the outgroup 
in evaluations and behavior (Tajfel and Turner, 1979:38). 
It is generally recognized that ingroup bias is an 
omnipresent feature of intergroup relations. Ingroup bias 
is a kind of intergroup behavior. Intergroup behavior, 
according to Sherif, is any behavior displayed by one or 
more actors toward one or more others that is based on the 
actors' identification of themselves and the others as 
belonging to different social categories (Turner and Giles, 
1981b;7). Intergroup behavior can be defined as social 
interaction between members of different social groups. 
We can find the existence of ingroup bias in everyday 
life. A long time ago Sumner studied ethnocentrism (Sumner, 
1959). He recognized ethnocentrism as a view of things in 
which one's own group is the center of everything and all 
others are scaled and rated with reference to it. It 
involves positive attitudes toward an ingroup and negative 
attitudes toward outgroups. 
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According to Sumner, ethnocentrism has three major 
facets. First, ethnocentrism is a syndrome involving 
mutually reinforcing interactions among attitudinal, 
ideological, and behavioral mechanisms that promote ingroup 
integration and outgroup hostility. Second, this syndrome 
is a universal concomitant of the formation and 
differentiation of social groups. Third, it is functionally 
related to intergroup conflict and competition (Brewer, 
1986:89). Rosenblatt (1964) argues that ethnocentrism 
satisfies psychic needs, i.e., it has a motivational factor. 
The greater are the perceived or expected psychic rewards of 
the ingroup and/or the less are the perceived or expected 
psychic rewards of the outgroup, the greater the 
ethnocentric needs. By associating oneself with a group 
which has traditions of victory, strength, goodness, and 
success, one receives the rewards of these vicariously. 
Such ethnocentrism represents ingroup bias in everyday life. 
In the 1950s, Allport investigated characteristics of 
prejudice. He argues that all thinking involves 
categorization, and that categorization implies distortions 
and simplifications. People have a propensity to prejudice 
and this propensity lies in our normal tendency to form 
generalizations and categories. According to Allport, 
prejudice is an avertive or hostile attitude toward a person 
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who belongs to a group, simply because he/she belongs to 
that group, and is therefore presumed to have the 
objectionable qualities ascribed to the group (Allport, 
1954:7). He indicated that people often form judgments on 
the basis of scant, even nonexistent, probabilities. 
Overcategorization is the commonest trick of the human mind. 
The human mind must think with the aid of categories. Once 
formed, categories are the basis for normal prejudgment, and 
orderly living depends on it. Everywhere we find a 
condition of separateness among groups. He even proposed 
five levels of rejection of outgroups; antilocution, 
avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and 
extermination. Allport's analysis also suggests the 
pervasiveness of ingroup bias in everyday life. 
' We often stererotype a person as a member of a group. 
An individual becomes the object of a stereotype after 
he/she has been placed into a category. Such stereotyping 
is thus a categorization process. Taylor (1981) indicates 
that people have a general stereotype of their own group as 
good and of outgroups as bad, and use this stereotype as a 
guideline for their behavior. As such, the ingroup bias 
phenomenon is quite general. When researchers investigate 
ingroup bias phenomenon, they usually study it both in 
experimental small group situations and in large groups 
which exist in a real world. 
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The study of ingroup bias has been active in the area 
of social psychology for a long time, especially since the 
1960s and early 1970s when Tajfel et al. (1971) proposed a 
new theory called social identity theory. Since then, the 
most recognized and powerful theory about ingroup bias has 
been social identity theory although there are several other 
theories or hypotheses to explain ingroup bias. 
Tajfel and his colleagues investigated the effect of 
social categorization on discrimination in terms of the 
operation of social comparison processes between groups and 
every person's need for a positive social identity. Social 
identity theory elaborates the relationship between 
perceived social identity and intergroup comparison, and 
argues that social comparisons give rise to processes of 
mutual differentiation between groups which can be analyzed 
as a form of social competition, i.e., conflict of group 
interests (Turner, 1975). Tajfel and Turner (1979) contend 
that much of the work on the social psychology of intergroup 
relations has focused on patterns of individual prejudice 
and discrimination and on the motivational sequences of 
interpersonal attraction. The common feature of most of 
this work has been the stress on the intraindividual or 
interpersonal psychological processes leading to prejudiced 
attitudes or discriminatory behavior. Thus the complex 
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interweaving of individual or interpersonal behavior with 
the contextual social processes of intergroup conflict and 
their psychological effects has not been the focus of many 
social psychologists. 
The alternative to these approaches has been suggested 
by Sherif and referred to as the realistic group conflict 
theory. However, Tajfel proposed social identity theory as 
a supplement to the realistic group conflict theory. While 
the latter emphasizes the objective aspects of group 
relations, social identity theory focuses on the subjective 
aspects of it. 
The specifics of social identity theory will be 
discussed in another chapter. The theory focuses on the 
process underlying the development and maintenance of group 
identity and on the autonomous effects of these subjective 
aspects of group membership upon the ingroup and intergroup 
behavior. The phenomenon of identification with the ingroup 
is basic in social identity theory. The main argument of 
the theory is that individuals strive to achieve or maintain 
positive social identity, and that this positive social 
identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons 
that can be made between the ingroup and some relevant 
outgroups. The need for a positive self-concept and 
positive social identity leads to positive evaluation of 
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one's own group through ingroup/outgroup comparisons and 
thus to ingroup bias. According to the theory, simply 
categorizing individuals into social groups is enough to 
produce ingroup bias. Furthermore, the theory is based on 
the assumption of existence of the need for a positive 
social identity, and is thus a motivationally oriented 
theory. 
There has been much research to support social identity 
theory, and the evidence supporting the theory seems 
impressive. However, although social identity theory is the 
dominant theory so far and has been proved to be valid, 
there is no consensus among scholars about an adequate 
theoretical explanation of ingroup bias. For example, 
Hinkle and Schopler (1979), while introducing eight major 
theories or hypotheses to explain biases in evaluations of 
group performance, concluded that there is a lack of major 
theory about group evaluation bias. Although there are 
quite a number of arguments for ingroup bias, most of them 
only remain at a hypothetical level and do not form coherent 
theory. Such lack of theory means a lack of understanding 
of the mechanism underlying ingroup bias. Therefore, there 
is current need for a new, more powerful explanation. 
The objective of this paper is to suggest a new theory 
and thus to contribute new knowledge to the issue of ingroup 
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bias. The paper will propose a new explanation by borrowing 
one of the theories of group polarization and by 
synthesizing it into ingroup bias research. That theory is 
called persuasive arguments theory. Unlike social identity 
theory, a new approach based on persuasive arguments theory 
is a cognitively oriented approach. Whilst social identity 
theory argues that ingroup bias originates from motivation 
for a positive social identity, ingroup bias may not be 
based on such motivation or need, but rather on some 
cognitive process. As an alternative to social identity 
theory the paper proposes and draws its hypotheses from 
persuasive arguments theory to explain ingroup bias. 
Persuasive arguments theory has been one of the major 
theories to explain group polarization or choice shift 
phenomenon. The theory contends that new and persuasive 
arguments heard by members during group discussion are the 
mediator of choice shifts effects. Group-induced response 
shifts occur because certain persuasive arguments which are 
not known initially by all group members are introduced 
during group discussion and these new arguments persuade the 
individuals to polarize their opinions. The choice of other 
group members is used as a cue for imagining the arguments 
behind their choice, in the case of no discussion. Shifts 
in choice occur either by listening to group discussion with 
argumentation explaining why people chose as they did, or by 
8 
imagining the arguments behind people's choices without 
group discussion. This dissertation draws several 
hypotheses based on the propositions of persuasive arguments 
theory and focuses on the effect of reasons in producing 
ingroup bias and in reversing this bias. This study will 
investigate several conditions in which intergroup bias does 
and does not occur. 
Unlike the assumptions of social identity theory, 
ingroup bias may occur because of a reasoning or 
argumentation process, i.e., because of intrapersonal 
information processing. It has been found that shifts in 
choice occurred in the absence of group discussion when 
individuals knew and thought about others' choices. This 
research borrows persuasive arguments theory from research 
on group decision making and proposes the cognitive rather 
than the motivational basis for ingroup bias. 
Intergroup research has significance in the area of 
social psychology. Intergroup behavior is one of core 
theoretical topics in social psychological studies. The 
study of ingroup bias has been one of the major topics in 
small group research. In everyday life people oftentimes 
face the problem of ingroup bias without any reasonable 
reasons for such bias and are puzzled or sometimes 
victimized by such bias. We may prevent ingroup bias 
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through knowledge and understanding of the mechanism behind 
the bias. Thus, the study of ingroup bias is not only of 
academic interest, but it also has practical implications. 
This dissertation tries to contribute new knowledge to the 
issue of ingroup bias. The significance of the study lies 
in the fact that it proposes new approach to the study of 
ingroup bias. If it is proved through the investigation 
that this new perspective is valid, it can open the new 
direction of research into the issue. 
This introductory chapter has been devoted to 
explaining the basic area of research and the specific 
problem of this research. The next chapter will be devoted 
to the review of literatures about ingroup bias. Chapter 
Three will explain the theoretical background of the study 
and propose hypotheses based on it. Chapter Four will 
present the main test and methods the study has used, and 
chapter Five will be devoted to the presentation of major 
findings. In the last chapter, summary and implications of 
the study will be discussed. 
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a considerable number of studies 
investigating ingroup bias, especially since the 1960s. 
These studies focus on various aspects of ingroup bias, 
including the many factors affecting the amount of ingroup 
bias, and the various results of that bias. This chapter 
will review that research, and thus give an overview of what 
has been done in the study of intergroup bias. Although 
many studies have investigated this issue, there is a lack 
of consensus about the nature of the phenomenon and 
generalizations about the findings. Most of the research 
presented here is not directly related to the problem of 
this paper, but this review will give an overview of the 
research area. 
Intra/intergroup Cooperation and Competition 
In many studies, intergroup or intragroup cooperation 
and competition have been suggested as major factors 
influencing ingroup bias. In some of the earliest research 
on the topic, Deutsch (1949) already proposed that there is 
more favorable evaluation of the group and its products 
under conditions of within-group cooperation than under 
conditions of competition. 
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The pioneering study dealing with the influence of 
intergroup competition is Sherif et al.'s (1961). Sherif et 
al.'s field study demonstrated that interaction under 
competitive conditions was sufficient to produce ingroup 
bias and intergroup hostility. Sherif and his colleagues 
ran the study in three stages; the stage of ingroup 
formation, the stage of intergroup competition and conflict, 
and the stage of reduction of intergroup conflict. In the 
second stage, they hypothesized that in the course of 
competitive relations between the two groups, unfavorable 
stereotypes will come into use about the outgroup and its 
members, and these stereotypes will become standardized over 
time. They found evidence in favor of this hypothesis. 
Blake and Mouton (1961) investigated the effect of 
intergroup competition under win-lose conditions, and found 
that while all groups rated themselves to be above average 
in problem solving before competition, such positive ratings 
of their own groups increased even further after intergroup 
competition. They used groups with 9 to 12 persons in a 
laboratory situation, in which subjects met several times. 
They interpreted the findings to be the result of strong 
pressures to evaluate one's own group more favorably due to 
solid identification with their own group's position. 
Another study by Blake and Mouton (1962) also focused on the 
evaluation of group products. Intergroup competition was 
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manipulated by leading subjects to expect that one group 
would be a winner and the other a loser on a problem solving 
task. The result showed that the product of one's own group 
was rated higher than that of the other groups. 
Ferguson and Kelley (1964) tried to minimize the 
competition factor and measured preference for ingroup and 
its products using temporary, ad hoc groups. They found 
that competition increased the preference for ingroup 
product, although competition was not necessary for such 
preference. 
Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) also investigated the effect 
of intergroup competition on ingroup bias. They compared 
three conditions; a condition in which subjects are 
expected to work together in competition with the other 
group; a condition in which subjects are expected to work 
together as a group but independently of the other group; 
and a condition in which they are expected not to work 
together as a group. The results showed that intergroup 
competition did not lead to greater ingroup solidarity, nor 
any overevaluation of ingroup's product, although there was 
weak evidence that intergroup competition led to a greater 
ingroup/outgroup differentiation than did noncompetitive 
relations. 
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Doise et al. (1972) divided individuals into two groups 
based on their preference for photographs, and made subjects 
allocate money to members of both their own and another 
group. Half of the subjects were told that they should gain 
as much money as possible for their own group (competitive 
group), and half were told that they should gain as much 
money as possible for both groups together and total money 
would be divided equally between the two groups (cooperative 
group). In a control condition, subjects rated each other's 
physical traits on various scales, without any manipulation. 
The result showed that the ingroup was always evaluated more 
favorably than the outgroup in both control and experimental 
conditions, but even more in the experimental conditions. 
However, there was no difference between the competition and 
cooperation conditions in evaluation of the ingroup, and 
discrimination against the outgroup was stronger when 
competitive interaction was anticipated. 
Kahn and Ryen (1972) investigated the minimal 
necessary conditions for ingroup bias. They hypothesized 
that ingroup bias would occur as a result of classification 
only when subjects expect the groups to compete. Thus, they 
manipulated the anticipation of cooperation or competition 
between groups, and found that subjects anticipating 
cooperation showed less ingroup bias than those in 
competition. However, even those subjects in cooperation 
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condition also showed significant ingroup bias. Thus, they 
concluded that intergroup competition is not a necessary 
condition for the bias. 
In another study, Ryen and Kahn (1975) tested the 
effects of five intergroup orientations on evaluations of 
the ingroup and the outgroup; those conditions were alone, 
coacting, cooperating, competing with the outgroup without 
feedback of outcome, and competing with win-lose feedback. 
Thus, they manipulated both intergroup orientation and 
feedback concerning the outcome of competition. They 
measured ingroup bias using seating choices and by semantic 
differential scales. The results showed that all conditions 
produced significant own group biases with the exception of 
the coacting condition. Subjects of the alone and coacting 
conditions chose random seating patterns. Subjects in 
cooperating groups sat near both ingroup and outgroup 
members, and displayed a slight bias favoring their own 
group. Subjects in the competing with no feedback condition 
sat near other ingroup members but far from outgroup members 
and rated their own group much higher than the other group. 
Winning feedback caused subjects to sit closer to the losing 
group, relative to no feedback conditions, while losing 
groups tended to sit as far from winning group as possible. 
Winning feedback caused even higher ingroup evaluations than 
the no feedback condition, while losing feedback produced 
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relatively low ingroup ratings. Thus, intergroup 
orientation affected ingroup bias; bias was least for 
coacting groups and greatest for groups competing with no 
feedback or competing with winning feedback. Ryen and Kahn 
concluded that a cooperative orientation is the most 
conducive to intergroup harmony, while a competition 
orientation produces not only greater evaluative bias but 
leads to seating patterns which make intergroup interaction 
hard. They interpreted these results as suggesting that an 
intergroup orientation provides expectations about future 
involvement with an outgroup and provides normative 
information as to how to place oneself with regard to own 
and outgroup members. 
Rabble et al. (1974) manipulated both intergroup 
orientation (cooperation versus competition) and bargaining 
position (weak versus strong), and made subjects play the 
role of union representatives. They found that competitive 
groups showed greater cohesiveness when they had a strong 
rather than weak position. However, cooperative groups felt 
more positive about their own group when they had a weak 
bargaining position. Competitive groups were more hostile 
and had more negative attitudes toward the other group than 
cooperative ones. 
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Rabble and de Brey (1971) investigated the effects of 
group goal incompatibility by manipulating competitive and 
cooperative orientation. They hypothesized that the 
cooperative groups would have a more positive evaluation 
about the product of the other group than competitive 
groups, and would have a more flexible attitude toward 
negotiations. The hypothesis that expectation of intergroup 
competition will produce a greater ingroup attraction was 
not supported, and the hypothesis that there would be a 
stronger outgroup depreciation in the competitive condition 
than in the cooperative condition was only partially 
supported. Thus, they concluded that competitive 
orientation does not lead to greater ingroup bias nor 
greater ingroup cohesion. 
Wilson and Miller (1961) hypothesized that intergroup 
competition would lead to an unfavorable perception of the 
outgroup and this perception would be an inevitable 
concomitant of ingroup cohesion. They found no evidence for 
this, however. 
Kennedy and Stephan (1977) studied the effects of 
within group cooperation and competition under conditions of 
success and failure on subject's evaluation of own and 
outgroup members. Unlike most studies on the effects of 
cooperation and competition between groups, this study 
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focused on how factors within groups affect relations 
between groups. The results showed that subjects in 
conditions of either cooperative-failure or competition-
success displayed ingroup bias. That is, ingroup bias was 
greater after successful competition than after unsuccessful 
competition, and after cooperative failure than after 
cooperative success. Thus, there was a significant 
interaction effect between within group orientation and 
group outcome, while the main effect of within-group 
orientation was nonsignificant. The fact that there was no 
bias in the cooperative-success condition suggested that the 
norm of ingroup/outgroup bias is not automatically elicited 
by ingroup cohesiveness. 
Brewer and Silver's study (1978) investigated the 
effects of different categorizations and of different reward 
structures. Subjects were categorized into two groups, 
arbitrarily or based on similarity in painting preferences. 
Also, they manipulated three reward structures. In the 
competitive condition each individual's total points were 
scored by summing the two ingroup member points and 
subtracting total points allocated to their counterparts in 
the outgroup. In the cooperative condition, the outcomes 
for members of the two groups were made positively 
interdependent by adding together points assigned to two 
ingroup members and two outgroup members. In the 
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independent condition no interdependence of the outcomes was 
established and the total points were set so that an 
individual could win if she were allocated the maximum 
possible points in each trial by her own group, regardless 
of outgroup's point allocation strategy. The purpose of the 
study was to clarify the nature of ingroup bias in reward 
allocation and to compare outcomes obtained from behavioral 
measures with those obtained from attitudinal measures. 
Thus, they used two kinds of measurements for ingroup bias, 
trait ratings and reward allocation matrices. 
They found that the results from subjects in the 
independent and competitive reward structure conditions were 
the same in reward allocations, i.e., subjects in both 
conditions used the maximum difference strategy most often. 
There were no differences between the competitive and 
independent conditions. However, under the cooperative 
condition, subjects chose relative gain significantly less 
often and showed equal preference for joint gain and 
equality. Thus, there were significant differences in 
choice of reward allocation strategy as a function of reward 
structure. There was no interaction between categorization 
and reward structure, and the influence of reward structure 
conditions on the use of relative gain and equality 
strategies was unaffected by differentiation between groups 
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based on either an arbitrary criterion or on similarity. 
There was a significant difference in the way subjects rated 
the ingroup and the outgroup. Their responses to various 
evaluation scales favored the ingroup. However, the 
difference was small and the size of bias was the same 
across all reward structure conditions. Based on such 
results, the researchers concluded that the mere presence of 
intergroup differentiation is sufficient to create 
conditions of social competition, and that while the 
cooperative interdependence succeeded in reducing allocation 
of rewards to ingroup members, it had no impact on ingroup 
bias in evaluative trait ratings. Reduction of competitive 
interdependence was not sufficient to eliminate ingroup 
bias. 
There are several other studies focusing on the effects 
of intergroup cooperation and/or competition on ingroup 
bias. Worchel et al. (1977) found that simple cooperation 
between groups was not sufficient to increase attraction 
between groups who have previously competed, and that the 
effect of intergroup cooperation on attraction depended on 
both the outcome of cooperation and the nature of the past 
interaction between groups. Previous success would lead to 
increased attraction for the outgroup regardless of previous 
interaction but failure resulted in increased attraction 
only if previous interaction had been cooperative. Thus, 
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both previous interaction and success of combined efforts 
were important variables in determining when intergroup 
cooperation would increase intergroup attraction. 
Attraction for the ingroup, however, was not affected by 
either of these variables. 
Bass and Dunteman (1963) concluded that when there was 
intergroup competition, people underevaluated the outgroup 
more than when there was not. Dunn and Goldman (1966) 
concluded that competition among groups might be unnecessary 
in producing positive ingroup feelings. Goldman et al. 
(1977) looked into the effects of intergroup competition or 
cooperation, intragroup competition or cooperation, and 
interdependence of means of task on group performance and 
evaluation of ingroup and outgroup. The results showed that 
evaluations of ingroup members were higher when there was 
intragroup cooperation rather than intragroup competition, 
and that it was not necessary to introduce intergroup 
competition for ingroup bias to occur. Evaluation of 
outgroup members were higher under intergroup cooperation 
than under intergroup competition, but not significantly 
higher. 
Most studies focus on intergroup competition rather 
than intergroup cooperation as we can see. Worchel (1986) 
indicated that until recently, there has been relatively 
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little study of the means by which intergroup conflict can 
be reduced, and that the most utilized means of reducing 
bias is intergroup cooperation. He suggests that 
cooperation results in increased communication, greater 
trust, and attraction, more coordination of effort and 
division of labor. Also, cooperation may reduce bias 
through reducing the salience of intergroup distinctions. 
He proposes some conditions which determine whether 
cooperation reduces conflict: status differences, outcome 
of cooperation, number of cooperative encounters, 
personality, and task and situational characteristics. 
As this chapter's examination of studies dealing with 
the effects of intra/ intergroup competition and/or 
cooperation on ingroup bias shows, there exist somewhat 
contradictory results. Some studies (e.g., Goldman et al., 
1977; Kennedy and Stephan, 1977) have focused on the effect 
of intragroup competition and/or cooperation. However, most 
studies investigate the effect of intergroup competition 
and/or cooperation rather than intragroup orientation. 
One of the issues in this kind of study is whether 
competition is necessary for the occurrence of ingroup bias. 
There are some studies showing that intergroup competition 
is not a necessary condition for inducing ingroup bias 
(e.g., Kahn and Ryen, 1972; Rabbie and Wilkens, 1971; Ryen 
and Kahn, 1975; Rabbie and de Brey, 1971; Wilson and Miller, 
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1961; Brewer and Silver, 1978; Dunn and Goldman, 1966; 
Goldman et al., 1977). On the other hand, there is other 
research to show that intergroup competition is necessary 
for the bias (e.g., Sherif et al., 1961). However, in 
general, there is more evidence to support the claim that it 
is not a necessary precondition for obtaining ingroup bias. 
Another unsolved issue would be whether intergroup 
competition increases the amount of ingroup bias. Some 
studies show that it enhances ingroup bias (e.g., Blake and 
Mouton, 1961; Kahn and Ryen, 1972), and others indicate that 
it does not increase the bias (e.g., Rabbie and Wilkens, 
1971; Brewer and Silver, 1978). Thus, Brewer suggests that 
since there are inconsistent results concerning this issue, 
it may be that intergroup competition does not affect 
intergroup attitudes directly, but only when confounded with 
other aspects of group differentiation. In other words, the 
presence of competition may serve to clarify the distinction 
between the ingroup and the outgroup under conditions in 
which the differentiation would otherwise be ambiguous 
(Brewer, 1979:314). 
Group Outcome 
There are a number of studies to look into the 
importance of shared group outcomes as one factor 
influencing ingroup bias. Blake and Mouton (1961) and Bass 
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and Dunteman (1963) investigated intergroup competition 
under win-lose conditions, and found that the self-ratings 
of the winning groups were inflated, but those of the losing 
groups dropped temporarily. Wilson and Miller (1961) found 
that when subjects' own team won and the other team lost, 
there were large positive shifts in the ratings of their 
teammates but small positive shifts in the ratings of 
opponents. On the other hand, when subjects' own team lost 
and the other team won, the ratings of their teammates 
showed small positive shifts and those of opponents showed 
larger positive shifts. Therefore, there was a significant 
interaction effect between win-lose condition and object 
rated (own versus opponent). There was no effect in the 
direction of lower ratings by subjects who lost. 
' Worchel et al. (1975) manipulated three different 
independent varibles; continue/discontinue, public/private, 
and win/lose/no information. In continuing groups, subjects 
were told that groups would compete on other problems. In 
the public condition, ratings of each group's product was 
announced to the groups. The win-lose condition was 
manipulated in a way that after competition, group members 
were informed that their product had either won or lost or 
that a decision about the winner had not yet been made. 
There was an interaction effect. In continuing groups. 
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members of winning groups showed less overevaluation of 
their own product when ratings were given in public than 
when ratings were given in private. However, the reverse 
effect was found in losing groups; continuing groups in the 
losing condition gave higher evaluations in public than in 
private condition. Subjects in continuing groups in the 
ambiguous outcome condition showed greater overevaluation in 
public than in the private condition. 
The authors interpreted this as resulting from 
subjects' desire to avoid complacency in winning groups and 
to avoid despair in losing groups. That is, it is to the 
advantage of all winning group members to avoid a feeling of 
complacency, because a decline in effort can cause the group 
to lose in future competition. Thus, group members who have 
already won and anticipate further competition will guard 
against complacency by means of evaluating their own group's 
performance less highly. Subjects in discontinuing groups 
overevaluated ingroup product more in public than in the 
private condition, and this was found in both winning and 
losing groups. The authors interpreted this as showing 
subjects' desire to leave the group with a positive 
expression. Thus, Worchel et al. demonstrated group 
evaluation as a function of expectation of group longevity, 
outcome of competition, and publicity of evaluation. 
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Another study by Worchel et al. (1977) also deals with the 
effect of group outcome. 
Ryen and Kahn (1975) compared competing with no 
feedback and competing with win-lose feedback conditions. 
They found that for groups competing with no feedback, 
subjects sat near other ingroup members but far from 
outgroup members and rated their own group much higher than 
the outgroup. Winning feedback caused subjects to sit 
closer to losing groups relative to the no feedback 
condition, while losing groups sat as far from the winning 
group as possible. Winning feedback caused higher ingroup 
evaluation than no feedback, while losing feedback produced 
relatively low ingroup evaluation. Thus, losing in 
competition decreased ingroup bias to a nonsignificant level 
below the no feedback-competition condition. 
Rabbie and Horwitz (1969), using Dutch teenagers as 
subjects, manipulated three conditions. In a chance 
condition, subjects could win a radio by flipping a coin. 
In the experimenter condition, the experimenter decided who 
would get the radio. In the group condition, only one group 
voted to determine who would win the radio. In a control 
condition, there was no prize. The results showed that 
those in the control condition had no bias in ratings of 
ingroup and outgroup members. Thus, simple categorization 
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into two groups was not sufficient to produce the bias. 
However, flipping a coin produced a significant ingroup 
bias. That is, the chance of win-loss created intergroup 
bias by leading subjects to anticipate better outcomes from 
interpersonal encounters with ingroup members than outgroup 
members. There was significant difference in both group 
attributes and individual attributes between ingroup and 
outgroup evaluations in experimental conditions, but not in 
the control condition. The difference between control and 
experimental conditions was mainly due to the chance 
condition; rewarded subjects in the chance condition showed 
the highest ingroup ratings. Those in the experimenter 
condition and the group condition showed less bias because 
subjects might perceive experimenter discrimination or 
ingroup unfairness in those two conditions. The researchers 
believed that it was unlikely that subjects' ingroup 
preferences stemed from their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the changed state of each group. The 
self-ratings by winning groups were not higher than those by 
losing groups, and outgroup ratings by losing groups were 
not lower than those by winning groups. 
Kahn and Ryen (1972) investigated the effects of 
ingroup and outgroup success on bias. Based on exchange 
theory, they assumed that a group which is successful in 
27 
competition has managed to reward its members, and members 
thus will show increased attraction to the group. The study 
demonstrated that under intergroup competition ingroup 
success produced greater liking for the ingroup than does 
ingroup failure; members of successful groups showed less 
attraction than unsuccessful groups to the other group, and 
ingroup bias increased positively with the increasing levels 
of group success. Under noncompetitive conditions, overall 
ingroup bias was greater only when the ingroup succeeded 
while the other group failed. 
Kennedy and Stephan (1977) studied the effects of 
within group cooperation and competition under conditions of 
success and failure on subjects' point allocation to ingroup 
and outgroup members. They found that ingroup bias was 
greater after successful competition than after unsuccessful 
competition, and that subjects in a cooperation-failure 
condition displayed greater bias than those in cooperation-
success condition. There was no bias in the cooperation-
success condition. Thus, there was a significant 
interaction effect between the cooperation-competition 
conditions and the failure-success conditions. 
In general, the research shows that people display more 
ingroup bias when their group wins against the other groups 
than when they lose. Although some studies (e.g. Rabbie and 
Horwitz, 1969) demonstrated that win-lose outcome might be a 
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necessary condition for ingroup bias, most studies on this 
issue treat group outcome as a factor that enhances or 
decreases the magnitude of ingroup bias rather than a 
necessary factor for ingroup bias to occur. As we can see 
in several studies, the outcome variable oftentimes 
interacts with other factors, and thus the effect of group 
outcome seems to differ depending upon other influences. 
Other Factors 
There has been a controversy over whether the salience 
or distinctiveness of a group is a necessary precondition 
for inducing ingroup bias. As an example of the studies 
dealing with this issue, Gerard and Hoyt (1974) hypothesized 
that the relative favorableness of ingroup evaluation would 
increase directly with the distinctiveness of ingroup 
membership. In their study, subjects wrote an essay and 
evaluated the essays written by two other ingroup and 
outgroup members. The distinctiveness of group membership 
was manipulated by size of the group; the smaller the 
ingroup, the more distinctive it would be. Thus, they 
compared groups with 2, 5, and 8 members, and found that 
ingroup bias was displayed only in 2 person groups. With 5 
or 8 ingroup members, subjects tended to favor outgroup 
members over ingroup ones. Also, such bias was not on 
subjects' evaluation of qualities of the essays but of the 
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writers. The authors argue that the ingroup was favored so 
long as it was in a minority position, but once it achieved 
the status of numerical equality or superiority, ingroup 
members felt the security that facilitates generosity toward 
outgroups. Despite Gerard and Hoyt's findings, however, 
there is a lack of evidence to support'salience as a 
determinant of ingroup bias. 
As another prerequisite for ingroup bias, Dion (1973) 
suggests cohesiveness within a group. In his experiment, 
Dion found that members of highly cohesive groups were more 
cooperative toward the ingroup than toward an outgroup, and 
evaluated co-members more positively than outgroup members. 
In contrast, low cohesive groups failed to exhibit a 
tendency toward ingroup favoritism. These results were 
interpreted in terms of a cognitive differentiation 
hypothesis, suggesting that cohesiveness leads group members 
to cognitively differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup, 
i.e., it induces a strong sense of unit formation among 
members of a group. Thus, Dion contended that 
differentiation is necessary and sufficient for eliciting 
ingroup bias. 
Dion (1979b) further analyzed the relationship between 
intergroup conflict and intragroup cohesiveness. He 
contends based on research findings such as those by Sherif 
et al. (1961), Blake and Mouton (1961), and Kahn and Ryen 
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(1972), that intergroup competition promotes intragroup 
cohesiveness, and he introduces a number of theories to 
explain such a relationship. Branthwaite et al. (1979) 
investigated group cohesiveness and found that greater 
cohesiveness led to less fairness and greater 
discrimination. However, there is no broad evidence to 
support the claim that group cohesiveness leads to ingroup 
bias. 
Wilder (1978) was interested in individuation of the 
outgroup as a factor to reduce the bias. He suggested that 
the reason for ingroup bias is that an individual does not 
know much about the person toward whom he/she has the bias, 
i.e., the less one knows about a person, the more likely one 
will behave unfavorably toward him/her. Therefore, the more 
deindividuated others are, the more likely one will behave 
in a negative manner. Outgroup members are oftentimes 
perceived in terms of stereotypes and are more 
deindividuated due to a lack of contact and knowledge. 
Thus, he hypothesized that subjects in the dissent condition 
(where one of outgroup members dissented) would view the 
outgroup members as a collection of individuals and would 
display the least amount of ingroup bias. Subjects were 
divided into two groups, allegedly on the basis of their 
painting preferences. Actually, group assignment was 
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random. The groups were separated into a jury group and a 
public group. The jury group would be provided descriptions 
of two civil suits and render a decision for each case. The 
public group assumed the role of the public and were asked 
to evaluate the jury's recommendation. Actually, each group 
was informed that it was the public group and the other was 
the jury group. In the unanimous condition, public groups 
were given the unanimous recommendation of each member of 
jury group. In the dissent condition, one of jury group 
members dissented from the other members. In the alone 
condition, feedback from the jury group came from only one 
member. 
The results showed that there were differences between 
the alone and dissent conditions, and between the unanimous 
and dissent conditions in subjects' reactions to jury group. 
Wilder interpreted this to indicate that it was not the 
specific behavior of dissenter but his/her relationship to 
the group that was the individuating factor. Few subjects 
in the dissent condition regarded the outgroup as a group, 
while most subjects in the unanimous and alone conditions 
regarded the outgroup as a single unit. When subjects were 
asked to divide money between ingroup and outgroup members, 
they awarded more money to ingroup members in the unanimous 
and alone conditions than in the dissent condition, and 
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there were no differences between the alone and unanimous 
conditions. Subjects divided money equally between ingroup 
and outgroup members in the dissent condition. Thus, an 
individuation of a dissenting outgroup member was sufficient 
to reduce ingroup bias directed at all outgroup members. 
In another experiment, Wilder tried to find out whether 
individuation or dissent, per se, facilitated reduction of 
the bias. Subjects were divided into two groups, performed 
a group task, and received negative evaluation on group 
performance from the outgroup. Later, they requested 
assistance from the outgroup on a different task. In the 
cooperative condition, the outgroup complied with the 
request, but it refused in the uncooperative condition. 
There were two other conditions; a partially cooperative 
group condition in which half of the outgroup members 
complied as a single unit to the request for help, and a 
partially cooperative individual condition in which half of 
the outgroup members complied as individuals to the request. 
He hypothesized that subjects would show the most ingroup 
favoritism when the outgroup refused to cooperate and the 
least when the outgroup cooperated. Furthermore, subjects 
in the partially coopérâtive-individual condition would 
discriminate less than either those in the partially 
cooperative-group condition or the uncooperative condition. 
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This is because if bias is due to the deindividuation of the 
outgroup, one would expect a reduction in bias only when 
dissenting members are perceived as individuals and not when 
they are perceived as a subgroup within the outgroup. 
He found that most subjects in the cooperative, 
uncooperative, and partially cooperative-group conditions 
perceived the outgroup as a unit, and those in partially 
cooperative-individual condition perceived the outgroup as 
an aggregate of individuals. There was no difference 
between the cooperative and partially coopérâtive-individual 
conditions in dividing a prize between ingroup and outgroup 
members. Subjects in the cooperative condition showed less 
ingroup bias than those in the partially cooperative-group 
and uncooperative conditions. Subjects in the partially 
cooperative-individual condition showed less ingroup bias 
than those in the uncooperative and partially cooperative-
group conditions. Overall, subjects in all conditions 
showed preference for the ingroup. Thus, individuation of 
the outgroup decreased ingroup bias. 
In his third experiment. Wilder claimed that the 
individuation effect cannot be attributed to the perception 
of the outgroup to be more tolerant of dissent and thus more 
attractive. He proposed this reason for the effect of 
individuation on reducing bias: individuation will blur the 
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simple ingroup/outgroup categorization and thus may lessen 
the tendency to behave differentially toward the groups. He 
indicated that his study neither shows individuation is 
necessary or sufficient to eliminate intergroup bias; 
rather, it suggests that individuation of the outgroup is a 
factor lessening the bias. 
Wilder and Thompson's study (1980) focused on the 
effects of both intragroup and intergroup contact on 
reducing intergroup bias. They hypothesized that repeated 
contact with an outgroup under favorable conditions would be 
more effective in decreasing intergroup bias than a single 
contact would, and that independent of outgroup contact, 
increasing ingroup contact would accentuate intergroup bias. 
They found support for their hypotheses. However, their 
hypothesis that the beneficial effects of contact with a 
subset of an outgroup would generalize to the larger 
category from which the experimental outgroup was drawn was 
not supported. They proposed several reasons why the 
increasing number of outgroup contacts reduces bias: it 
could be due to a desensitizing effect to the outgroup, to 
disconfirming expectations about the outgroup through 
favorable contact, to the increasing familiarity of 
outgroup, to discovering more similarities between ingroup 
and outgroup members, or to more confidence in predicting 
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future actions of outgroup members. According to the 
results, evaluations of ingroup were largely unaffected by 
changes in the amount of ingroup contact, but evaluation of 
the outgroup decreased with greater ingroup contact, thus 
accentuating differences between the groups. Overall, 
changes in ingroup and outgroup contact affected evaluations 
of outgroup more than those of the ingroup. Evaluations of 
the outgroup improved when outgroup contact was increased or 
when ingroup contact was limited. Moreover, greater ingroup 
contact increased the perception of the outgroup as a unit. 
Thus, contact with the ingroup appeared to affect the 
absolute evaluation of the outgroup as well as the relative 
evaluation of the outgroup compared to the ingroup. 
Amir (1969) reviewed research about the effects of 
intergroup contact on ethnic relations and concluded that 
intergroup contact under favorable conditions tends to 
reduce prejudice in ethnic relations, but contact under 
unfavorable conditions could increase intergroup bias. For 
instance, relative status of group members within the 
contact situation may be an important factor; contact 
between groups with equal status will reduce the bias, but 
contact will not otherwise have this effect. 
There are not many studies investigating intragroup and 
intergroup contact. Wilder (1986) has reviewed the effects 
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of intergroup contact. He concludes that favorable contact 
with a member of the outgroup will generalize to a more 
positive evaluation of the outgroup as a whole. The 
favorable contact provides an opportunity to learn about the 
outgroup. Successful contact is dependent on a perception 
of a positive relationship between the person in the ingroup 
and person in the outgroup. Positive ingroup/outgroup 
member interaction will have maximum impact when there is 
little opportunity for biases in attention and attribution, 
when the person in the outgroup behaves consistently 
positively and is supported by other outgroup members, and 
when an outgroup member behaves in a manner that 
individuates him/herself. Also, positive interaction with 
an outgroup member will have a favorable impact on the 
evaluation of outgroup as a whole when that person is highly 
typical of the outgroup, but negative interaction with an 
outgroup member will have an unfavorable impact on ingroup 
members' evaluation of the outgroup regardless of that 
outgroup member's typicalness. In conclusion, the success 
of contact is contingent on the favorability of the 
interaction with the outgroup members and the perceived 
relationship between the outgroup members (contact persons) 
and the outgroup itself. Regardless of how favorable the 
contact is, the important thing is the ingroup members' 
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perception of the interaction. Wilder points out that we 
cannot assume that the success of contact will occur easily 
because many other factors influence the outcome of 
intergroup contact. Thus, there remains potential for 
further studies on the unsolved issues. 
Worchel et al. (1975) investigated the effects of group 
longevity, outcome of competition, and publicity of 
evaluation. They found some significant interaction effects 
among these three factors in such a way that subjects 
expecting to continue their relationship with the other 
group and who were told that they had won, overevaluated 
their own group product less when ratings were made publicly 
than when privately. On the other hand, continuing groups 
in losing conditions gave higher evaluations for their own 
product in public than in the private condition. Subjects 
in continuing groups with ambiguous outcomes showed greater 
overevaluation in public than in private condition. In 
discontinuing groups, public evaluation resulted in higher 
evaluations of a group's own product than private evaluation 
for both winning and losing groups. The interaction effect 
between publicity and outcome was significant within 
continuing group conditions but not within discontinuing 
conditions. Thus, the authors concluded that overevaluation 
of one's own product might vary in rather complex ways. 
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Tajfel and Billig (1974) focused on a rather different 
factor: subject's uncertainty and insecurity in a situation. 
They tested the hypothesis that subjects' uncertainty and 
insecurity in a novel situation, at least in part, would be 
responsible for ingroup bias because these subjects should 
try to lessen their insecurity by identifying more strongly 
with the ingroup. However, contrary to their hypothesis, 
groups who were familiar with a situation (and hence less 
uncertain and insecure) showed more outgroup discrimination 
than unfamiliar groups, although both groups displayed 
significant ingroup favoritism. Also, subjects who were 
familiar with the situation showed more fairness and more 
consistency in their responses to a money distribution task. 
Tajfel and Billig argue that such result implies that 
greater familiarity with a novel situational context can 
induce an even stronger adherence to the social norms which 
prevail in a more usual situation. The results make sense 
because both responses of favoring the ingroup and of 
equality of reward are normative in the world of English 
schoolboys who were the subjects. 
Rabbie and Huygen (1974) examined the effects of 
disagreement and of social interaction within a group on 
attitudes toward the ingroup and the outgroup. Homogeneous 
groups consisted of subjects who had the same opinion on an 
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issue, and heterogeneous groups consisted of those who had 
opposite opinions. The authors wanted to examine to what 
extent internal disagreement would lead to a lessening of 
ingroup cohesiveness and an increase in outgroup hostility. 
They reasoned that internal disagreement may be redirected 
to the outside enemy and lead to attribution of negative 
characteristics to the outgroup. The results showed that 
heterogeneous groups had higher outgroup ratings than 
homogeneous groups although there were no differences in 
ingroup ratings. Thus, the hypothesis that differences of 
opinion in heterogeneous groups would lead to a more 
negative evaluation of the outgroup was not supported. In 
general, after the group's discussion, ingroup/outgroup 
differentiation was stronger in homogeneous than in 
heterogeneous groups, and this difference in differentiation 
was due to higher outgroup ratings of heterogeneous groups. 
Likewise, similarity in attitudes affected outgroup ratings 
more than ingroup ratings. As expected, homogeneous groups 
showed a greater tendency than heterogeneous groups to 
prefer ingroup's product over that of the outgroup. In 
general, heterogeneous groups were more positive about the 
outgroup and more negative about the ingroup product than 
were homogeneous ones. In addition, the authors found that 
increases in social interaction through group discussion led 
to greater liking for ingroup. Thus, they conclude that 
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intragroup attraction is a strong determinant of ingroup 
attraction. 
As this chapter's examination shows, there are many 
factors which have been suggested as affecting the amount of 
ingroup bias or as a necessary condition for bias. However, 
there are no conclusive findings and thus it is difficult to 
generalize the results of this research. Oftentimes some 
factor interacts with other variables. Thus, Turner (1980) 
recognizes that ingroup/outgroup behavior is extremely 
variable and sensitive in complex ways to a multitude of 
factors. He argues that the future research about this 
behavior should contribute to systematizing our 
understanding of the conditions under which intergroup bias 
varies in terms of some causal theory. Therefore, more 
research needs to be done to specify different factors. 
Other Findings 
Several studies investigated the effect of cross 
categorization based on multiple memberships on ingroup 
bias. Deschamps and Boise's study (1978) is a 
representative one. They hypothesized that when subjects 
are asked to describe people from outgroups, they would 
establish a greater differentiation between these people and 
themselves than when they are asked to describe groups which 
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are different from their own on one criterion but identical 
to their own on another criterion, i.e., crossing of 
categories would lead to a weakening of categorical 
differentiation. Thus, they used two different criteria in 
each experiment, sex and age, and sex and color (hue), and 
cross categorized subjects based on these. Their hypothesis 
was supported; in the second experiment, for example, when 
natural and strong categorization by sex was crossed with 
one by hue which was artificial and weak, the effect of the 
latter was to decrease discriminatory effects of the former. 
Likewise, they tried to limit the functioning of categorical 
differentiation in the case of crossed categories and to 
show that introducing common memberships reduce intergroup 
bias. 
Commins and Lockwood (1978) also were interested in 
cross categorization. They hypothesized that when compared 
with single religion groups, discrimination against outgroup 
and favoritism to ingroup would be reduced in criss-cross 
(mixed religion) group. They used students from two 
different religious schools and found evidence for the 
hypothesis. 
Brown and Turner (1979) criticized Deschamps and 
Doise's study (1978) pointing out that the latter did not 
employ categorizations with equivalent psychological 
significance (e.g., color versus sex) and that the use of 
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real life groups confounded social categorization, per se, 
with the prevailing norms and attitudes associated with that 
intergroup relation. Brown and Turner compared two 
hypotheses. According to an additive hypothesis, there must 
be intergroup discrimination in both simple and crossed 
categorization conditions. In the latter condition, the 
level of bias will vary according to the two quadrants being 
compared, being most marked between in-in and out-out group 
members. Bias may be attenuated in the complex rating 
situation where members of all four quadrants are evaluated, 
due to decreased salience of the categorizations. On the 
other hand, according to cognitive hypothesis, there should 
be intergroup discrimination in the simple but not crossed 
categorization conditions, irrespective of whether the 
latter involves simple or complex rating tasks. 
They used school children aged 12-13 years, and 
manipulated five categorization conditions, one simple and 
four crossed categorization. In the simple categorization 
condition, subjects rated ingroup and outgroup members. In 
crossed categorization conditions, half the ingroup members 
determined by one division were outgroup members by the 
second division. In these conditions, subjects' ratings of 
members of both ingroups were compared with those of members 
of one ingroup and one outgroup. Also, subjects' ratings of 
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members of both ingroups were compared with those of members 
of both outgroups. Subjects also rated all ingroup and 
outgroup members. The results displayed that ingroup 
members were rated more favorably than outgroup members, and 
that ingroup bias was found with crossed but not simple 
categorization. Also, ingroup bias was greatest when 
members of both ingroups were compared to those of both 
outgroups. Thus, the results supported an additive 
hypothesis. The authors suggested that the reason why there 
was no bias in the simple categorization condition was 
because subjects could see the members of groups and thus 
make judgments on the basis of features of individuals 
rather than by memberships. They conclude that criss­
crossing, per se, does not reduce the salience of intergroup 
divisions and discrimination is maintained. 
From a somewhat different perspective, Arcuri (1982) 
manipulated three types of classifications, simple, 
superimposed, and crossed, and investigated the effects of 
these conditions on attribution memory, i.e., on 
discriminative accuracy in memory. The findings from these 
kind of studies show in general that cross categorization 
may tend to reduce ingroup bias. 
The study by Howard and Rothbart (1980) of the effects 
of social categorization on memory for behaviors focuses on 
a different issue. They were interested in the fact that 
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when subjects have prior expectancies about a group, memory 
processes serve to confirm already existing beliefs. The 
experiments showed that social categorization generated the 
implicit expectancy that the ingroup would engage in more 
favorable and/or less unfavorable behaviors than would the 
outgroup, and that subjects showed significantly better 
memory for negative outgroup than for negative ingroup 
behaviors. In this research, Howard and Rothbart intended 
to clarify some of cognitive consequencies of social 
categorization by examining subjects' expectancies of and 
memory for ingroup/outgroup members' behaviors. 
Moreland's study (1985) focused on the effects of 
social categorization on intragroup rather than on 
intergroup relations, and showed interesting findings. He 
was interested in the effects of social categorization on 
the assimilation of new group members. Assimilation means 
attempts by a group to change a newcomer's thoughts and 
behavior in ways that will make that person more similar to 
full group members. Using five member groups, two subjects 
were told that they were newcomers, and the other three had 
no information and believed that everyone was new. The 
researchers found that there was strong ingroup/outgroup 
bias on the part of the newcomers between new and old group 
members, and biases were strongest during the first meeting 
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and weakened over time as the distinction between new and 
old members became less salient. They suggested that the 
newcomers were biased because they were confused, unfamiliar 
with the group, and uneasy about acceptance by oldtimers, 
and under such condition social categorization could be 
useful to them because it serves to guide behavior. The 
effects of social categorization on subjects began with 
their expectations about the group and its members; compared 
with control subjects, newcomers were less enthusiastic 
about group membership, more pessimistic about fellow 
members, and more likely to believe that seniority would 
determine intragroup relations. Although subjects had not 
yet met, they already had clear expectation about what the 
group would be like. Newcomers tended to interact more 
frequently and positively with one another than they did 
with oldtimers, and most of their biases involved ingroup 
acceptance rather than outgroup rejection. Although by the 
third week they were fully assimilated into the group, 
assimilation took a long time. 
Although we talk about ingroup bias in a general sense, 
there may be various dimensions of the bias. Ingroup bias 
may have different aspects. The bias associated with any 
particular basis for categorization may not be constant 
across all response dimensions, i.e., there may be selective 
bias. 
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Wilson et al. (1965) and Wilson and Kayatani (1968) 
looked into the problem of selective bias. They suggested 
that ingroup bias may be different depending upon different 
dimensions of the bias. In Wilson and Kayatani's (1968) 
study, for instance, they found that attitudinal biases 
favoring the ingroup were stronger in case of game-relevant 
motive traits such as cooperativeness, hostility, and 
fairness than for other traits which were not directly 
related to the game performance such as likability, 
capability, or anxiety. In other words, there was a 
significant interaction between types of traits and ingroup 
bias. The bias was very strong on motive traits, but only 
moderate on sociometric and ability traits, and did not 
exist at all on personality traits. Brewer and Silver 
(1978) also found the most bias on ratings of trust 
worthiness, friendliness, and cooperativeness but no 
significant bias on other traits. 
Dustin and Davis (1970) observed the effects of 
competition when the competition took place on an individual 
basis versus on a group basis. The results showed that 
following group competition, there was significant bias in 
product ratings in favor of the ingroup, but no bias from 
subjects who were competing on an individual basis. 
Overevaluation of the product of one's own group was greater 
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on all three dimensions, i.e., overall value, creativity, 
and originality, for competing groups than for competing 
individuals. Thus, the authors conclude that evaluative 
bias is at least partly due to group factors, i.e., the 
group context is crucial for the bias to occur. 
Ingroup bias may differ depending upon the status of 
groups. Turner and Brown (1978) argue that subordinate 
groups will seek positive distinctiveness from dominant 
groups to the degree that their inferiority is not perceived 
as inherent, immutable, or fully legitimate. High status 
groups can also have an insecure social identity and they 
must maintain and justify own status. Turner and Brown 
indicate two conditions under which high status groups will 
perceive a need to assert their own positive distinctiveness 
to maintain positive social identity; when they may be 
threatened by a low status group, or when they may perceive 
a conflict between their own system of values on the one 
hand, and the bases of their dominance over outgroups on the 
other hand. 
The researchers manipulated three independent 
variables; status (high/low), legitimacy of status 
relations, and stability of status relations. The status 
variable was manipulated by a difference in group 
performance. The results demonstrated that high status 
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groups displayed more ingroup bias than low status groups, 
although groups of both status displayed bias toward high 
status groups. They also found that groups with 
illegitimate status relations showed more ingroup bias than 
those with legitimate relations, for both high and low 
status groups. Also, there was partial evidence for the 
hypothesis that groups with an unstable status would show 
more ingroup bias than those with stable relations, but this 
was only found for legitimately superior and illegitimately 
inferior groups. Insecure social identity resulted in 
attempts to achieve a positive self-concept through group 
creativity. The authors conclude that insecure social 
identity is sufficient condition for enhancing the search 
for group distinctiveness. 
In a similar context, Moscovici and Paicheler (1978) 
found an exception to ingroup bias, i.e., they found that 
the minority would show a tendency to favor the dominant 
outgroup. They found that a group which has an insecure 
image of itself (minority group) did not find it easy to 
adopt clear discriminatory strategies when confronted with a 
superior (majority) group, and thus this group showed a 
slight tendency towards bias in favor of the outgroup. 
Also, when superiority was confirmed (majority with positive 
self-image), the feeling of security was sufficiently strong 
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to enable them to display equitable behavior. On the other 
hand, the fragility of a group's status leads to increased 
group distinctiveness, and this effect of fragility was 
shown both in minority groups with positive self-image and 
majority groups with negative self-image. In case of the 
latter, the group defended its status and in the former 
case, the group claimed it status through distinctiveness. 
They claim that if social recognition is acquired, there is 
no reason for displaying distinctiveness and thus the 
majority with positive self-image shows equitable behavior. 
Branthwaite et al. (1979) also proved that the status 
of a group has an influence on the strength of 
discrimination. They used both arbitrary experimental 
groups and natural groups. They found that groups with 
inferior status showed greater discrimination and less 
fairness. They interpreted this to mean that an underdog 
attempts to assert a positive identity by discriminating 
against the topdog in order to compensate for the self-
perceived lack of status. 
Ng (1982) discusses some of the possible effects of 
intergroup power relations on discrimination. He argues 
that a bilateral, equal power relationship is inherent in 
the traditional social categorization experiments. The 
traditional procedure results in a bilateral and equal power 
relationship since the members of both groups are given the 
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same power to distribute the property. Ng argues, however, 
that it is true that the social context in which groups 
discriminate against one another partly consists of the 
power relation between the ingroups and thus the power 
element is inherent in the social categorization paradigm. 
He intended to make the implicit power element more explicit 
by investigating two kinds of power relations; unilateral 
direct power relation in which only members of one group are 
in the position to distribute the property, and unilateral 
indirect power relation in which the distributions proposed 
by the members of one group is judged by a committee which 
consists of members of both groups. He found that 
discrimination in the distribution of a property for power 
was greater when the unilateral power relation is secure 
than insecure, i.e., when the decisions made by the members 
of the empowered group were binding on the other, 
subordinate group rather than when the decisions were not 
binding. He concludes that outgroup discrimination is not a 
necessary outcome of social categorization, but is 
contingent upon an equal intergroup power relation, and in 
the presence of such a power relation, the magnitude of 
discrimination increases when the power advantage becomes 
decisive. 
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Most studies using a matrix such as the one developed 
by Tajfel et al. (1971) or Brewer and Silver (1978) to 
measure ingroup bias make subjects allocate points or money 
to both ingroup and outgroup members and test for 
differences in the amount of rewards allocated. However, 
Hewstone et al. (1981) tried to replicate the result using 
monetary penalties rather than rewards, and found somewhat 
different results: there was less evidence of ingroup 
favoritism when using penalties and, instead, fairness was 
an important strategy. Thus, they concluded that people 
apparently have different ideas about the distribution of 
rewards and penalties, and feel that fairness is better in 
case of penalties. 
The phenomenon of ingroup bias may differ according to 
different cultures. Vaughan (1978) and Wetherell (1982) 
report cross-cultural studies. Wetherell (1982), for 
instance, compared European children and Polynesian children 
living in New Zealand. Groups were established by picture 
preferencess and allocation of money and matrices were used 
as measure for bias. She found that both Polynesian and 
European children showed ingroup favoritism but Polynesians 
were less discriminatory. In the second experiment, she 
compared European, Samoan, and Maori children, and found 
that Samoans were the least discriminatory but Maorians used 
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ingroup favoritism strategy as much as Europeans. Thus, she 
concluded that there are cultural differences and that 
Polynesians show greater generosity to the outgroup which is 
probably due to their non-Western value system. 
Some studies look at sex differences in ingroup bias. 
Gerard and Hoyt (1974) found no statistically significant 
difference between male and female students although female 
subjects showed less ingroup bias than males. Turner et al. 
(1979) also report the same results. Dion (1979a), however, 
found significant ingroup bias among male subjects but no 
bias among females, and interpreted this as a result of 
males' greater task orientation. However, the findings 
about the effects of gender are not consistent, and it seems 
reasonable to conclude that sex does not make any 
difference. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Theories of Ingroup Bias 
There have been quite a number of theories or 
hypotheses to explain the ingroup bias phenomenon, to 
explicate why such bias occurs. Unfortunately, however, 
social psychology lacks a major dominant theory so far in 
this area. Some explanations do not reach a theoretical 
level. For instance, Hinkle and Schopler (1979) presented 
eight major hypotheses for group performance evaluation bias 
and indicated that there is a lack of major theory about 
group evaluation bias. 
Thus, the main purpose of this dissertation is to 
propose a new theory which can explain ingroup bias better. 
This new theory derives from the study of group polarization 
or choice shifts. There are two dominant theories on choice 
shifts: interpersonal comparison theory and persuasive 
arguments theory. Interpersonal comparison theory is based 
on social comparison theory of Festinger, and thus it shares 
assumptions with social identity theory which is the 
dominant theory in ingroup bias study. In this chapter, it 
is contended that since persuasive arguments theory has been 
the strongest rival theory against interpersonal comparison 
theory, a new perspective derived from persuasive arguments 
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theory can be an alternative explanation to social identity-
theory for the explanation of ingroup bias phenomenon. 
First of all, in the following section, several existing 
explanations for ingroup bias will be discussed along with 
some of their problems or weaknesses. 
Balance theory 
Some research on ingroup bias has applied Heider's 
balance theory for explaining the phenomenon. According to 
the theory, group members who work together form a positive 
unit relationship. According to Heider, if group members 
perceive themselves as being connected to a group (positive 
unit relation), they should come to like their own group. 
Likewise, if group members perceive that they are excluded 
from membership in another group (negative unit relation), 
they should come-to dislike the other group. Thus, ingroup 
bias should be a rather immediate- consequence of membership 
in one group and exclusion from membership in another group. 
Any factor that increases either the strength of the 
positive unit relation towards own group or the attraction 
towards own group, and any factor which serves to increase 
either the strength of the negative unit relation towards 
the other group or the disliking of the other group, should 
increase ingroup bias. Likewise, any factor decreasing the 
strength of the unit and attraction relations existing after 
55 
classification should result in decreased ingroup bias (Kahn 
and Ryen, 1972:34). Thus, according to Heider, all that is 
necessary to produce ingroup bias is the perception by group 
members that they are members of one group and not members 
of another group. 
Ferguson and Kelley (1964) explain four possible 
hypotheses for overevaluation of the product of own group; 
participation hypothesis, propaganda hypothesis, self-
enhancement hypothesis, and balance theory. They found 
evidence supporting balance theory. According to the 
theory, the high evaluation of one's own group's product 
reflects the high evaluation of the group itself. The two 
relationships that 'I like the group' and 'the group is 
responsible for this product' require the third relationship 
'I like the product' if balance is to prevail (Ferguson and 
Kelley, 1964:224). They compared ratings of products by 
both participants and nonparticipants. They argue that the 
finding that the nonparticipant members also showed as much 
bias in favor of their own group's products as do the 
participants suggests that the crucial factor is sheer 
loyalty or cathexis for the group and not cognitive context 
acquired through taking part in the production process. 
They found evidence that the evaluations represent the 
subjects' true evaluations of the products rather than 
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distorted reports. If the evaluations are reflecting 
genuine preferences, then that fact can eliminate 
differential cognitive context as the factor mediating the 
preference. Because the nonparticipants have no richer 
cognitive contexts for evaluating their group's product than 
do members of the other group, their preference must stem 
from their relationship to the group. Thus, they conclude 
that emotional identification or attraction to the group is 
the factor basic to preference for own group product. 
Kahn and Ryen's (1972) study also uses balance theory. 
They found that a significant ingroup bias was revealed as a 
result of classification only. Ingroup bias was an 
immediate consequence of group membership, thus supporting 
balance theory. They argue that since subjects had no 
knowledge of even who the other members of their group were, 
it appears that perception of being classified in a group is 
sufficient to produce ingroup bias, and this gives strong 
support to balance theory. 
As such, there are some early studies arguing for 
balance theory as an appropriate explanation for ingroup 
bias. However, none of these studies seems to be able to 
prove the theory. The mere finding that classification into 
groups was sufficient to produce ingroup bias does not lead 
to the conclusion that the need for a balanced relationship 
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which people are involved in is the cause of ingroup bias. 
Turner (1975) indicates that balance theory is ruled out 
through Rabbie and Horwitz's (1969) study. Their experiment 
comprised four conditions— in each of which subjects were 
classified into two groups. In the control condition (group 
classification per se) the groups were neither rewarded nor 
deprived. In the three experimental conditions (common 
fate) the groups were either rewarded or deprived by chance 
alone, by the arbitrary choice of the experimenter or by the 
choice of one of the groups. According to the results, the 
control condition showed no discriminatory evaluations, but 
the combined ratings of the experimental conditions showed a 
significant ingroup bias, mainly due to the choice 
condition, i.e., where winning or losing was most fair. 
Turner argues that balance theory is ruled out since 
contrasting experience with outgroup members in the 
experimental conditions did not generate more negative 
ratings of the outgroups in these conditions than in the 
control condition. Ingroup bias was a matter solely of more 
positive ingroup evaluation; there was no outgroup 
depreciation at all. 
Similarity-attract ion hypothesis 
In the 1960s, Rokeach proposed belief similarity 
hypothesis as an explanation for prejudice among groups. 
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According to the hypothesis, prejudice or discrimination is 
largely due to perceived belief dissimilarity among groups 
rather than to differences in group membership. The belief 
similarity hypothesis contends that persons assume that 
ingroup members possess similar beliefs to their own and 
outgroup members have dissimilar beliefs. Such differences 
in presumed belief similarity between ingroup and outgroup 
members, rather than the social norm of ingroup favoritism, 
may have mediated the discriminatory behavior. Thus, the 
hypothesis predicts that subjects will attribute greater 
belief similarity to ingroup members than to outgroup 
members, and that the beliefs of ingroup and outgroup 
members will be a more potent determinant of intergroup bias 
than mere categorization (Allen and Wilder, 1975). 
Some related research on this issue has been done in 
the 1960s (e.g., Byrne and Nelson, 1964, 1965; Byrne, 
London, and Griffitt, 1968; Clore and Baldridge, 1968). For 
example, Byrne and Nelson (1964, 1965) found that the 
proportion of similar attitudes of strangers had a highly 
significant positive effect on attraction toward them. 
Byrne, Clore, and Smeaton (1986) argue that attitude 
similarity is a potent factor affecting attraction. 
Allen and Wilder (1975) tested whether belief 
similarity is a more important determinant of discriminatory 
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behavior than group categorization. According to the 
result, mere categorization based on art preference was 
sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination, and ingroup 
favoritism was further enhanced when the ingroup held 
similar beliefs to those of subjects, but similarity or 
dissimilarity of outgroup members did not differentially 
affect discriminatory behavior as measured by distributing 
rewards between ingroup and outgroup. More discrimination 
occurred when the ingroup would benefit than when outgroup 
would, regardless of the belief similarity manipulation. In 
conclusion, ingroup belief similarity significantly affected 
ingroup favoritism and accentuated the use of maximum 
difference strategy when distributing rewards. Allen and 
Wilder point out that although the ineffectiveness of their 
outgroup belief similarity manipulation suggests that the 
belief similarity hypothesis is not a sufficient 
explanation, such conclusion is premature because the result 
can differ depending on different experimental procedures. 
However, their research shows that once categorized into 
groups, subjects display significant ingroup favoritism 
regardless of belief similarity of ingroup and outgroup 
members, and that belief similarity of outgroup has little 
effect while that of the ingroup increases ingroup bias. 
60 
Allen and Wilder (1979) extended the hypothesis further 
by asking whether it can be applied to situations involving 
temporary groups formed on an arbitrary basis, and whether 
subjects who assume differential belief similarity for 
ingroup and outgroup members confine their assumptions to 
beliefs which are relevant to the basis of categorization. 
They found that subjects tend to attribute more similarity 
of beliefs among ingroup and outgroup members on general 
items than on task-relevant items. Subjects who made 
attributions about the beliefs of ingroup members assumed 
these members had beliefs more similar to their own than did 
subjects who made attributions about the beliefs of an 
outgroup member. That is, subjects attributed more 
dissimilar beliefs to outgroup members than ingroup members, 
and such attribution appeared to be somewhat stronger for 
task-relevant than more general belief items. Subjects 
assumed a greater variance in beliefs exists between ingroup 
and outgroup on issues relevant to the basis of group 
formation than on general issues. The researchers argue 
that the belief similarity hypothesis is applicable to 
groups created on the basis of a rather arbitrary criterion 
and whose members have no contact with one another. They 
argue that the implication of the study is that the ingroup 
bias phenomenon may be reinterpreted from a belief 
similarity perspective. 
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Wilder's (1984) two experiments investigated 
assumptions of ingroup similarity and outgroup 
dissimilarity. It was hypothesized that subjects would 
predict greater homogeneity among outgroup members than 
among ingroup members, greater similarity between themselves 
and ingroup members than outgroup members, and greater 
similairty among ingroup members in the presence of an 
outgroup. Also, such homogeneity and similarity effects 
were predicted to be strongest on items relevant to the 
categorization criterion and to be accentuated over time. 
The results displayed that subjects biased their predictions 
about the beliefs of other ingroup or outgroup members. 
Subjects tended to reduce differences between their opinions 
and ingroup members' opinions, and to increase differences 
between their opinions and outgroup members' opinions. 
Also, subjects expected ingroup members to be more similar 
to themselves when an outgroup was present than when no 
explicit outgroup existed, and this bias was strongest for 
items relevant to the categorization criterion. Thus, the 
categorization of persons into a group was sufficient to 
foster assumptions of belief similarity on items relevant to 
the categorization. 
Herringer and Garza's (1987) recent research intended 
to test directly the perceptual effects of categorization in 
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a minimal group context. They found that perceptual 
accentuation occurred, biasing a subject's later perceptions 
of the paintings used to categorize the subjects. 
Perceptual accentuation, which means increase in differences 
of painting preference between own versus the other choice 
due to increased distinctiveness of paintings was greater 
when the two groups were categorized based on art preference 
than for either not categorized groups or randomly 
categorized groups. It is generally supported that ingroups 
are assumed to be more similar to oneself than outgroups. 
The belief similarity hypothesis has been extended and 
used to study whether not only similar beliefs or attitudes 
but also similarity in general attributes may lead to 
ingroup bias. Hewstone et al. (1981) found a significant 
similarity effect, but not a categorization effect, using 
monetary penalties. Social categorization was based on 
arbitrary classification into groups, and similarity was 
based on trivial similarity of aesthetic preferences. By 
manipulating these two independent variables, ingroup 
favoritism was found only in the noncategorization-
similarity condition. Thus, the critical role of social 
categorization reported in Billig and Tajfel's (1973) study 
were not replicated. 
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Dion's (1973) study also supports the hypothesis. 
Although he intended to manipulate the degree of 
cohesiveness within a group, he actually manipulated 
similarity. That is, in the high cohesiveness condition, 
the ingroup was highly similar in personality traits, 
general backgrounds and interests, while ingroup members in 
low cohesiveness condition were quite different in those 
characteristics. He found that only highly cohesive groups 
elicited differential biases toward ingroup and outgroup 
members. Thus, his study is another example of support for 
the similarity hypothesis. Hensley and Duval (1976) 
manipulated similarities of both ingroup and outgroup, and 
found that as dissimilarity between opinions of the outgroup 
and the subject increased, liking for ingroup members 
increased and liking for outgroup members decreased. 
One problem in this kind of study, as Locksley et al. 
(1980) indicated, is that the effects of social 
categorization, per se, on subjects' discriminatory behavior 
are hard to distinguish from those of inferred similarity of 
attributes. One attempt to distinguish between social 
categorization and similarity effects has been done by 
Billig and Tajfel (1973). They recognized that in past 
research, social categorization and similarity were 
confounded since the basis for categorization was presumably 
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some real similarity among ingroup members, i.e., similarity 
in art preference. Thus, they tried to assess the effects 
of social categorization, per se, using a random 
categorization basis. They indicate that one crucial 
difference between most of the similarity-attraction studies 
and the minimal group experiments is that in the latter the 
similarities and differences involved are trivial while in 
the former they have been more important. 
Billig and Tajfel compared four conditions: 
categorization-similarity, categorization-nonsimilarity, 
noncategorization-similarity, and noncategorization-
nonsimilarity conditions. Subjects in categorization-
similarity condition were told whether they were in the 
group which preferred Klee or the group which preferred 
Kandinsky. Subjects in categorization-nonsimilarity 
condition were told that they would be divided into group X 
and group W and that it was just a matter of chance whether 
they were in either group. Those in noncategorization-
similarity condition only knew the code numbers of other 
subjects to whom they award money. They were told that some 
of the code numbers were in the forties and some in the 
seventies, and that the experimenter gave code numbers in 
the forties to those who preferred the Kandinsky paintings 
and code numbers in the seventies to those who preferred the 
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Klee pictures. Subjects in noncategorization-nonsimilarity 
condition only knew the individual's code number, and were 
told that some of the code numbers are in the forties and 
some in the seventies and that the experimenter alloted 
these numbers randomly by the toss of a coin. According to 
the findings, only categorization-similarity and 
categorization-nonsimilarity conditions showed significant 
ingroup favoritism, and the former showed more bias than the 
latter. Neither of the noncategorization conditions showed 
ingroup favoritism, but the noncategorization-similarity 
condition showed nonsignificant trend towards ingroup 
favoritism. Thus, Billig and Tajfel conclude that the 
categorization variable and the similarity variable both 
produce significant main effects but that categorization is 
more important than similarity. Similarity was not found to 
be a necessary condition for ingroup favoritism. Although 
similarity affected the bias positively, it was not a 
crucial variable. 
Hence, there exists contradictory evidence regarding 
the similarity-attraction hypothesis. Sometimes similarity 
is found to be necessary and in other cases it is not. 
Studies based on the minimal group paradigm insist that it 
is not necessary to have similarity in order to induce 
ingroup bias. Brown and Turner criticize the similarity-
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attraction hypothesis in that it explains intergroup 
relations at an interpersonal level. This approach treats 
individual's beliefs as personal attributes, not as shared 
effects of their common group memberships. Despite 
interpersonal similarity, individuals may come to dislike 
each other when group memberships are salient. Salient 
intergroup divisions lead to perceptual accentuation of 
intergroup differences in attitudes and beliefs, 
independently of interpersonal similarities and differences. 
Thus, one cannot extrapolate from interpersonal similarities 
and attraction between individuals to their social relations 
when group memberships are salient, since the latter tends 
to produce perceived differences in beliefs between them 
(Brown and Turner, 1980). 
Realistic group conflict theory 
Compared to balance theory or the similarity-attraction 
hypothesis, realistic group conflict theory represents a 
more cohesive theoretical orientation. Actually this theory 
was proposed a long time ago by Sumner when he explained the 
origin of ethnocentrism. According to Sumner, the 
differentiation of people into ethnic groups originates in 
the context of conditions of the struggle for existence. In 
this perspective, attitudinal biases in favor of one's own 
group over other groups are the product of intergroup 
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competition over a real conflict of interests. This kind of 
explanation takes a functional approach. The functional 
approach of intergroup relations is represented in Sherif 
and his associates' field experiment. They can be regarded 
as the founders of this theory. 
In their experiments in the 1940s and 1950s using a 
boys' summer camp, three sequential stages were set up to 
manipulate intergroup competition. In the first stage of 
ingroup formation, group goals as an integrating factor were 
introduced to create two groups. The second stage was the 
intergroup competition phase in which intergroup tension and 
competition were introduced by making groups compete for the 
same goals. In the third stage, superordinate goals were 
introduced in order to reduce intergroup conflict and lead 
to intergroup integration. Superordinate goals are goals 
that encompass all parties caught in a dispute or conflict, 
which cannot be fulfilled by the resources and energies of 
the parties separately, but require the concerted efforts of 
all parties involved (Sherif, 1979:258). Such goals must 
override some of the incompatible goals of both groups. 
Twenty four boys from similar family backgrounds were the 
subjects. 
Sherif et al. (1961) contend that intergroup attitudes 
and behavior as manifest in the forms of social distances 
68 
and stereotypes are produced as a consequence of functional 
relations between groups, and that intergroup hostility and 
its reduction cannot be explained merely by the nature of 
relationships within the groups but by the nature of 
functional relations between groups. They hypothesized that 
when individuals having no established relationships are 
brought together to interact and work for common goals, they 
develop a group structure with hierarchical statuses and 
roles. If two groups thus formed are brought together in a 
functional relationship under conditions of competition and 
mutual frustration, attitudes and appropriate hostile 
actions in relation to the outgroup and its members would 
arise and be standardized and shared by group members 
(Sherif et al., 1961). Also, they hypothesized that the 
course of relations between two groups which are in a state 
of competition and frustration would tend to produce an 
increase in ingroup solidarity, and that functional 
relations between groups would bring about changes in the 
pattern of relations within the ingroups. Contact between 
groups would not in itself produce a decrease in an existing 
state of intergroup hostility, even if the conditions of 
contact may be pleasant. When groups are brought into 
contact under conditions embodying superordinate goals whose 
attainment is desired by each group, they will tend to 
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cooperate toward the common goal, and such cooperation will 
have a cumulative effect in the direction of reducing 
existing conflict and unfavorable attitudes between groups 
(Sherif, 1979). 
Sherif and his associates found that when groups 
engaged in reciprocally competitive activities, such that 
the gain of desired goals by one group results in loss for 
the other, unfavorable stereotypes of the outgroup and its 
members came into use. These unfavorable attitudes were 
standardized in a group and the outgroup was placed at a 
prejudicial distance. With the rise of prejudicial 
attitudes toward the other group, self-glorifying attitudes 
toward one's own group are strengthed and the performance of 
the outgroup is deprecated. Also, this kind of competitive 
intergroup relations had an impact on relations within 
groups in a way that it led to the increase in ingroup 
solidarity and cooperativeness (Sherif and Sherif, 1979). 
Conflict between groups and the products of such conflict 
were reduced through the introduction of superordinate 
goals. Various superordinate goals over a period of time 
were necessary to sustain cooperation between groups. When 
contact and communication involved cooperative efforts 
towards superordinate goals, they were utilized in the 
direction of reducing conflict in order to attain the goals. 
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As we can see through Sherif and Sherif's arguments, 
realistic group conflict theory constitutes a functional 
theory of intergroup behavior. It implies that functional 
interdependence between individuals or groups for the 
achievement of their goals leads directly to cooperative or 
competitive social interaction, and that cooperative or 
competitive interaction directly produces favorable or 
antagonistic attitudes between members. Thus, the social 
relations between groups or individuals are determined by 
their functional or goal relations, and intergroup conflict 
and bias result from objective conflicts of interests. 
Turner (1981) criticizes Sherif's study in that he 
confounded functional interdependence with cooperative and 
competitive social interaction. Turner argues that social 
interaction seems to matter more for intergroup attitudes 
than does functional interdependence, and that emphasis on 
the importance of the latter, per se, is not appropriate. 
Rabbie and Horwitz's (1969) experiment showed that ingroup 
bias was found which could not be explained in terms of 
conflict of interest, i.e., there was significant ingroup 
bias when subjects were deprived only due to mere chance, 
and there was no difference in outgroup ratings between 
subjects who were deprived by chance and who lost by the act 
of the outgroup. Realistic group conflict theory was 
popular until social identity theory was introduced. 
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Social identity theory 
The most recognized and powerful theory about ingroup 
bias so far is social identity theory by Tajfel and his 
colleagues. Social identity theory has been developed as 
the most coherent theoretical orientation among all theories 
dealing with this issue. During the 1960s and early 1970s 
several studies were done to challenge the functional 
theory. These studies tended to show that intergroup 
competition for incompatible group goals is not necessary, 
but categorization and ingroup/outgroup membership, per se, 
is necessary and sufficient for ingroup bias. 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) mention that social identity 
theory is intended not to replace the realistic group 
conflict theory but to supplement it in some respects. They 
indicate that the realistic group conflict theory has merit; 
unlike previous works on intergroup relations which have 
focused on individual prejudice and discrimination and on 
the intraindividual or interpersonal psychological processes 
leading to prejudiced attitudes or discriminatory behavior, 
the theory stressed intergroup functional relations. 
According to that theory, opposed group interests in 
obtaining scarce resources promote competition and develop 
into overt social conflict through competition. Sherif also 
argues that such intergroup competition leads to increased 
intragroup cohesiveness and cooperation. Thus, the real 
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conflicts of group interests not only create antagonistic 
intergroup relations but also heighten identification with, 
and positive attachment to, the ingroup. 
Tajfel and Turner, however, indicate that this 
identification with the ingroup has been given relatively 
little prominence as a theoretical problem in its own right 
in realistic group conflict theory. The development of 
ingroup identifications is seen as an epiphenomenon of 
intergroup conflict in that theory. The theory does not 
focus either on the processes underlying the development and 
maintenance of group identity nor upon the possibly 
autonomous effects upon ingroup and intergroup behavior of 
these subjective aspects of group membership (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979:34). Turner (1981) says that there is no doubt 
that people's objective interests play a major role in 
social conflict. However, their effects are mediated by 
their impact on social identifications. We cannot assume 
one to one correspondence between objective interests and 
group membership. Therefore, whilst the realistic group 
conflict theory focuses on the objective aspects of group 
relations, Tajfel and his associates propose social identity 
theory to emphasize the subjective aspects of it, i.e., the 
phenomenon of identification with the ingroup. 
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Before explaining the theory, it may be helpful to 
distinghish between two extremes of social behavior, 
interpersonal and intergroup behavior. Tajfel and Turner 
explain that behavior can be seen as falling on the 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum. At one extreme of the 
continuum, there is interaction on the basis of 
interpersonal relationships and individual chatacteristics, 
not at all affected by various groups or categories to which 
actors belong (i.e., purely interpersonal behavior). The 
other extreme consists of interactions between two or more 
individuals which are fully determined by their respective 
memberships in various social groups or categories, and are 
not at all affected by the interindividual, personal 
relationships between the people involved (i.e., purely 
intergroup behavior) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979:34). 
They indicate that pure forms of these extremes cannot 
be found in real social situations. Nevertheless, behavior 
towards members of the ingroup and the outgroup will be 
affected by whether an individual sees the situation as 
being nearer to one or the other extreme. The main question 
researchers have to answer is what are the conditions that 
determine whether an actor adopts a form of social behavior 
nearing one extreme or the other. For example, as an 
intergroup conflict becomes more intense, individuals who 
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are members of opposing groups may be more likely to behave 
as a function of their respective group memberships, rather 
than in terms of their individual characteristics or 
interpersonal relationships. The nearer a social situation 
is to the intergroup extreme of the continuum, the more 
uniformity the individual members of the groups will show in 
their behavior towards members of outgroup, and the stronger 
tendency there will be for members of the ingroup to treat 
members of the outgroup as undifferentiated items in a 
unified social category. This will be reflected in a clear 
awareness of the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, in the 
attribution to members of the outgroup certain traits 
assumed to be common to the group as a whole, and in value 
judgments pertaining to these traits (Tajfel, 1978b:44-45). 
According to Tajfel and Turner, the study of ingroup 
bias is the study of intergroup behavior rather than that of 
interpersonal behavior. Thus, the theory to explain the 
phenomenon should be a theory at the intergroup level, not 
based on an interpersonal dimension. They state that the 
existence of a group need not depend on the frequency of 
intermember interaction, systems of role relationships, or 
interdependent goals. From the social psychological 
perspective, the essential criteria for group membership are 
that the individuals involved define themselves and are 
defined by others as members of a group. 
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Thus, they conceptualize a group as a collection of 
individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the 
same social category, share some emotional involvement in 
this common definition of themselves, and achieve some 
degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their 
group and of their membership. Thus, they define intergroup 
behavior following Sherif's definition; intergroup behavior 
is any behavior displayed by one or more actors toward one 
or more others that is based on the actors' identification 
of themselves and the others as belonging to different 
social categories (Tajfel and Turner, 1979:40). Sherif 
mentioned that whenever individuals belonging to one group 
interact, collectively or individually, with another group 
or its members in terms of their group identification, we 
have an instance of intergroup behavior. 
Tajfel suggests that there are two interdependent 
conditions that are basic in determining behavior in terms 
of group rather than in terms of self; the dichotomization 
of the social world into clearly distinct categories, and 
the impossibility or serious difficulty in passing from one 
group to another. He indicates that there are many other 
conditions which are also important in increasing or 
decreasing the salience of group membership. However, 
acting in terms of group rather than self cannot be expected 
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to play a predominant part in an individual's behavior 
unless there is a clear cognitive structure of us and them 
and unless this structure is not perceived as capable of 
being easily shifted in a variety of social and 
psychological conditions (Tajfel, 1978c:97-98). 
Although social identity theory is claimed to be a 
theory of intergroup behavior, there is some criticism 
against Tajfel's definition of a group and his theory. 
Bornewasser and Sober (1987) criticize social identity 
theory in that it takes into account only the properties of 
individuals. They argue that in that theory the group is no 
longer conceptualized as an organized whole that exists 
independently of individual factors. Rather, the group is 
seen as a product of individual cognitive processes. They 
indicate that according to Tajfel and Turner's definition of 
the social group as a collection of individuals who share a 
common social identification of themselves, and who perceive 
themselves to be members of the same social category, group 
formation is based on the perceived similarity of aggregated 
individuals concerning a relevant, individually determinable 
property or verbal category, and, hence intergroup behavior 
is mainly determined by reference to properties of 
individual members. Against this, Bornewasser and Bober 
argue that only the consideration of group structure and the 
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differentiation of partially individual and partially 
structural attributes of the group members can result in a 
conceptually adequate theory of group formation and 
intergroup behavior. They distinguish among three concepts 
of class, collective, and a group. A categorization based 
alone on individually determinable properties only results 
in the formation of a class or a collective, but not in the 
intended formation of a group, and the individual is merely 
defined as an element of a class, not as a part of an 
organized whole. They criticize that the terms "social 
categorization" and "identification" used in social identity 
theory are not able to provide an adequate explanation of 
group formation and intergroup behavior. Both are not 
sufficient to conceptualize the group as a concrete holistic 
entity. 
When Tajfel and his associates proposed social identity 
theory in the early 1970s, they argued that the reason why 
social categorization has powerful effects on intergroup 
relations is because it evokes a cultural norm, i.e., 
because individuals expect people from outgroups to compete 
with the ingroup members. Thus, in their early study, 
Tajfel et al. (1971) performed their experiments based on 
social norm theory. 
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Through their experiments, they found that the subjects 
favored the ingroup in the distribution of real rewards and 
penalties in a situation in which nothing but the variable 
of irrelevant classification distinguished between the 
ingroup and the outgroup. Subjects attempted to achieve a 
maximum difference in dividing real pecuniary rewards 
between the ingroup and outgroup, even at the price of 
sacrificing other objective advantages. Tajfel and his 
colleagues interpreted such results in terms of a generic 
social norm of ingroup/outgroup behavior which guided 
subjects' choices, i.e., in terms of the functioning of a 
generic social norm which was perceived by the subjects as 
relevant to the solution of a problem of social conduct. 
Such a social norm is perceived by subjects as pertinent and 
is expected to operate when the social world of an 
individual is clearly dichotomized into an ingroup and 
outgroup. They argued that certain societies create generic 
outgroup attitudes. In our everyday life, norms, values, 
and expectations coming from socialization and education 
foster or reinforce a tendency to behave differentially 
towards ingroups and outgroups even when such behavior has 
no utilitarian value to an individual or to his/her group, 
and even when a particular categorization has little meaning 
in terms of emotional investment (Tajfel et al., 1971:151). 
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In the same context, when Tajfel and Billig (1974) 
explained their finding that subjects who were familiar with 
a situation showed more bias than unfamiliar ones, they 
interpreted this by social norm theory; greater familiarity 
with a novel situation can induce stronger adherence to 
social norms prevailing in more usual situations. Subjects 
showed more ingroup bias in a familiar condition because 
responses favoring the ingroup are normative and widely 
accepted in the social world of the English schoolboys who 
were the subjects. Increasing familiarity with a new 
situation induces increasing ease and certainty of normative 
behavior. Consequently, people in that situation show the 
bias which is normative in their society quite easily. 
Billig (1973) tried to find evidence for the argument 
that ingroup bias is a normative phenomenon, that biased 
behavior is the outcome of certain processes of social 
influence. He distinguished two sources of normative 
influence; influence from those who create the categories, 
e.g., the experimenter, and influence from those who use the 
categories, e.g., the subjects. He indicates that in 
previous experiments there was no communication between 
subjects and thus the only possible social influence was by 
experimenter. However, if subjects receive communications 
from other subjects, they may gain social support for the 
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use of categorization and thus second generation subjects 
may build up stronger ingroup bias than first generation 
subjects. Therefore, he compared ingroup bias between first 
and second generation subjects. Contrary to the prediction, 
however, first generation subjects used both ingroup 
favoritism and fairness strategies more in rewarding money 
compared to second generation ones. In other words, 
intersubject communication did not increase the norm of 
ingroup favoritism, and subjects did not transmit 
spontaneously the normative values of groups. Therefore, 
this study did not suppport the social norm hypothesis. 
On the other hand, when Ryen and Kahn (1975) 
interpreted their findings about the effects of different 
intergroup orientations on evaluation and proxemic behavior 
between ingroup and outgroup, they argued that this was 
because intergroup orientation provided expectation about 
involvement with the outgroup and provided normative 
information about how to place oneself with regard to own 
and outgroup members. Thus, they contended that their 
results supported the cultural norm explanation. 
However, Tajfel himself changed the theory somewhat 
later on, and argued that the effects of social 
categorization reflect the need for a positive social 
identity. Tajfel and his colleagues proposed the generic 
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norm hypothesis as a preliminary attempt to explain ingroup 
bias, but soon they abandoned it because it tended toward 
circularity and was unheuristic and lacked explanatory 
power. Therefore, the revised social identity theory will 
be explained in the following part. 
Unlike realistic group conflict theory, social identity 
theory contends that incompatible group interests are not 
always necessary for the development of intergroup bias. 
Even a trivial, ad hoc intergroup categorization can easily 
lead to ingroup favoritism and discrimination against the 
outgroup. Simply categorizing individuals into social 
groups is enough to produce ingroup bias. Social 
categorization produces ingroup bias even when the basis for 
categorizing individuals into groups is arbitrary. The mere 
perception of belongingness to two distinct groups and of 
the presence of an outgroup are sufficient to trigger 
intergroup bias. 
There are several general assumptions of the theory 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979:40). First, individuals strive to 
maintain or enhance their self-esteem. They strive for a 
positive self-concept. Second, social groups or categories 
and membership in them are associated with positive or 
negative value connotations. Hence, social identity may be 
positive or negative according to the evaluation of those 
82 
groups that contribute to an individual's social identity. 
Third, the evaluation of one's own group is determined with 
reference to specific other groups through social 
comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and 
characteristics; positively discrepant comparisons between 
ingroup and outgroup produce high prestige, and thus 
positive social identity. Negatively discrepant comparisons 
result in low prestige and thus unsatisfactory social 
identity. 
Based on these assumptions, Tajfel and Turner suggest a 
number of theoretical principles. First, individuals strive 
to achieve or to maintain positive social identity. Second, 
positive social identity is based to a large extent on 
favorable comparisons that can be made between the ingroup 
and some relevant outgroups; the ingroup must be perceived 
as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant 
outgroups. Third, when social identity is unsatisfactory, 
individuals will strive either to leave their existing group 
and join some more positively distinct group or to make 
existing group more positively distinct. 
In this manner, the theory borrows the basic 
propositions of social comparison theory and elaborates on 
the relationship between perceived social identity and 
intergroup comparison. The theory argues that social 
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comparisons give rise to processes of mutual differentiation 
between groups, which can be analyzed as a form of social 
competition. Turner (1975) explains Tajfel's extension of 
social comparison theory. He indicates that Tajfel applied 
several propositions of social comparison theory such as the 
existence of a drive to evaluate one's opinions and 
abilities, an evaluation of opinions and abilities by 
comparing with those of others, and the existence of a 
unidirectional drive upward in abilities. Thus, Tajfel 
suggests that an individual has a need to evaluated oneself, 
that the range of social comparison can be extended to 
include both social context of nonsocial and social 
elements, and that the important comparative dimensions for 
social identity parallel those of abilities rather than 
opinions, i.e., they are value-laden. 
Social groups attempt to differentiate themselves from 
each other because of the pressure to evaluate one's own 
group positively through ingroup/outgroup comparisons and 
achieve a positive social identity. Thus, the aim of 
differentiation or categorization is to maintain or achieve 
superiority over an outgroup on some dimensions. Any such 
act, therefore, is essentially competitive. Under these 
conditions, intergroup competition, which may be unrelated 
to the objective goal relations between the groups, can 
occur. 
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Therefore, Turner distinguished between social and 
instrumental or realistic competition. Social competition 
is motivated by self-evaluation and takes place through 
social comparison, while instrumental or realistic 
competition is based on realistic self-interest. 
Incompatible group goals are necessary for realistic 
competition as realistic group conflict theory argues, but 
mutual intergroup comparisons are necessary and often 
sufficient for social competition (Tajfel and Turner, 
1979:41). Social and realistic competition also differ in 
their consequences for intergroup behavior. After realistic 
competition, losing groups should be hostile to winning 
outgroups. However, in social competition, losing ingroups 
do not always derogate evaluations of winning outgroups. 
Also, intergroup behavior based on social competition can 
occur even when it conflicts with realistic self-interest. 
Thus, Turner (1975) indicates that any similarity between 
social competition and Sherif's conflict of interests would 
be misleading. Sherif's theory has as its basis the 
postulate of self-interest, not self-evaluation. Thus, 
realistic group conflict theory can easily explain 
cooperation versus competition in terms of positive versus 
negative interdependence of group interests, whereas in 
social identity theory positive interdependence with regard 
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to positive identity is impossible because positive social 
identity comes from discriminatory evaluation of others. 
Turner suggests several requirements for social 
competition (Turner, 1975:21), First, the categorization 
and location of individuals within it must be explicit, non-
overlapping, not in direct conflict with more strongly felt 
group membership and relevant to the criteria for 
differentiation. Second, the dimension of comparison must 
be recognized and shared by both groups. Third, both groups 
must share a similar attribution of value to a range of 
possible actions, and fourth, there must be room for 
differentiation, i.e., no necessary reason to prefer one 
group in reality. 
Likewise, Tajfel and Turner contend that although it is 
nearly impossible in most social situations to distinguish 
between, on the one hand, discriminatory intergroup behavior 
based on a real or perceived conflict of objective interests 
and, on the other hand, discrimination based on attempts to 
establish a positively valued distinctiveness for one's own 
group, the two can be distinguished theoretically. Unlike a 
genuine conflict of interests, the goals of actions aimed at 
the achievement of positively valued ingroup distinctiveness 
often retain no value outside of the context of intergroup 
comparisons (Tajfel and Turner, 1979:46). 
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Social categorization is conceived of as cognitive 
tools that segment, classify, and order the social 
environment and thus enable the individual to undertake many 
forms of social action. It also provides a system of 
orientation for self-reference which creates and defines the 
individual's place in society. It stimulates a self-
evaluative social comparison process. It tends to be 
internalized to define the self in the social situation and 
hence contribute to self-evaluation. An individual defines 
him/herself as well as others in terms of his/her location 
within a system of social categories— specifically, social 
group memberships— and social identity may be understood as 
a definition of his/her own position within a system 
{Turner, 1975). 
Social groups provide their members with an 
identification of themselves in social terms. These 
identifications are relational and comparative. No group 
lives alone—all groups live in the midst of other groups. 
Thus, the positive aspects of social identity, the 
reinterpretation of attributes in social action, only 
acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparison with, other 
groups. Therefore, the characteristics of one's group as a 
whole achieve most of their significance in relation to 
perceived differences from other groups and the value 
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connotations of these differences. A group becomes a group 
in the sense of being perceived as having common 
characteristics or fate only because other groups are 
present in the environment. A group will be able to 
preserve its contribution to those aspects of an 
individual's identity which are positively valued only if it 
manages to keep its positively valued distinctiveness from 
other groups. Thus, social comparisons between groups are 
focused on the establishment of distinctiveness between 
one's own and other groups (Turner, 1975:7-8). One's own 
group must differentiate itself relative to other groups on 
the dimensions which have a value differential in order to 
fulfill one's need for a positively valued identity. Thus, 
an individual's positive social identity is a matter of 
mutual comparisons between groups— a comparison where any 
two groups attempt mutual but asymmetrical differentiation 
from each other and toward the positively valued relevant 
dimension. 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that they use the term 
social identity in a strictly limited sense. Social 
identity consists of those aspects of an individual's self-
image that derive from the social categories to which he/she 
perceives him/herself as belonging. It is only those 
aspects of the self-concept based on group membership 
88 
(Turner, 1981:84). People value memberships in relatively 
successful groups because they want to feel good about 
themselves and/or look good to others. Ingroup bias can 
make a group to which the individual belongs seem more 
successful and positive and thus make the individual look 
better. 
There are several variables that influence intergroup 
differentiation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979:41). First, 
individuals must have internalized their group membership as 
an aspect of their self-concept. They must be subjectively 
identified with the relevant ingroup. Second, the social 
situation must be one that allows for intergroup comparisons 
and enables actors to select and evaluate relevant 
relational attributes. Not all differences between groups 
have evaluative signficance. Third, the outgroup must be 
perceived as a relevant comparison group. Ingroups do not 
compare themselves with every available outgroup. Such 
factors as similarity, proximity, and situational salience 
may determine outgroup comparability. 
Unlike realistic group conflict theory, status is not 
considered as a scarce resource in this theory. Rather, it 
is the outcome of intergroup comparison and reflects a 
group's relative position on some evaluative dimensions of 
comparison. The lower a group's subjective status position 
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in relation to relevant comparison groups, the less a 
contribution it can make to positive social identity. 
As discussed above, social groups must preserve a 
positively valued distinctiveness from relevant comparison 
groups in order for group members to maintain self-esteem. 
When people have an unsatisfactory or negative social 
identity through their membership in certain groups, 
therefore, they are motivated to undertake certain behavior 
to achieve positively valued distinctiveness. There can be 
various ways to achieve positive identity (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). People can react to negative social identity 
through individual mobility, social creativity, or social 
competition. Individuals can move from a low to a high 
status group. Social creativity means that members of the 
group can seek positive distinctiveness for the ingroup by 
redefining or altering the elements of the comparison 
situation. They may try to compare the ingroup to the 
outgroup on new dimension, or to change the outgroup and 
avoid using any high status outgroup as a comparison group. 
Also, group members may seek positive distinctiveness 
through direct competition with the outgroup. They may try 
to reverse the actual relative positions of the ingroup and 
outgroup on some salient dimensions, i.e., try to change the 
group's objective social position. 
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Tajfel calls the situation he uses to test ingroup bias 
phenomenon the "minimal intergroup situation" because social 
categorization, per se, without any prerequisites or any 
other properties of group life, can cause intergroup bias. 
Tajfel and his associates introduce some experimental 
procedures and criteria to guide research on ingroup bias 
and call these the minimal group paradigm. The criteria for 
the minimal group paradigm are as follows. First, there 
sould be no face-to-face interaction between subjects, 
either in the ingroup or in the outgroup, or between the 
groups. Second, there should be complete anonymity of group 
membership. Third, there should be no instrumental or 
rational link between the criteria for intergroup 
categorization and the nature of ingroup and outgroup 
responses requested from the subjects. Fourth, responses of 
the subjects should not represent any utilitarian value to 
the subjects. Fifth, a strategy of responding in terms of 
intergroup differentiation should be in competition with a 
strategy based on other more rational and utilitarian 
principles, such as obtaining maximum benefit for all. And 
last, the responses should be made as important as possible 
to the subjects; they should consist of real decisions 
about the distribution of concrete rewards, rather than some 
form of evaluation of others (Tajfel et al., 1971:153-54). 
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Thus, when Tajfel and his associates perform experiments, 
they proceed along these lines, using anonymous subjects, 
allowing no interactions, and using reward allocation 
matrices as their measure of ingroup bias. 
In criticism, Bornewasser and Bober (1987) maintain 
that these criteria prove that the minimal group paradigm 
neglects the main property of a group and its structure. As 
a consequence, intergroup behavior as an interaction in 
terms of the actor's group identification is confined to the 
subject's reference to a similarity criterion. However, 
these authors also recognize that many studies utilizing 
Tajfel's experimental criteria lead to results that are 
similar to those found with well-structured groups. Thus, 
this raises the question of whether even this restricted set 
of experimental criteria and usage of the term "group" 
cannot prevent subjects from presupposing structural 
properties and interpreting the situation in this sense. 
Bornewasser and Bober indicate that theoretically, there are 
some indications that make this assumption plausible. 
According to the minimal group paradigm, ingroup bias 
should be produced in situations with or without an actual 
reward, with or without group task activity and interaction 
among subjects, and regardless of how bias is measured. The 
only requirement to obtain ingroup bias is, thus. 
92 
classification of subjects into different groups. Groups 
formed in this way are ad hoc groups not based on any 
significantly valued categorization. In the minimal group 
paradigm, subjects are divided into two groups based on 
their responses to an irrelevant judgmental or preference 
test. After they are informed of their own group 
membership, in the absence of any contact with or knowledge 
of other group members, they are given a choice task that 
involves allocating money or points between two other 
subjects in the experiment. The identity of the other 
subjects is indicated only by an identification number and a 
group label. 
Reward allocation matrices are usually used as a 
measure for ingroup bias in experiments by Tajfel and other 
colleagues. The matrix approach has been one of the 
dominant methods in this research, although some 
investigators have criticized it by pointing out drawbacks 
and some problems in data analysis (e.g., Gerard and Hoyt, 
1974; Brewer, 1979; Aschenbrenner and Schaefer, 1980; 
Bornstein et al., 1983). There are various versions and 
different types of matrices depending upon the combinations 
of distribution rules. However, the basic logic is the 
same. Within each matrix, each column represents an 
alternative allocation of points distributed between the two 
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target persons (one ingroup and one outgroup member), and 
the subject is to choose one of the alternatives. In 
Tajfel's matrices, there are usually 13 alternative 
allocations. Matrices are constructed to represent a number 
of different possible distribution rules that could be 
applied. There are several strategies or distribution rules 
which subjects can show: maximum joint profit is defined as 
the choice in a matrix which results in the largest possible 
common benefit to the two target individuals; maximum 
ingroup profit is defined as the choice in a matrix which 
corresponds to the highest number of points that can be 
awarded to the member of the ingroup; maximum difference is 
defined as the choice which results in the greatest possible 
difference between points awarded to the ingroup member over 
points awarded to the outgroup member; and fairness is a 
choice to divide points equally between the two individuals 
(Tajfel et al., 1971). 
The result of matrices choices shows what kind of 
strategy subjects used. Using a maximum difference strategy 
means the subject showed ingroup bias because the purpose of 
this strategy is to make the ingroup relatively higher than 
the outgroup. Sometimes a combination of maximum difference 
and maximum ingroup profit is called an ingroup favoritism 
strategy. What is important, however, is that subjects 
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usually show the tendency to choose maximum difference 
rather than a maximum ingroup profit, meaning that people 
prefer a relatively higher position for the ingroup compared 
to the outgroup, even at the expense of own absolute profit. 
That is, they tend to choose more reward for the ingroup as 
a means to achieving positive distinctiveness from the 
outgroup. In most experiments, strategies of maximum 
ingroup profit or maximum joint profit are rarely chosen. 
The research shows that fairness is also a commonly used 
strategy. Most experiments based on the minimal group 
paradigm use this matrix measurement approach to 
operationalize ingroup bias. Most also use some evaluative 
scales. 
There are many studies supporting social identity 
theory. Billig and Tajfel's (1973) study is one of them. 
They indicate that in previous studies, groups were formed 
on the basis of certain criteria of real similarity between 
subjects who were assigned to the same category, e.g., 
subjects were categorized by their visual judgments or by 
their painting preferences. Thus, it was not clear 
according to those studies whether ingroup bias was due to a 
similarity factor or to simple categorization. Billig and 
Tajfel thus established social categories on a random basis 
without reference to any real similarity in order to 
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determine whether such random categorization would still 
lead to ingroup bias. 
They created four conditions; the categorization-
similarity condition in which subjects were told their group 
membership and divided based on art preference; the 
categorization-nonsimilarity condition in which subjects 
were divided into two groups on a random basis; the 
noncategorization-similarity condition in which subjects 
were told their own art preference but no group label was 
mentioned; and the noncategorization-nonsimilarity condition 
in which subjects were assigned a number randomly from two 
series of code numbers. They measured ingroup bias by 
examining ingroup favoritism, maximum joint profit, and 
fairness strategies. 
They found that as soon as the notion of group was 
introduced into the situation, the subjects discriminated 
against those in the outgroup. This discrimination was more 
marked than when subjects knew their different art 
preferences but no explicit notion of a group was 
introduced. The results also showed that subjects only in 
the two conditions involving categorization displayed 
significant ingroup favoritism, and those in the 
categorization-similarity condition showed more bias than 
those in the categorization-nonsimilarity condition. The 
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noncategorization-similarity condition showed a non­
significant trend toward ingroup favoritism. Although both 
similarity and categorization variables produced significant 
main effects, the categorization variable was a more 
important determinant of bias than similarity. Fairness was 
also a popular strategy. 
Furthermore, Billig and Tajfel isolated the effects of 
social categorization from those of similarity and showed 
that ingroup bias is not based on similarity, but on mere 
categorization. Just by inserting the group notion, a 
subject's definition of the situation was significantly 
altered. They interpret such bias as a result of searching 
for positive social identity through positive social 
comparison. Experiments using the minimal group paradigm 
show that categorization based on very trivial grounds can 
lead to ingroup bias. 
As we can see in Billig and Tajfel's study, most 
research based on the minimal group paradigm tries to test 
whether subjects show ingroup bias when they are divided 
into groups by some criterion. There have been several 
interesting studies to investigate social identity theory by 
looking at different aspect of ingroup bias. For example, 
Oakes and Turner (1980) tried to test the theory by 
assessing directly whether the discriminatory responses 
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increase self-esteem. Their experimental and control 
conditions followed the standard minimal group paradigm 
except that in the control condition subjects did not 
complete the matrix booklets. The experimenter measured the 
amount of self-esteem as a dependent variable. The results 
showed that self-esteem was significantly higher in the 
experimental than in the control condition. Thus, Oakes and 
Turner insist that discrimination increases self-esteem, 
which supports social identity theory. 
Lemyre and Smith's (1985) study tackles the same 
aspect. They criticize Oakes and Turner's study because the 
experimental tasks in the experimental and control 
conditions in that study were not of equal psychological 
significance, i.e., one was to fill out matrix booklets and 
the other was just to read a newspaper. In such case, the 
importance of the task can influence self-esteem. Thus, 
they tried to extend Oakes and Turner's study, investigating 
the relation between social categorization, intergroup 
discrimination, and self-esteem. They had a 2x2x2 design, 
manipulating categorization versus noncategorization 
variables, type of allocation task, and ordering of the 
allocation task and the self-esteem measurement, resulting 
in eight conditions. The condition which had 
categorization, the ingroup/outgroup matrix allocation task. 
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followed by the self-esteem was the basic condition in which 
to expect ingroup bias. 
The results displayed that subjects who had been 
categorized and could discriminate against the outgroup 
through filling out matrices showed higher self-esteem than 
those who could not discriminate. Categorized subjects who 
discriminated showed higher postexperimental self-esteem 
than either categorized subjects who did not have 
opportunity to discriminate or noncategorized subjects who 
were engaged in a similar matrix allocation task. Thus, the 
results support the predictions of social identity theory 
about the effects of discriminatory behavior on self-esteem 
and show that categorization, in and of itself, is not 
enough to raise self-esteem. 
' Although the strategy of maximum difference represents 
ingroup bias, fairness has also been frequently found to be 
a popular strategy in minimal group experiments, as Tajfel 
has acknowledged. Thus, Branthwaite et al. (1979) contend 
that there are two opposing norms governing intergroup 
behavior— a norm for fairness and a norm for 
discrimination. The relative strength of these two norms 
and the balance between them are important questions. They 
found that less cohesive groups and superior groups showed 
more fairness, and that subjects tried to balance unequal 
allocations across the various matrices so that the overall 
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outcome would be about equal between the ingroup and the 
outgroup. Fairness was applied as a personal moral 
principle and as an alternative way of getting respect and 
positive identity. They argue that fairness defines a 
stable reciprocal balance in intergroup relations, and that 
norms for fairness and discrimination exert about equal 
influence under minimal group conditions. 
Turner (1980) argues against Branthwaite et al.'s 
contention about the coexistence of fairness and 
discrimination norms. He indicates that it seems to be 
conceptually self-contradictory to suggest that ingroups are 
as fair as they are discriminatory towards outgroups, and 
that the hypothesis of two opposed norms may be 
unfalsifiable. He says that the discovery of ingroup 
favoritism is counter-intuitive and thus worth studying 
while fairness is an uninteresting outcome. It is natural 
for subjects to perceive fairness as a normative, desirable 
strategy because this norm is common in our daily lives. 
Thus, it is possible that subjects' responses represent a 
compromise between the intergroup processes which produce 
ingroup favoritism and the normative pressures for fairness 
based on interpersonal relations. Psychological processes 
implicated in the transition from interpersonal to 
intergroup relations tend to shift social behavior from 
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baseline fairness to ingroup/outgroup discrimination 
(Turner, 1980:141). Ingroup favoritism is the particular, 
unique result of intergroup relation. He indicates that 
ingroup favoritism does not always occur, i.e., intergroup 
attitudes and behavior vary with changes in the relationship 
between specific groups and are determined by a complex, 
social context. He argues that the theoretical task is to 
find unexpected phenomenon of ingroup bias despite such 
complex social conditions. 
Aschenbrenner and Schaefer (1980) later criticize 
Brathwaite et al.'s study from different perspective. They 
argue that Branthwaite et al.'s study has some 
methodological weakness. Aschenbrenner and Schaefer claim 
that the minimal group paradigm should be correctly defined 
in terms of a minimal group conflict situation with the task 
of distributing money by use of the payoff matrices. They 
criticize the paradigm that it makes much sense only if a 
person participates in an experiment, and they claim that 
there is no reason to assume that the subject really 
believes what he/she is told. The task of distributing 
money by the use of matrices is suspect, causing the subject 
to think about the real purpose of the study. They contend 
that it is not correct to speak about generic norms or make 
general statement that minimal groups are discriminatory. 
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The minimal group paradigm constitudes a rather narrow, 
somewhat artificial experimental situation, causing the 
problem of generalization. 
Later, Brown et al. (1980) argue against Aschenbrenner 
and Schaefer, contending that the ingroup bias phenomenon is 
universal and general. They indicate that Aschenbrenner and 
Schaefer's definition of the minimal group paradigm is 
incorrect because the paradigm cannot be considered in 
advance as being a conflict situation. Also, they indicate 
that other kinds of methods provide the evidence for ingroup 
bias besides just the reward allocation matrices, and 
studies have used children as well as college students, 
assuring generality of the phenomenon. Discrimination has 
always been found using many different analysis methods and 
experimental conditions. They contend that ingroup bias is 
not the result of an artificial experimental situation, not 
due to any demand characteristics as insisted by Gerard and 
Hoyt (1974). 
As reviewed above, many studies support social identity 
theory and some propose counterarguments against it. 
Regardless of some controversy over the theory and findings, 
social identity theory still dominates the area of ingroup 
bias research. The core feature of the theory is that it 
integrates self-evaluation through social identity, social 
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categorization, and intergroup comparison processes in a 
coherent theoretical framework. As indicated before, this 
theory can be regarded as a motivational approach because it 
contends that ingroup bias derives from motivational 
process. In the following section, a rather different, new 
perspective to look at ingroup bias will be explicated and 
the rationale for it will be discussed. 
Theories of Group Polarization/Choice Shift 
Group polarization or choice shift refers to the 
tendency for group members to become more extreme in the 
direction of their previously held opinions after either a 
group discussion or learning of the preferences of others. 
The terms group polarization and choice shift are usually 
used interchangeably in research. It is difficult to 
clearly distinguish between these two concepts because they 
explain almost the same phenomenon. Some researchers define 
group polarization as group-produced enhancement of 
individuals' attitudes toward an already prevailing 
direction, as the average change in individuals' pre and 
postdiscussion responses. Choice shift, on the other hand, 
is defined as a difference between the mean of individuals' 
decisions and a subsequent collective group decision by the 
same individuals, i.e., the difference between the mean of 
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the group members' prediscussion responses and the actual 
group decision (e.g., Laughlin and Barley, 1982:273). When 
the group polarization or choice shift phenomenon was first 
introduced, investigators called it "risky shift", 
indicating the tendency for groups to take greater risks 
than individuals. The term "risky shift", however, became 
criticized because there are many cases where group 
decisions are not necessarily riskier than individual 
decisions. Contrary to the notion of risky shift, some 
research found a shift toward a more cautious choice after 
group discussion. Thus, the term "risky shift" was 
abandoned and people instead call the phenomenon either 
choice shift or group polarization. 
There have been many theories to explain group 
polarization. Pruitt (1971a, 1971b) explains various 
theories such as diffusion of responsibility theory, 
familiarization theory, leadership theory, value theory, and 
decision theory. Among value theories, there are several 
different theories such as social comparison theory, 
pluralistic-ignorance theory, relevant arguments theory, and 
commitment theory. Pruitt (1971a) indicates that value 
theories seem to have the most support. He rejects 
diffusion of responsibility, familiarization, and leadership 
theories, and argues that relevant arguments theory seems to 
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have the most empirical support. When Lamm and Myers (1978) 
introduced several theories about group polarization such as 
social decision theory, responsibility diffusion theory, 
informational influence theory (relevant arguments theory), 
and social comparison theory, they also contended that 
informational influence theory has been the most strongly 
and consistently supported. 
Although there are many theories about group 
polarization as we have seen, two theories can be selected 
as the most supported and dominant theories; interpersonal 
comparison theory and persuasive arguments theory. The two 
theories produced a lot of research and stimulated a lot of 
controversy. 
Interpersonal comparison theory 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, interpersonal 
comparison theory is based on social comparison theory, and 
thus it shares the same assumptions with social identity 
theory. Since persuasive arguments theory has been the 
strongest rival theory against interpersonal comparison 
theory, a new perspective derived from persuasive arguments 
theory can be an alternative explanation to social identity 
theory for the explanation of ingroup bias phenomenon. This 
section will first explain the interpersonal comparison 
theory briefly, and then will discuss persuasive arguments 
theory in more detail. 
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The interpersonal comparison theory has three basic 
assumptioms (Laughlin and Barley, 1982:274). First, the 
typical group member is motivated to exceed or at least 
equal the average group member on positively valued 
dimensions directly or indirectly engaged by the dicison 
task. It assumes that people are motivated to see and to 
present themselves as better embodiments than most other 
members of the group on socially desired abilities, traits, 
and attitudes (Lamm and Myers, 1978:176). Second, there 
exists a state of pluralistic ignorance in which the group 
members assume that they exceed or at least equal the 
average other member. Third, social comparison during group 
interaction indicates to a minority of the members that they 
fail to equal the average group member. A choice shift 
results to the extent that these members change in the 
positively valued direction in order to present themselves 
as at least the equal of the average group member on the 
positively valued dimension, and in order to maintain their 
favorable self-perception. Furthermore, even those members 
who meet and exceed the group average may become more 
extreme after group discussion. Knowing others' positions 
may show them that they were not as above average as they 
had thought. Hearing the relatively extreme positions of 
others may "release" these members to shift even farther 
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toward the socially desirable pole. The theory assumes that 
group discussion exposes people to others' positions, 
causing them to adjust their own responses in order to 
maintain favorable self-conception. Knowing the positions 
of others is both necessary and sufficient for polarization 
to occur. 
Likewise, as social identity theory explains ingroup 
bias based on the need for a positive self-evaluation and 
social identity through social comparison, so does 
interpersonal comparison theory explain group polarization 
based on the motivation for a positive self-image through 
positive social comparison with others. Cotton and Baron's 
(1980) study supports this theory. They argue that social 
comparison is solely responsible for choice shifts because 
it occurs without group discussion. 
Persuas ive arguments theory 
The importance of persuasive argumentation in group 
decision making was noted in the 1930s by Thorndike, and it 
has been used to analyze group-induced shifts in choice by 
Nordhoy, St. Jean, Stoner, Teger and Pruitt, Vinokur, and 
Burnstein during the late 1960s and early 1970s (cited by 
Burnstein et al., 1973). Contrary to interpersonal 
comparison theory, persuasive arguments theory contends that 
new and persuasive arguments heard by members during group 
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discussion are the sole mediator of choice shifts effects, 
and that social comparison plays little role. Group-induced 
response shifts occur because certain persuasive arguments 
are not initially known by all group members. During group 
discussion these unshared arguments are introduced to those 
members who have been unaware of them, and these new 
arguments stimulate and persuade the individuals to change 
their opinions. The theory hypothesizes that if exchange of 
persuasive arguments during discussion induces response 
shifts, the. the r^oice-alternative to which the shift 
usually occurs should have a larger number of arguments and 
arguments which are more persuasive than those associated 
with the other alternatives. 
There are three basic assumptions of the theory 
(Laughlin and Barley, 1982:274). First, there exists a pool 
of abstract arguments of varing persuasiveness for and 
against a given course of action. Second, a given argument 
may have been considered by at least one but not all group 
members, so that the arguments are collectively only 
partially shared. And third, during group interaction the 
arguments for and against a given course of action are 
proposed and assessed on their merits. A choice shift 
results to the extent that group members who had not 
previously considered these partially shared arguments are 
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convinced of their merits. The choices of other group 
members are used as a cue for assessing the merits of such 
arguments. As Pruitt (1971a, 1971b) and Lamm and Myers 
(1978) indicated, persuasive arguments theory has been 
supported widely. Some researchers such as Laughlin and 
Barley argue that different theories about group 
polarization or choice shifts need not be rivals, but rather 
they are complementary. 
Among the representative proponents of the theory are 
Pruitt, Burnstein, and Vinokur. Burnstein and Vinokur's 
study (1975) tries to specify how in the absence of 
normative incentives, i.e., the desire to meet or exceed the 
choices of others, knowledge of others' choices can by 
itself change a person's mind. They attempted to show that 
knowledge of others' choices affects the manner in which one 
thinks or argues to him/herself about an issue and the 
opinion or choice he/she later expresses can be guided by 
such knowledge. They criticize that many previous studies 
have been focused only on the external determinants of 
opinion change, overlooking assumptions about internal 
processes. According to them, Greenwald already guessed 
earlier that opinion change directly depends on the 
arguments elicited in the recipient by the message and not 
so much on those contained in the message. Thus, opinion 
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change might be minimal if the target person was not 
stimulated to think of propositions beyond those contained 
in the persuasion attempt, and a boomerang effect could 
occur if he/she imagines novel counterarguments. They call 
interpersonal comparison theory a theory focusing on 
normative processes, and persuasive arguments theory a 
theory emphasizing persuasive argumentation or informational 
processes. 
Burnstein was aware of research that shows choice 
shifts without discussion. Burnstein and Vinokur (1975) 
argue that finding a small shift in choice to occur even 
without discussion when individuals merely know each other's 
preference is actually consistent with persuasive arguments 
theory. According to the theory, knowledge of others' 
choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons or 
arguments others might have had for their choice— reasons 
which ordinarily would not come to mind without this 
knowledge. They contend that such reasoning functions in 
the same way as persuasive argumentation during group 
discussion; it causes the person to persuade him/herself 
that an alternative course of action now has greater merit 
than the one he/she initially preferred. 
In order to test the theory, they made subjects respond 
to choice-dilemma items under three conditions. In the 
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first condition, following their choice, subjects learned 
one another's choices on a specific decision task and 
immediately afterward wrote arguments in support of each of 
the alternatives involved in that same item. In the second 
condition, subjects learned what others had chosen on a 
decision task and then wrote arguments in support of each of 
the alternatives given in a different task. In the third 
condition, they received no information about others' 
choices and only knew their own preference on a decision 
task, and merely wrote arguments in support of each of the 
alternatives involved in that same item. 
Burnstein and Vinokur predicted that if knowledge of 
the others' choices produces a revision in the person's own 
preference indirectly, i.e., only when such knowledge 
induces the person to think of arguments explaining the 
others' choices, then shifts in choices would be obtained in 
the first condition but not in the second or third 
conditions. The reason is because the person is prevented 
from thinking in an appropriate way, from generating 
relevant arguments, either because of the nature of the 
activities he/she must perform immediately upon being 
informed of the others' choices (second condition), or 
because he/she simply does not know what others have chosen 
(third condition). Also, if knowledge of others' choices 
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induces the person to think of reasons why such a course of 
action might be preferred, then the person will generate 
more arguments in support of alternatives suggested by the 
positions of others in the first condition than in the 
second condition. The basic premise of these predictions is 
that shifts in choice are due to the arguments a person 
generates for him/herself upon learning others have chosen 
differently. 
The results showed that significant shifts in choice 
occurred only when the person knew what others chose and had 
an opportunity to think about those choices (first 
condition), and did not occur if an opportunity to think 
about others' choices was denied as in the second condition 
or if knowledge of others' choices was withheld as in the 
third condition. The mean choice shifts did not differ 
between the second and third conditions. According to a 
postexperimental questionnaire, subjects in the first 
condition who said that the difference between their own 
initial choice and the choices of others made a difference 
to them tended to be disturbed and curious about the 
difference and to wonder about the reasons others might have 
had for making their choices in the first place. Also, 
subjects who thought of reasons the others might have had 
for their choices and who had new considerations come to 
mind produced a greater number of pro-risk arguments and 
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tended to shift toward greater risk (on an item from the 
Choice Dilemma Questionnaire that usually produced a risky-
shift after group discussion). Consequently, shifts 
occurred in the absence of group discussion only when 
individuals knew and thought about what others had chosen. 
The extend to which they thought of reasons for others' 
choices determined the extent to which they revised their 
own choice, a finding which supports persuasive arguments 
theory. 
According to the theory, knowledge of others' choices 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of 
shifts in choice. Rather, shifts are due to the sharing of 
arguments for a particular course of action. Burnstein and 
Vinokur recognize that there have been a few studies in 
which only knowledge of others' choices seemed to produce 
shifts. To explain this contradictory finding, they 
conjectured that information about others' choices 
stimulates a person to generate reasoning or argumentation 
which would explain the reasons of their choice. In their 
1975 experiment described above, they found evidence for 
this conjecture. They contend that the revision of opinions 
under the absence of group discussion is the result of intra 
and interpersonal information processing. Creating new and 
reweighing old arguments may constitute the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions for revision of opinion and choice. 
Therefore, Burnstein and Vinokur encourage more study 
concerning the nature of such argumentation. 
Burnstein et al. (1973) compared interpersonal 
comparison theory and persuasive arguments theory through 
varing the number of others' choices available for 
comparison and the number of arguments others presented in 
support of their choices. According to interpersonal 
comparison theory, the magnitude of shift is a function of 
the number of others' choices and not of the number of 
arguments, while the opposite prediction draws from 
persuasive arguments theory. Burnstein and his colleagues 
argue that the extent of choice shifts depends on the 
likelihood that the average member will have available all 
or most of the persuasive arguments. If the likelihood is 
great, the individuals will have already made their initial 
choice on the basis of all or most of the arguments. Thus, 
not only will they have already taken an extreme position, 
but they also are unlikely to encounter any new persuasive 
arguments during discussion. On the other hand, if the 
likelihood is small, very few individuals will be able to 
gather strong support for their position during discussion 
and thus hardly anyone will have a good reason for changing 
their view. Therefore, these researchers indicate that the 
largest shifts will be induced by group discussion when 
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persuasive arguments have a moderate likelihood of being 
available to the average member. 
In their experiment, Burnstein et al. varied the number 
of arguments and the number of others' positions. As a 
result, only the number of arguments had a main effect, thus 
supporting persuasive arguments theory. They indicate, 
however, that interpersonal comparison theory cannot be 
completely dismissed because a modest shift was shown when 
argumentation was minimal but several others' choices were 
known. They interpreted this finding as showing that 
knowing others' choices stimulated subjects to generate 
reasonable arguments in back of those choices. 
Studies such as the one by Cotton and Baron (1980) 
argue against Burnstein et al.'s result by demonstrating 
that choice shifts occur under anonymous conditions when 
only social comparison information is provided, and by 
showing no relationship between choice shift measures and 
argument measures. They contend that various forms of 
social comparison information produce choice shifts but do 
not lead subjects to produce arguments favoring that shift. 
Thus, social comparison theory is the best for explaining 
choice shift phenomenon under conditions with no group 
discussion. However, as Burnstein et al. (1973) pointed 
out, the persuasive arguments explanation need not be 
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restricted only to group discussion conditions. They showed 
that it can also explain the phenomenon without group 
discussion. 
Several studies also found that the number of arguments 
is an important factor influencing the amount of choice 
shift. Hinsz and Davis (1984) tested the influence of 
information exchange in terms of the number and 
persuasiveness of arguments on group polarization and choice 
shifts. Their experiment separated the number and 
persuasiveness of arguments, and assessed the importance of 
both factors. Furthermore, they tested for both group 
polarization and choice shifts. The results showed that a 
larger number of arguments and a higher level of 
persuasiveness both significantly increased polarization 
toward risk on a risky choice dilemma item and increased 
polarization toward caution on a cautious item. In terms of 
choice shifts, higher persuasiveness increased shift toward 
risk on a risky item, but a larger number of arguments 
increased shift toward caution on a cautious item. Thus, 
despite some differences between polarization and choice 
shifts, the findings showed significant effects for both the 
number and persuasiveness of arguments, and therefore 
supported persuasive arguments theory. 
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Synthesis of the Theory and Hypotheses 
As indicated before, interpersonal comparison theory 
draws its basic premise from social comparison theory and 
thus shares the same theoretical ground as social identity 
theory. In the area of group polarization or choice shift, 
persuasive arguments theory has been widely supported and 
has shown itself to be a more powerful explanation than 
interpersonal comparison theory. 
The main purpose of this research is to borrow 
persuasive arguments theory for the study of ingroup bias 
and apply it into the study, and to suggest a new approach 
based on persuasive arguments theory as an alternative to 
social identity theory. This new approach takes a cognitive 
perspective because it emphasizes cognitive informational 
processes within the individual. 
Wilder (1986), when he argued the need for more 
cognitive studies about intergroup behavior, contended that 
a cognitive approach to intergroup bias regards bias as a 
product of the ways individuals select, structure, and 
process information. He regarded this orientation as an 
addition to, rather than a replacement for, more functional 
and motivational explanations. A cognitive orientation 
focuses on the information processing mechanisms by which 
knowledge and beliefs are acquired and utilized. The person 
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viewed from this perspective is one who is actively coping 
with incoming stimuli, continually attending to, encoding, 
and interpreting information, and retrieving it from memory. 
The person is seen as one who is adapting to a complex 
stimulus world through the use of cognitive mechanisms. 
Likewise, according to a cognitive approach, a human being 
is a thinking, cognizing person (Taylor, 1981). 
As Burnstein and Vinokur (1975) indicated, persuasive 
arguments theory emphasizes informational processes 
occurring within or between persons, as opposed to an 
emphasis on desirability or motivational factors. This 
research suggests that the ingroup bias phenomenon may be 
based on such informational processes within individual 
members of a group, i.e., on intrapersonal information 
processing, rather than on motivational factor as social 
identity theory argues. Ingroup bias may depend upon the 
reasoning or argumentation that people use as they think 
about the reasons they and others from both the ingroup and 
outgroup may have had for their choices, choices which were 
the basis for their categorization into groups. It will 
depend upon the amount of argumentation or thinking both for 
and against one's own choice and the choice of the outgroup. 
As choice shifts in the absence of group discussion have 
been proved to be the result of intra and interpersonal 
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information processing, so ingroup bias may be proved to be 
the result from intrapersonal information processing. 
Following categorization, subjects may start thinking, 
creating new arguments and reweighing old arguments about 
why group members made the initial choices which allocated 
them into different groups, and this cognitive work may 
alter subjects' minds and cause a change toward ingroup 
bias. Moreover, ingroup bias may be due to the fact that 
subjects tend to think naturally more about their own choice 
than about the other group's choice and such biased 
cognitive thinking leads to a biased evaluation in favor of 
the ingroup. 
This research draws several hypotheses from persuasive 
arguments theory, focusing on the effect that listing 
reasons, either in favor of the ingroup or outgroup's 
choice, will have on the magnitude of ingroup bias. The 
research proposes to study ingroup bias under several 
conditions; a condition in which subjects are given the 
opportunity to think about reasons, but are not instructed 
to do so; a condition in which subjects are directed to 
think about and list reasons only for the ingroup's choice; 
a condition in which subjects are directed to think about 
and list reasons only for the outgroup's choice; and a 
condition in which subjects are prevented from thinking 
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about any reasons due to their attention to other 
activities, i.e., due to some distraction. 
The study hypothesizes that; 
1. Subjects who are given the opportunity to think 
about reasons but are not directed to do so will 
show a moderate amount of ingroup bias, because 
they are implicitly thinking of reasons for their 
own choice (basic, replication condition). 
2. Subjects who are directed to think about and list 
reasons for the ingroup's choice will show the 
highest amount of ingroup bias because as they 
think mostly about reasons for their own and 
other ingroup members' choices, they will produce 
more, new persuasive arguments supporting their 
choice (ingroup condition). 
3. Subjects who are directed to think about and list 
reasons for the outgroup's choice will show no 
ingroup bias or reverse bias because as they 
think mostly about reasons for outgroup members' 
choices, they will produce more, new persuasive 
arguments supporting the outgroup's choice 
(outgroup condition). 
4. Subjects whose attention is directed toward other 
activities will show no ingroup bias because they 
will not have an opportunity to think about 
reasons for either the ingroup or the outgroup's 
choice due to the distraction (distraction 
condition). 
In addition, the study tries to see whether there is a 
significant relationship between the number of reasons 
listed and the amount of ingroup bias in such a way that as 
subjects list more reasons for ingroup members' choice, they 
will show more ingroup bias and as they list more reasons 
for the outgroup's choice, evaluation of the outgroup will 
be increased. In choice shift research, it has been found 
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that the number of arguments is positively related to the 
amount of choice shifts. 
Recently, a new line of thinking which fits persuasive 
arguments theory came from Billig, one of Tajfel's 
colleagues who has been involved in intergroup bias research 
and has been one of proponents of social identity theory. 
Billig offers an alternative approach to the study of 
prejudice which has been based upon the notion of 
categorization, and he calls it the rhetorical approach. 
His rhetorical approach shares common arguments with the 
theoretical framework of this research. The rhetorical 
approach, unlike that of the categorization, does not assume 
the inevitability of prejudice. He argues that the 
categorization approach ignores the issue of tolerance, and 
that by focusing on categorization as a cognitive process, 
it has overlooked an opposing process, that of 
particularization. 
If categorization refers to the process by which a 
particular stimulus is placed in a general category, 
particularization référés to the process by which a 
particular stimulus is distinguished from a general category 
or from other stimuli (Billig, 1985:82). The term 
particularization means the process by which an individual 
stimulus is distinguished from a category and treated as a 
121 
particular case. Categorization theorists have often tended 
to treat cognition according to a rather a mechanistic 
model. Billig suggests that a less mechanical perspective 
is possible if the relations between the two processes of 
categorization and particularization are considered from a 
rhetorical perspective, which examines the argumentative 
nature of thought. 
The rhetorical approach permits a distinction between 
prejudice and tolerance on the basis of argumentative 
content, rather than form, and thereby avoids assuming the 
inevitability of prejudice. As we can see, such emphasis on 
content rather than form, and on argumentative nature of 
thought makes Billig's ideas similar to persuasive arguments 
theory. He says that particularization and categorization 
as psychological processes are integrally linked on 
cognitive level, so that a separation of people into those 
who categorize (the prejudiced) and those who particularize 
(the tolerant) would ignore the interrelatedness of the two 
processes. Therefore, it may be more effective to 
distinguish between prejudice and tolerance on the basis of 
content. Billig argues that attitudes have important 
argumentative aspects. If the world can be categorized in 
different ways, then the choice of one particular 
categorization can be seen as being part of an argument 
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against another way of viewing things, and is to be defined 
by argument against argument. He criticizes Tajfel by 
pointing out that in Tajfel's theory stability is associated 
with categorization and change is explained in terms of 
motivational processes. What is lacking is any purely 
cognitive element, which might operate flexibly to show the 
cognitive aspects of change. 
To test these ideas Billig and Cochrane examined the 
complexities of prejudiced and tolerant arguments expressed 
by British working class adolescents. According to these 
researchers, one way to highlight the argumentative aspect 
of attitudes is to set up discussion groups and then to 
observe participants expand upon and defend their arguments, 
when confronted by the arguments of others. Using this 
methodology, they found that the arguments on the topic of 
race were seldom based on straightforward divisions between 
racist and anti-racist positions. Instead, most 
participants were likely to use both racist and tolerant 
themes. Billig contends that the rhetorical approach would 
not view the expression of arguments simply as a matter of 
drawing topics from a existing store of arguments. Novel 
arguments, and novel situations, might elicit novel, 
previously unformulated, responses. Thus, he points out 
that it is not surprising that extreme minority opinions can 
produce effects on majority attitudes, for minority opinions 
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will be setting up new topics for debate to be examined by 
new arguments. Even if the minority views are rejected, 
they will not leave the majority attitudes unchanged, for 
new stocks of arguments will have been formed. In this way, 
one might find oneself formulating views in the course of a 
debate; thus, rather than it being the attitude which 
determines in a strict sense what is said, the attitude in a 
real sense might only be discovered through argumentation. 
As such, Billig's new approach shows a new theoretical 
direction to the study of ingroup bias, one in which 
prejudice following categorization is not taken for granted. 
Furthermore, Billig's discussion illuminates and supports 
the basic theory behind this study. A similar argument has 
been presented earlier. Schroder et al. (1967) suggested 
attitudes as information-processing structures. They argued 
that interpersonal and intergroup attitudes are formed as a 
consequence of the differentiation and integration of 
dimensions of information about a domain of stimulus. 
Integration of other than only the salient and congruent 
items of information and integration of more than one 
dimension tend to result in a less extreme and less 
categorical attitude. It is generally recognized that 
cognitively complex people are less likely to categorize. 
If this is true, then a reasoning process which leads to 
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more complex cognition will lead to less categorization 
based on simple categories and to less discrimination in 
favor of the ingroup. Gardiner's (1972) research shows a 
negative relationship between cognitive complexity and 
intergroup bias. 
Linville and Jones (1980) and Linville's (1982) 
complexity-extremity hypothesis may also be helpful for the 
basic argument of the study. They tested the hypothesis 
that people would have a more complex schema regarding 
ingroup than outgroups, and thus, appraisals of outgroup 
members would be more extreme or polarized than those of 
ingroup members, i.e., greater complexity would result in 
evaluative moderation. 
Using white subjects, Linville and Jones (1980) found 
that when application credentials were positive, an outgroup 
member (black or opposite sex) was evaluated more favorably 
than ingroup members, and when the credentials were weak, 
the outgroup member was evaluated more negatively. White 
subjects showed greater complexity about white people than 
about blacks. The finding that subjects evaluated an 
outgroup member more favorably than ingroup member in the 
case of positive information is contrary to ingroup bias. 
They answer the question of how the evidence for more 
favorable ratings of an outgroup member with strong 
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credentials can be reconciled with ingroup bias study. They 
say that the mediating factor is the amount and kind of 
information provided about the individual being evaluated. 
The reason ingroup bias is displayed in most studies is 
because those studies involve evaluation of a group as a 
whole based on only scanty information. Thus, the study 
suggests that outgroup members can be beneficiaries of 
favorable information (e.g., when they have strong 
credentials) because they stand out strongly from the 
outgroup which may be viewed negatively. Therefore, they 
argue that instead of uniform favorable bias toward either 
ingroup or outgroup, the direction of bias may be depend on 
the information about the group member. They indicate that 
the evaluative side of intergroup relations may be closely 
tied to the cognitive side. 
Linville (1982) criticizes traditional theories of 
stereotyping which assume that stereotyping has 
unidirectional evaluative consequences following from the 
categorization of individuals on the basis of salient cues. 
Such an assumption of unidirectional bias is incorrect 
because positive information will lead to more favorable 
ratings of an outgroup. Thus, the direction of the bias 
depends on the favorability of information about a specific 
group member. She extended Linville and Jones' study 
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further and proved the hypothesis was valid. She argues 
that her study supports the speculations that a cognitive 
mechanism influences intergroup evaluation, and that the 
evaluative bias is bidirectional as opposed to 
unidirectional. Also, she contends that the complexity-
extremity hypothesis complements rather than contradicts 
motivational theories because the extremity prediction can 
coexist with a main effect by group membership. The 
evaluative aspect of intergroup relations is tied to 
cognitive structure and specifically to the lack of complex 
interpretive mechanisms for processing information about 
outgroup members. Such contention supports the theoretical 
basis of this study and is consistent with its main 
arguments. If ingroup members generate more persuasive 
arguments for the outgroup, it means a more complex 
cognitive representation of the outgroup. Such increased 
complexity will lead to a less extreme, depolarized 
evaluation of outgroup, and such change may result in 
reduced ingroup bias. 
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CHAPTER IV. DATA AND METHODS 
Pretests 
Before conducting a major test, two pretests were 
conducted to find out whether the theoretical approach 
seemed valid and whether experimental procedures used in the 
past by Tajfel and Burnstein and Vinokur might be modified 
and combined. The chapter will first explain briefly those 
pretests and their results. 
Pretest 1 
The basic idea and hypotheses of this pretest are 
mainly drawn from Burnstein and Vinokur's (1975) research 
which showed how persuasive arguments theory can explain 
choice shifts in the absence of group discussion. In their 
experiment, three conditions were manipulated; a condition 
in which subjects know others' choices and generate 
arguments supporting the same choice item; a condition in 
which subjects know others' choices but generate arguments 
about a different choice item; and a condition in which 
subjects do not know others' choices and generate arguments 
about the same choice item. It was found that choice shifts 
occurred only when subjects knew what others chose and had 
an opportunity to think about those choices. Based on this 
experiment, this pretest intended to manipulate several 
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conditions in which subjects can or cannot think about 
reasons for their own or others' choices and to show how 
such conditions may make a difference in the magnitude of 
ingroup bias. 
Subjects were college students recruited from a 
sociology course, and they were given extra credit points 
for their participation in the experiment. The experiment 
was conducted during the regular class time and lasted about 
one hour. A total of 44 students participated in the 
experiment, but three of them were excluded from the data 
analysis due to incorrect responses (they listed reasons in 
a wrong way). Among the remaining 41 subjects, 25 were 
females and 16 were males. 
Five conditions were run simultaneously; the total 
number of subjects in the first condition was 9, 8 in the 
second condition, 6 in the third condition, 9 in the fourth 
condition, and 9 in the fifth condition. The research used 
experimental method, random assignment of subjects to 
conditions, and an experimental questionnaire which mainly 
contained questions about how subjects evaluate the ingroup 
and the outgroup. 
The procedure was as follows. First, subjects signed 
the consent form. In the consent form, the purpose of the 
study was disguised as a study about cognitive schema. 
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Subjects were told that the study would test the relative 
impact of audio versus visual stimulation on the formation 
of personal schémas. The experimenter handed out 
questionnaires and collected the signed consent forms. 
Subjects then listened to two pieces of music composed by 
Erik Satie (two minutes of each piece), and silently 
indicated their choice of music on the questionnaire. Then 
the experimenter showed slides of two paintings each by Klee 
and Kandinsky, and subjects publicly raised their hands to 
indicate their choice of painter. Subjects moved their 
chairs based on their choice of painting to either side of 
the classroom. Those who chose Klee's painting were called 
the Klee group, and those who chose Kandinsky's were called 
the Kandinsky group in the questionnaire. As explained 
below, for subjects in conditions one, two, and three, there 
was no further mention of music and their questionnaires 
focused on the groups formed by preference of painter. For 
subjects in condition four, there was no further mention of 
the paintings and their questionnaires focused on the groups 
formed (silently and invisibly) by music preference. 
Subjects in condition five considered both music and 
paintings in their questionnaires. Subjects filled out the 
questionnaire at their own pace. After finishing it, the 
experimenter handed out a sheet to ask subjects to guess the 
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hypotheses behind the study and to make comments about the 
study. Finally, the experimenter collected the 
questionnaires and debriefed the subjects thoroughly. 
The first condition (basic condition) was intended to 
replicate Tajfel's experimental procedures. In this 
condition, subjects were not asked to list reasons for 
either their own or other subjects' choice of paintings. 
They went directly to pages of the experimental 
questionnaire which asked them to evaluate both the ingroup 
and outgroup. It was hypothesized that subjects in this 
condition would show moderate ingroup bias because they 
would implicitly think about the reasons for their own 
choice of painting eventhough they were not given much time 
for such thinking, and they were not directed to do so. In 
the second condition ("both" condition), subjects were asked 
to list reasons for both their own group and the outgroup 
members' choices of paintings, and then asked to evaluate 
both the ingroup and outgroup. It was hypothesized that 
subjects in this condition would show less ingroup bias than 
those in the basic condition because, in addition to 
thinking about ingroup reasons (which presumably also occurs 
in the basic condition), these subjects were also directed 
to think about outgroup reasons. This thinking process 
would lead to less prominent ingroup bias because it would 
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produce new persuasive arguments for the outgroup's choice 
of painting. In the third condition (outgroup condition), 
subjects were asked to list reasons only for the outgroup 
members' choice of painting and then to evaluate both the 
ingroup and outgroup. It was hypothesized that subjects 
would show no ingroup bias or even reverse bias (favoring 
the outgroup over the ingroup) because they would mainly 
think about reasons for the outgroup members' choice, and 
such thinking process or argumentation would produce new 
persuasive arguments for the outgroup's choice of painting 
which would, in turn, lead to no ingroup bias or reverse 
bias. In the fourth condition (music condition), subjects 
were led to think about their classification into two music 
groups (music A and music B groups) based on their choice of 
music. They were asked to list reasons for both their own 
group and the outgroup members' choice of music, and to 
evaluate both the music ingroup and music outgroup. It was 
hypothesized that subjects in this condition would show no 
ingroup bias because of a lack of distinction or 
differentiation between the ingroup and outgroup. This lack 
of differentiation was presumed because subjects raised 
their hands for their choice of paintings and were separated 
spacially based on that choice, but were only labelled as 
belonging to music A and music B groups in the 
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questionnaire. In other words, subjects never publicly 
indicated their music preference and could not guess who 
might be in their group or the other group. In such a 
situation, subjects' classification based on paintings would 
be much more salient, and so presumably would be 
ingroup/outgroup feelings, than their classification based 
on music. In the fifth condition (distraction condition), 
subjects were divided into two groups based on their choice 
of paintings (as in all other conditions), then asked to 
list reasons for choosing both music A and music B, and then 
asked to evaluate the painting ingroup and outgroup. It was 
hypothesized that subjects in this condition would show no 
ingroup bias becuase they would not have opportunity to 
think about reasons for choosing paintings due to the 
distraction, i.e., due to listing reasons for the choice of 
music rather than painting. 
Ingroup bias was measured by two kinds of methods; 18 
semantic differential scales were used as an evaluative 
measure and the two-choice matrices designed by Brewer and 
Silver (1978) were used as a behavioral measure of ingroup 
bias. The study used two different measures because ingroup 
bias is supposed to have both evaluative and behavioral 
aspects. Subjects evaluated both ingroup and outgroup 
members by selecting one point on a seven point scale, with 
anchor points such as likable/dislikable. 
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friendly/unfriendly, etc. The 18 dimensions of the scales 
were likable, friendly, capable, pleasant, intelligent, 
desirable as a friend, attractive, original, organized, 
artisitc, confident, generous, creative, talented, 
sophisticated, good taste, and rational. The favorable and 
unfavorable end points of the scales were arranged 
alternately to prevent response set. 
The result of scale responses was analyzed using 
matched pairs analysis. Each subject's outgroup evaluation 
was subtracted from the ingroup evaluation and summed across 
the 18 dimensions. The mean of these values for each 
condition are: 24.06 (s.e.=10.91) in the basic condition, 
2.56 (s.e.=1.49) in the "both" condition, -2.50 (s.e.=4.55) 
in the outgroup condition, 9.33 (s.e.=4.72) in the music 
condition, and 10.89 (s.e.=5.22) in the distraction 
condition. The result of t-tests to see whether the mean in 
each condition is significantly different from zero was: 
t=2.21 (p(0.06) in the basic condition, t=1.72 (p=0.13) in 
the "both" condition, t=-0.55 (p=0.61) in the outgroup 
condition, t=1.98 (p(0.09) in the music condition, and 
t=2.09 (p<0.08) in the distraction condition (all two-
tailed). Thus, according to t-tests, subjects in the basic, 
music, and distraction conditions showed ingroup bias at 
marginally significant levels. The t-test for the total 
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sample of subjects was t=3.15 (p<0.01), which shows that 
there was overall ingroup bias across conditions. 
Nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test was performed as an 
alternative to t-test because the number of subjects in each 
condition was quite small. According to this, subjects in 
the basic condition and the distraction condition showed 
significant ingroup bias (p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively), 
and those in the music condition showed the bias at a 
marginal level of significance (p<0.08). According to the 
general linear model, however, there was no difference in 
terms of means by condition (F=2.21, df=4, 36; p<0.09; R* 
=0.198). Also, the amount of ingroup bias was not different 
by sex. 
Matrices proposed by Brewer and Silver (1978) were used 
as a behavioral measure of ingroup bias. There are four 
kinds of strategies or distribution rules: equality, 
relative gain, own gain, and joint gain. Those correspond 
to fairness, maximum difference, maximum ingroup profit, and 
maximum joint profit strategies, respectively, of Tajfel's 
matrices. Subjects had to choose one of two allocation 
types to give extra credit points to ingroup and outgroup 
members who would participate in the research next semester 
(matrices will be explained in detail later). There was a 
mistake in the questionnaire, so that the results of 
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matrices for the subjects who chose the Kandinsky painting 
in the basic, "both", outgroup, and distraction conditions 
and for those who chose music A in the music condition could 
not be obtained. Thus, the results are only based on 33 
subjects. Subjects used the relative gain strategy 
dominantly in both the basic and "both" conditions, thus 
showing ingroup bias. However, those in the outgroup, 
music, and distraction conditions chose both equality and 
relative gain almost equally. Overall, subjects selected 
relative gain most often (twice as much as the equality 
strategy), and chose equality next frequently. The own gain 
and joint gain strategies were only small portion of the 
total choices. 
In addition, it was found that the correlation between 
the number of reasons listed for the outgroup's choice of 
painting and the evaluation of the outgroup in the outgroup 
condition was r=-0.933 (p<0.05). Thus, the more reasons 
subjects listed for the outgroup's choice, i.e., the more 
they thought about the outgroup and produced arguments for 
its choice, the more favorable were their evaluations of 
outgroup members. This supports the prediction by 
persuasive arguments theory. However, there was no 
relationship between the number of reasons listed for the 
ingroup's choice and the evaluation of the ingroup in the 
"both" condition. 
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As we have seen above, the pretest showed that subjects 
evaluated the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup and 
tended to give more reward to the ingroup than to the 
outgroup. The basic condition showed significant ingroup 
bias, supporting the hypothesis. However, contrary to the 
hypotheses, subjects in the music condition and in the 
distraction condition also showed ingroup bias, although it 
was at marginal levels. There are plausible reasons for 
that. The manipulation for the music condition may not have 
been appropriate. While it is true that the ingroup and 
outgroup based on the choice of music were not visible, 
subjects could still conceptualize the existence of a 
distinct ingroup and outgroup and the groups were labelled 
as "music A" and "music B" in the questionnaire. Thus, the 
intention to minimize and obscure categorization in the 
music condition might not have been achieved. The results 
in the distraction condition may have occurred because the 
distracting activity was not strong enough to actually 
distract subjects from thinking about the paintings and 
their choices. This possibility seems to be plausible 
because in response to a question at the end of the 
experimental session, "How much did you think about the 
reasons that your (or the other) group members might have 
had for making their choice of paintings", subjects in this 
condition indicated they had thought about it a lot. In 
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fact, their answers were higher than in any other condition. 
As predicted, subjects in the outgroup condition did not 
show ingroup bias. Their evaluation was the reverse of 
ingroup bias although it was not significant. Despite 
rating the outgroup higher than the ingroup on the average, 
the mean evaluation of the ingroup across the total 18 
scales in this condition was the highest among all 
conditions. Subjects in the "both" condition did not show 
ingroup bias; actually the mean was the second lowest, 
following that of the outgroup condition. Thus, it seems 
that thinking about both the ingroup's and the outgroup's 
reasons tends to lead to a balanced, fair evaluation. The 
results of matrix choices, however, seems somewhat different 
from that of the scales. Contrary to the results from the 
scales, subjects in the "both" condition strongly preferred 
relative gain, which means ingroup bias. Thus, it is 
possible that the kind of measurement used for measuring 
ingroup bias makes a difference in the results. 
This pretest provided some interesting preliminary data 
but also pointed to a number of drawbacks in the research 
design. First of all, a majority of subjects chose the 
paintings by Klee, and thus the size of the two groups was 
not equal (Klee group: 34 subjects, Kandinsky group: 7). 
This may have caused majority versus minority effects. 
Second, the manipulation of conditions was probably 
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ineffective or incorrect, especially for the music and 
distraction conditions, as indicated above. Also, according 
to their responses to the postexperimental questionnaire, 
many subjects could guess or at least come close to guessing 
the experimental hypotheses and purpose of the research. 
Thus, there is a possibility that these subjects might have 
answered the questions and evaluated the groups in response 
to the demand characteristics of the situation. 
Furthermore, subjects in this study were not anonymous, and 
thus previous acquaintance or personal preference might have 
influenced their evaluation of the groups. Also, the size 
of a group might have been too big because the whole class 
was divided into two groups. Based on the results of this 
study, a second pretest was conducted which revised many of 
the procedures used in the first pretest. 
Pretest 2 
The basic purpose of the second pretest was the same as 
that of the first pretest except some conditions were 
replaced by other conditions. This was conducted two months 
after the first pretest. Subjects were college students who 
were taking a sociology course. They were given extra 
credit points for their participation in the experiment. 
The experiment was run during the regular class hour and 
lasted about one hour. A total of 25 students participated 
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in the experiment, but one subject was excluded in data 
analysis because he did not take the procedures seriously. 
Three condions were run simultaneously; 9 subjects in the 
first condition, 7 in the second condition, and 8 in the 
third condition. There were 17 female subjects and 7 males. 
The range of age was between 19 and 30, and about half of 
the subjects were juniors. As in the first pretest, an 
experimental method and a questionnaire were employed. The 
questionnaires were stapled not only at the top but also at 
the bottom in order to prevent subjects from moving through 
the pages at a different pace. The experimenter told all 
the subjects when to tear off the page and move on to the 
next section. 
There were three conditions. The first condition 
(basic condition) was intended to demonstrate basic ingroup 
bias. Subjects were not asked to list reasons for their 
choice of paintings but instead were asked to just relax for 
several minutes and think about whatever they wanted to 
think about. As in all conditions of this second pretest 
they evaluated both the ingroup and outgroup as categorized 
by painting preferences (no music was involved in this 
pretest). It was hypothesized that subjects in this 
condition would show moderate ingroup bias. The second 
condition (ingroup condition) was a new condition which was 
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not tested in the first pretest. In this condition, 
subjects were asked to list reasons for their own and other 
ingroup members' choice of painting, and then evaluate both 
the ingroup and outgroup. It was hypothesized that subjects 
in this condition would show the most ingroup bias because 
they would think mostly about the reasons for ingroup 
members to choose the same paintings as they did. Such 
reasoning would produce new persuasive arguments for the 
ingroup's choice which would lead to increased ingroup bias. 
In a third condition (outgroup condition), subjects were 
asked to list reasons for only the outgroup members' choice 
of paintings and then evaluate both the ingroup and 
outgroup. It was hypothesized that subjects would show no 
ingroup bias or even reverse bias. 
The procedure was as follows. First, subjects signed 
the consent form. In the consent form, the purpose of the 
study was explained as a study of seating arrangements and 
nonverbal cues. In order to disguise the purpose of 
dividing them into groups and having them evaluate each 
other, subjects were told that the study is about the 
relationship between seating arrangements and nonverbal cues 
and that they would be asked to sit in a several, different 
seating arrangements and answer questions about their 
judgments and perceptions of others. To make the cover 
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story believable, the experimental session was divided into 
three segments: a first seating arrangement followed by 
half of the evaluation scales, a second seating arrangement 
followed by the reward allocation matrices, and a third 
seating arrangement followed by the rest of the evaluation 
scales. All conditions were identical except for the time 
immediately after each seating arrangement during which some 
subjects listed reasons and others did not. After 
collecting the consent forms, the experimenter handed out 
the questionnaires. Subjects were asked to fill out the 
first page of the questionnaire which mainly included 
questions related to social space (e.g., "Where do you 
usually sit in a classroom?"). Then the experimenter showed 
two pairs of slides; one pair were paintings by Klee and the 
other pair by Kandinsky. After studying the slides, 
subjects raised their hands to indicate their choice of 
paintings and then took a seat on either side of the room 
based on that choice. Thus, subjects were divided into two 
groups, the Klee group and the Kandinsky group. Next, the 
experimenter told the subjects to move on to the next page 
and complete what was referred to as the "first transition 
period". During the first transition period, subjects in 
the basic condition did nothing, while subjects in the 
ingroup and outgroup conditions listed reasons for either 
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their ingroup or outgroup's choice of paintings, 
respectively. After about 3 to 4 minutes, the experimenter 
told them to go on to the next page referred to as 
"nonverbal cues from first seating arrangement". In this 
section, subjects rated the ingroup and outgroup members on 
nine semantic differential scales. Next, subjects were 
asked to seat themselves in a different arrangement. Each 
group made a circle. Subjects completed the "second 
transition period" which contained the same activity as in 
the first transition period (either listing reasons or 
relaxing). After completing that, they moved to a page 
called "allocation cues from second seating arrangement", in 
which they allocated extra credit points to the ingroup and 
the outgroup using the Brewer and Silver matrices. Then 
subjects moved to the third transition period. During this 
period, those in the basic condition did nothing and were 
asked to think about whatever they want to think about. 
Those in the other conditions were given a list of possible 
reasons for choosing a paintings (e.g., color, design) and 
were asked to rank the 10 most important reasons for 
choosing either the same paintings as they chose (ingroup 
condition) or the other paintings (outgroup condition). 
Then subjects completed a page called "nonverbal cues from 
third seating arrangement", in which they again evaluated 
both ingroup and outgroup members using another set of nine 
143 
evaluation scales. At this point, the experimenter told 
them that they could go ahead and finish the rest of 
questionnaire at their own pace. After finishing the 
questionnaire, the experimenter handed out a sheet which 
asked subjects to guess the hypotheses behind the study and 
make comments about the study. The experimenter collected 
the questionnaires and debriefed subjects thoroughly. 
The same two kinds of measurements for ingroup bias 
were used as in the first pretest. The dimensions of the 
scales were somewhat different from those in first pretest, 
however (i.e., such dimensions as capable, imaginative, 
original, artistic, creative, and good taste in first 
pretest were replaced by those as competent, effective, 
trustworthy, responsible, kind, and cooperative). The scale 
responses were again analyzed using matched pairs analysis. 
The mean for each condition are: 8.89 (s.e.=2.89) in the 
basic condition, 13.50 (s.e.=11.05) in the ingroup 
condition, and 5.75 (s.e.=3.99) in the outgroup condition. 
The results of t-tests were; t=3.07 (p<0.02), t=1.22 
(p=0.28), and t=1.44 (p=0.19) respectively (two-tailed). 
Thus, although the mean of the ingroup condition was the 
highest, its standard error was very large and only the 
basic condition showed significant ingroup bias. Neither 
the ingroup nor outgroup conditions showed significant 
ingroup bias. The result of Wilcoxon signed-rank test was 
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the same; significant ingroup bias occurred only in the 
basic condition. The mean for the total sample of subjects 
was 9.0 (s.e.=3.26), and was significantly different from 0 
(t=2.76; p(0.02). Thus, overall, subjects evaluated the 
ingroup members more highly than the outgroup members. 
According to general linear model, there was no difference 
in means among the three conditions (F=0.40, df=2, 20; 
p=0.68; R*=0.038). 
The result of matrice choices is not available because 
of a problem in the questionnaire, i.e., because matrices 
were not relevant for those who chose Kandinsky paintings 
and this time the majority of subjects (n=16) chose 
Kandinsky paintings. 
There was no significant relationship between the 
number of reasons listed for ingroup or outgroup's choice of 
painting and the amount of ingroup bias. To see whether the 
manipulation of listing reasons was effective, a question at 
the end of the questionnaire asked the subject how much he 
or she thought about the reasons behind the ingroup's and 
the outgroup's choice of painting. In the basic condition, 
the mean was 2.33 for thinking about the ingroup and 2.33 
for thinking about the outgroup on a scale from 1 to 5, 
where higher scores indicate more thought. In the ingroup 
condition, the mean was 3.66 for the ingroup's choice and 
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2.83 for the outgroup, and in the outgroup condition, 2.88 
and 4.13. This means that subjects in the basic condition 
thought about the reasons for the ingroup and outgroup's 
choice of paintings equally, and those in the ingroup 
condition thought about the reasons for the ingroup's choice 
more than those for the outgroup's choice, and those in the 
outgroup condition thought about the reasons for the 
outgroup's choice more than those for ingroup's choice. 
Therefore, this shows that the manipulation— repeatedly 
listing reasons— was more successful than it was in the 
first pretest, when subjects listed reasons only once. 
In general, the study showed that subjects evaluated 
the ingroup more favorably than the outgroup across 
conditions. The predictions for the basic and outgroup 
conditions were supported while the prediction for the 
ingroup condition was not supported. Different from the 
results of first pretest, the direction of bias in the 
outgroup condition was not reverse. Also, although the 
ingroup condition had the highest mean, ingroup bias was not 
significant probably due to big standard error value. One 
encouraging finding, however, was that the values of the 
means for the three conditions were in the predicted order; 
the highest in the ingroup condition, middle in the basic 
condition, and the lowest in the outgroup condition. 
Nevertheless, ingroup bias was not different by condition 
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according to an F-test, probably due to big standard error 
values. 
This pretest tried to remedy some of drawbacks found in 
the first test. For instance, it contained three transition 
periods in order for subjects to think more about reasons 
and have more time for argumentation. Also, the cover story 
was changed so that subjects could not guess the hypotheses. 
To disguise the real purpose of the study, subjects were 
asked to move seats several times. Such disguise proved to 
be successful according to postexperimental question, i.e., 
most subjects could not guess the hypotheses. As another 
way to disguise the purpose, 18 scales were divided into two 
parts and matrices were inserted between them. However, 
there were also some problems. Especially disappointing, 
once again the size of the two groups were not equal, i.e., 
16 subjects chose Kandinsky and 8 chose Klee paintings, 
although this pretest tried to prevent this by showing two 
different paintings by each artist. Despite careful 
selection and pretesting of the paintings used, it seemed 
impossible to ensure approximately equal choice of the 
paintings in any given set of subjects. Thus, the main test 
was designed to prevent this problem by using confederates. 
Through the results of two pretests, it was shown that 
the hypotheses drawn from persuasive arguments theory have 
some plausibility even though some results did not reach 
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statistically significant level probably due to small number 
of subjects. Thus, based on these tests, the main test was 
designed and conducted. 
Subjects and Conditions 
Subjects were undergraduate students who were enrolled 
in several sociology courses. Most of them participated 
voluntarily for extra credit points, and only several of 
them participated voluntarily without any extra credit. 
Subjects can be presumed to be unaquainted because they came 
from different classes. The data were collected through 
five sessions, and each session had a total of 17 to 22 
subjects, who consisted of one ingroup and one outgroup. 
Thus, the size of groups in each condition ranged from 8 to 
12 people. Female subjects were somewhat more numerous in 
each session, but the sex composition was not radically 
skewed. A total 72 students participated in the experiment. 
Out of that number, 7 subjects were deleted in data analysis 
because 6 of them guessed the purpose and hypotheses of the 
study correctly according to their responses to 
postexperimental questions, and one violated the conditions 
of the experiment. He based his evaluation of the ingroup 
entirely on his observation of the behavior of the subject 
sitting next to him. This was very clear from his comments 
on the postexperimental questionnaire. Thus, the analysis 
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is based on the responses of a total of 65 subjects, 34 
females and 31 males. The distribution of subjects by 
school year is; 18 freshmen, 22 sophomores, 12 juniors, and 
13 senior students. The range of age was from 18 to 51 (two 
students were in their thirties, one in his 40's and one 51, 
with the rest between 18 and 20s). Five to seven 
confederates, who were also students in sociology courses 
and given extra credit points for their participation, were 
used in each session. The purpose of using confederates was 
to make the size of the ingroup and outgroup approximately 
equal. Confederates were instructed to join the group which 
was smaller than the other group. 
The basic condition was conducted entirely in one 
session, and the distraction condition in another. The 
ingroup and outgroup conditions were run simultaneously 
using three sessions. The size of the session for the basic 
condition was 21, among them 5 were confederates. Thus, 
there were 16 real subjects in the basic condition, and one 
of them was excluded in data analysis. The session for the 
distraction condition consisted of 22 students, among them 5 
were confederates. Thus, there were 17 real subjects in the 
distraction condition, and one of them was deleted in data 
analysis due to a correct guess of the hypotheses. The 
three sessions for the ingroup and outgroup conditions 
consisted of 17, 19, and 21 students, among them 7, 5, and 6 
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were confederates respectively. Thus, the number of real 
subjects were 10, 14, and 15 respectively for each session, 
and 5 of them were excluded in data analysis due to a 
correct guess of the hypotheses. Among the 34 real subjects 
in these three sessions, 18 were in the ingroup condition, 
and 16 were in the outgroup condition. Therefore, the total 
number of subjects for the basic condition is 15, 16 for the 
distraction condition, 18 for the ingroup condition, and 16 
for the outgroup condition. The proportion of male and 
female students is: 8 to 7 in the basic condition, 10 to 6 
in the distraction condition, 6 to 12 in the ingroup 
condition, and 7 to 9 in the outgroup condition. The 
purpose of using confederates was successfully achieved, 
i.e., the size of ingroup and outgroup was approximately 
equal in each session. 
Four conditions were tested. In the basic condition, 
subjects were not asked to list any reasons and evaluated 
both the ingroup and outgroup. It was hypothesized that 
subjects would show the basic ingroup bias because of 
implicit thinking of reasons for own group's choice. In the 
ingroup condition, subjects were asked to list reasons only 
for ingroup members' choice of painting and to evaluate both 
the ingroup and outgroup. It was hypothesized that subjects 
would show the most ingroup bias because they would think 
most about the reasons for their own and other ingroup 
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members' choice and thus produce new persuasive arguments 
for the ingroup's choice. In the outgroup condition, 
subjects were asked to list reasons only for outgroup 
members' choice of painting and to evaluate both ingroup and 
outgroup. It was hypothesized that subjects would show no 
ingroup bias or reverse bias because they would mostly think 
about the reasons for outgroup members' choice and thus 
generate new persuasive arguments for the outgroup's choice. 
In the distraction condition, subjects were not asked to 
list reasons. Instead, they performed various activities, 
and evaluated both ingroup and outgroup. Such activities 
were provided to prevent them from thinking about the 
paintings and their choices. It was hypothesized that 
subjects would show no ingroup bias because they do not have 
an opportunity to think about the reasons for either groups' 
choice due to the distraction and thus cannot produced new 
arguments for or against the choice. 
Procedures 
The design of the study is similar to that of second 
pretest except some modifications such as the introduction 
of confederates. When recruiting subjects, the purpose of 
the study was explained as a study about seating 
arrangements and nonverbal cues. Two female experimenters 
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run each session. Each session lasted approximately 50 
minutes. When subjects arrived, they received the consent 
form and one page questionnaire which includes questions 
about background information mostly related to social space. 
The purpose of these questions was to disguise the real 
intention of the study. There were two kinds of consent 
forms, one for subjects who got extra credit points and one 
for those who did not. Subjects completed the questionnaire 
while wating for other subjects to show up. Subjects were 
asked not to talk to each other in order to prevent the 
effect of social interaction on ingroup bias. When all 
subjects arrived, the experimenter told them that the study 
was about seating arrangements and nonverbal cues and gave 
brief instructions. In these instructions, subjects were 
asked not talk throughout the study because it is about 
nonverbal cues. The experimenter said that the 
questionnaire would ask for a number of judgments, and asked 
subjects to read all the instructions in the questionnaire 
carefully. The experimenter showed an example of the 
questionnaire, explaining that it is stapled at the bottom 
so that subjects not to get ahead of each other and would 
move through the questionnaire simultaneously. Subjects 
were told to tear off the next page when asked. Then the 
brief explanation of the procedure was given as follows: 
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the experimenter will collect the background information 
sheets and will divide subjects into two groups. Instead of 
assigning them to a group, they will be divided according to 
their preference judgment. Then the experimenter will put 
the subjects into three different seating arrangements. 
Between each seating arrangement, there will be a transition 
period. The purpose of the transition period is to prevent 
the effects of one seating arrangement from contaminating 
the effects of the next seating arrangement. During each 
transition period subjects will have a "filler activity". 
The experimenter once again reminded the subjects not to 
talk. 
After these instructions, the experimenters collected 
the signed consent forms and the background information 
sheets. Categorization of subjects into two groups was 
based on subjects' painting preferences. Slides of two 
pairs of Klee and Kandinsky paintings were projected 
alternately. Two paintings by each artist were selected ("A 
hotel" and "Sunset in the city" by Klee, and "White line" 
and "Composition VII" by Kandinsky). These paintings were 
selected because they seemed equally attractive. Subjects 
were asked to raise their hands indicating which artist they 
preferred, and then to take a seat on either side of the 
room. 
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Those who chose the Klee paintings were told to sit in 
rows facing the back of the room, and those who chose the 
Kandinsky paintings facing the front of the room. After 
this first seating arrangement was instituted, the 
experimenters handed out the questionnaires, asked subjects 
to fill out the first page which indicated subjects' 
painting preferences, and then move on to the second page 
titled, "first transition period". The experimenter told 
them to follow the instructions and that they had several 
minutes before moving on to the next page. During this 
period, subjects in the basic condition read the instruction 
to just relax and think about whatever they wanted. 
Subjects in the ingroup and outgroup conditions were 
instructed to list reasons for the ingroup and outgroup's 
choice of paintings respectively and to select among all the 
reasons they had listed the three most important reasons for 
the painting choice. In the distraction condition, subjects 
were instructed to solve a word jumble (unscramble words and 
solve a riddle). This and the other distraction activities 
used in this condition were selected because they seemed to 
attract subjects' attention and required their cognitive 
efforts. 
After 3-5 minutes for the first transition period, the 
experimenter told subjects to move on to the next two pages 
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called "nonverbal cues from first seating arrangement". 
Subjects were given about two minutes to complete these 
pages which included 9 semantic differential scales for 
evaluating the ingroup and 9 different scales for evaluating 
the outgroup. In other words, subjects rated the ingroup on 
likable/dislikable, friendly/unfriendly, etc, but rated the 
outgroup on organized/disorganized, 
responsible/irresponsible, etc. Later in the session these 
scales were switched so that the ingroup was rated on 
organized/disorganized, etc., and the outgroup on 
likable/dislikable, etc. The total 18 pairs of scales were 
divided into two parts and presented alternately in an 
attempt to make subjects less suspicious about the purpose 
of the study. 
After finishing this, subjects were asked to move their 
chairs for the second seating arrangement. The Klee group 
and the Kandinsky group lined up in single file on either 
side of the room facing each other in this arrangement. 
Then the experimenter told them to move on to the page 
titled "second transition period", and said they would have 
several minutes to complete this page. During this period, 
subjects in the basic condition were instructed to do the 
same thing as in the first transition period, relax and 
think about anything they wished. Those in the ingroup and 
outgroup conditions were asked to list new reasons for the 
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ingroup and outgroup's choice of paintings respectively, and 
to write a brief paragraph describing these paintings as 
vividly as they could. Those in the distraction condition 
were instructed to make paper sailor's hat and an origami 
bird by folding pieces of paper. 
After completing this, subjects moved on to a page 
titled "allocation cues from second seating arrangement" 
which included matrices for allocating points to the Klee 
and Kandinsky groups. Subjects had to choose one of two 
kinds of reward allocations for each of the 8 Brewer and 
Silver items. Following this, subjects were asked to move 
their chairs for the third seating arrangement. In this 
arrangement, the Klee group members sat in rows facing 
forward and the Kandinsky group members sat in rows facing 
the back of the room. After moving their seats, the 
experimenter asked subjects to move to the next pages titled 
"third transition period". Once again, subjects were given 
several minutes. Subjects in the basic condition were again 
asked to just relax. Those in the ingroup and outgroup 
conditions were given a list of 36 possible reasons for 
choosing a painting (color, design, etc.) and were asked to 
select and rank the 10 most important reasons for choosing 
the paintings in question— the paintings they chose for the 
ingroup condition and paintings the other group chose for 
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the outgroup condition. Also, they were asked to write the 
most persuasive paragraph they could, trying to convince 
someone to choose those. Subjects in the distraction 
condition were asked to match "Far Side" cartoons with their 
correct captions and to make up their own captions for 
several other cartoons. 
After this third transition period, the experimenter 
asked subjects to move on to the next page which was titled 
"nonverbal cues from third seating arrangement", and 
included 9 scales on which to evaluate the ingroup and 
outgroup for each group. The experimenter told them that at 
this point they can move at their own pace and tear off 
pages as they completed the questionnaire. After all 
subjects finished the questionnaire, the experimenters 
handed out a postexperimental questionnaire asking subjects 
to guess the hypotheses behind the study and to make 
comments. Subjects were told to insert this sheet into the 
experimental questionnaire booklet. Lastly, the 
experimenters collected the questionnaires, and reminded 
subjects not to talk about this study to any friends who are 
going to participate later. An example of a questionnaire 
is presented in the Appendix. 
157 
Dependent measures 
Ingroup bias can be displayed in various ways. It can 
be affective, cognitive, or behavioral. Affective bias 
includes feelings of attraction toward ingroup members, and 
cognitive bias includes beliefs that members of the ingroup 
are similar to one another and members of the outgroup are 
dissimilar. Behavioral bias includes attempts to reward 
ingroup members at the expense of outgroup members. Dion 
indicates that ingroup bias exists at the behavioral level, 
evaluative level, and cognitive level, and that the 
interconnection among these three levels of bias needs to be 
studied. According to Herringer and Garza's study (1987), 
ingroup bias was displayed in terms of matrix choice but did 
not exist when measured by trait ratings. It seems that the 
results from the two measures may not be always corresponded 
each other. Therefore, measuring ingroup bias using both 
measures may be necessary and informative. 
Evaluative measure-- scales A total of 18 pairs of 
semantic differential scales which represent traits of 
ingroup and outgroup members were used to measure ingroup 
bias at the evaluative level. Subjects rated ingroup 
members first and then outgroup members on a series of 
seven-point bipolar scales (9 different scales for each 
group) during the first "nonverbal cues" sequence. For the 
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second "nonverbal cues" period, the set of 9 scales were 
switched so that subjects evaluated the ingroup on the 
scales previously used to evaluate the outgroup, and vice 
versa. The 18 scales are: likable/dislikable, 
friendly/unfriendly, competent/incompetent, 
pleasant/unpleasant, intelligent/unintelligent, desirable as 
a friend/undesirable as a friend, attractive/unattractive, 
effect ive/inef feet ive, trustworthy/untrustworthy, 
organized/unorganized, responsible/irresponsible, 
confident/unconfident, generous/stingy, kind/unkind, 
talented/untaiented, sophisticated/unsophisticated, 
cooperative/uncooperative, rational/irrational. Some of 
them represent sociometric traits, some are about abilities, 
and others measure personal characteristics of the members. 
Thus', the study includes various kinds of scales in order to 
measure a general evaluation of group members. 
Behavioral measure— matrices Brewer and Silver's 
(1978) two-choice reward allocation matrices were used to 
measure the behavioral aspect of ingroup bias. These 
matrices have not been used often in ingroup bias research. 
They were designed by Brewer and Silver, and used by Lemyre 
and Smith (1985) and Herringer and Garza (1987). All these 
studies showed ingroup bias. 
159 
Most Other researchers using matrices usually adopt 
Tajfel's multiple-choice matrices. However, there have been 
some criticisms of Tajfel's instrument. For instance, 
Brewer criticizes that Tajfel's matrices are not 
systematically varied to compare favoritism with all 
possible choice combinations. In particular, the choice 
alternatives that maximize the difference between ingroup 
and outgroup reward in favor of the ingroup members are 
usually confounded with alternatives that maximize absolute 
gain, i.e., the choice that maximizes the number of points 
provided to the ingroup member alone. Thus, the structure 
of the matrix task itself may have dictated a competitive 
strategy, in that a gain for the ingroup could be achieved 
only at a cost to the outgroup member. Furthermore, Brewer 
indicates that in Tajfel et al.'s experiment (1971) only one 
matrix format was used which maximized the ingroup member's 
outcome and did not also maximize relative gain, and in this 
one case the strategy was confounded with maximizing joint 
gain and maximizing the difference in favor of the outgroup 
member (Brewer, 1979:309-310). Thus, Brewer and Silver 
developed the two-choice matrices to alleviate this problem. 
Others have criticized Tajfel's matrices. Bornstein et 
al. (1983) contend based on their data that Tajfel's 
measures are potentially misleading. They found that using 
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Tajfel's and their own revised measures lead to different 
results, and they indicated five possible problems with 
Tajfel's instrument. Their revised procedure is designed to 
measure 7 between-group orientations instead of 4. It seems 
that Tajfel's matrix design is more complicated and requires 
subjects more time to complete in comparison with two-choice 
matrices. Thus, this study used two-choice matrices (Table 
1). The choice matrices were presented in a scrambled 
order. 
These matrices test the generality of a preference for 
outcomes which maximize the competitive advantage of the 
ingroup under forced-choice conditions. The matrices 
represent all possible pairings of the four alternative 
distribution rules of interest. For each pair of two-choice 
matrices (e.g., matrix A1 and A2), the distribution rules 
that are confounded in the first matrix of the pair are 
opposed in the second matrix. Thus, assuming consistency of 
choice preferences across matrices, the pattern of choices 
for the two matrices in each pair, when combined, 
discriminates perfectly among the four distribution rules. 
This is indicated by the scoring key associated with each 
matrix pair in Table 1. That is, the scoring key given in 
the table describes how the combination of either the 0 or 1 
choice for the first matrix and either the 0 or 1 choice for 
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TABLE 1. Two-choice reward allocation matrices (Brewer and 
Silver, 1978) 
MATRIX PAIRS CHOICE SCORING KEY 
Matrix A1: 0 1 
payoff to ingrouper 7 8 0. 0: equality 
payoff to outgrouper 9 4 0. 1; joint gain 
Matrix A2: 0 1 1. 0: relative gain 
payoff to ingrouper 7 8 1. 1: own gain 
payoff to outgrouper 9 12 
Matrix B1; 0 1 
payoff to ingrouper 6 7 0. 0: joint gain 
payoff to outgrouper 8 3 0. 1: equality 
Matrix B2; 0 1 1. 0; own gain 
payoff to ingrouper 6 5 1. 1: relative gain 
payoff to outgrouper 8 4 
Matrix CI; 0 1 
payoff to ingrouper 6 7 0. 0; equality 
payoff to outgrouper 4 10 0. 1: relative gain 
Matrix C2; 0 1 1. 0: joint gain 
payoff to ingrouper 6 7 1. 1: own gain 
payoff to outgrouper 4 1 
Matrix Dl: 0 1 
payoff to ingrouper 7 9 0. 0: relative gain 
payoff to outgrouper 5 12 0. 1: equality 
Matrix D2: 0 1 1. 0; own gain 
payoff to ingrouper 7 6 1. 1: joint gain 
payoff to outgrouper 5 7 
the second matrix provides evidence for the four allocation 
strategies. Brewer and Silver label the four allocation 
strategies as "own gain", "relative gain", "equality", and 
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"joint gain" which correspond directly to Tajfel's 
strategies called "maximum ingroup profit", "maximum 
difference", "fairness", and "maximum joint profit". In 
their study, Brewer and Silver report that the majority of 
the subjects tended to choose relative gain, thus consistent 
with previous evidence for maximum difference choice. 
In the present study, subjects were told that the 
experimenter would conduct a similar experiment next 
semester, except for the fact that it would involve the 
differential allocation of points to participants. Without 
knowing the particulars of this research, subjects were 
asked to indicate how they thought the experimenter should 
allocate points to those who chose Klee versus Kandinsky 
paintings by choosing one of two different allocations for 
each of the 8 matrix pairs. The study asked subjects to 
allocate points to future participants rather than some 
immediate rewards such as money or extra credit points in 
order to eliminate the influence of self-interest on their 
choices. 
Data Analysis Methods 
The result of semantic differential scale responses 
will be analyzed using matched pairs analysis. Matched 
pairs analysis is appropriate for analyzing the results 
because the scales consist of response pairs, one for 
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ingroup and one for outgroup evaluation. The outgroup 
evaluation is subtracted from the ingroup evaluation for 
each dimension (e.g., friendly/unfriendly), these are summed 
across all dimensions, and this sum represents the subject's 
relative evaluation of the ingroup versus the outgroup. 
Positive values indicate higher evaluation of the ingroup, 
negative values, higher evaluation of the outgroup. The 
mean of these values in a condition should be zero if there 
is no evaluation bias. The evaluation scales will then be 
analyzed using t-tests and the nonparametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (see Bickel and Doksum, 1977). T-tests and 
Wilcoxon test will be used to test whether there is a 
significant ingroup bias in each condition. A nonparametric 
technique is adopted because the number of subjects in each 
condition is rather small. In such cases, assuming a normal 
distribution may not be reasonable. Tajfel and his 
colleagues (Tajfel et el., 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; 
Tajfel and Billig, 1974) sometimes used Wilcoxon test to 
analyze their experimental data. When Brown et al. (1980) 
responded to Aschenbrenner and Schaefer's criticism about 
minimal group studies, they pointed out that the basic 
findings of the studies requires no parametric assumptions. 
Also, an analysis of variance for the total subjects pool 
will be presented. 
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The result of matrices will be analyzed based on the 
frequency with which subjects chose the four distribution 
rules. In addition, a "test of composition" randomization 
test developed by Edgington (see Edgington, 1987) will be 
used to analyze these data. Randomization test is a 
permutation test based on randomization. It is a test for 
which the significance of experimental results is determined 
by permuting the data repeatedly to compute test statistics. 
A "test of differences in composition" which will be used to 
analyze the result of matrices concerns differences in 
composition of compounds contained within individual 
experimental units. It calculates the p-value for a test of 
differences in composition. The p-value is defined as the 
number of test statistic values that are as large as, or 
larger than, the obtained test statistic value over the 
number of test statistic values calculated by the program. 
The test statistic is the sum of all T**2/n where T is the 
total for each cell in a group by variables matrix and n is 
the number of subjects for each cell. This test statistic 
is an equivalent test statistic to F for one-way ANOVA, for 
determining significance by data permutation. 
165 
CHAPTER V. FINDINGS 
Evaluative Measure 
The results of semantic differential scales by matched 
pairs analysis are presented in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. Ingroup bias in scales 
condition basic ingroup outgroup distraction total 
mean 5 .73* *  11.94** 2.38 4.81 6.40 
s.e. 1.93 3.32 1.89 2.63 1.35 
n 15 18 16 16 65 
**Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed). 
As predicted, ingroup bias was highest in the ingroup 
condition, next highest in the basic condition, followed by 
the distraction condition, and the outgroup condition. To 
see whether those means are significantly different from 0, 
t-tests were performed. According to t-tests, significant 
ingroup bias occurred in the basic condition (t=2.98; p< 
0.01). The ingroup condition also displayed significant 
ingroup bias (t=3.60; p<0.01). However, both the outgroup 
and distraction conditions did not show the bias (t=1.25, 
p=0.23 and t=1.83, p<0.09 respectively, two-tailed). The 
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distraction condition showed ingroup bias at a marginally 
significant level. Thus, as predicted, subjects in ingroup 
and basic conditions showed considerable ingroup bias while 
those in the outgroup condition did not, and those in the 
distraction condition did so, but moderately. Overall, 
subjects showed ingroup bias across conditions (t=4.76; p< 
0.0001). The result of Wilcoxon signed-rank test is almost 
the same as the result of t-tests (p<0.02, p<0.01, p=0.33, 
p=0.21, respectively) except for the fact in this case the 
distraction condition does not even approach a marginally 
significant level. 
Table 3 shows that ingroup bias differs depending upon 
various conditions, and those conditions explain about 11.4% 
of the variance in ingroup bias. 
TABLE 3. General linear model 
source df F PR) F R*" 
condition 3 2.62 0.059 0.114 
error 61 
c.total 64 
Therefore, as predicted, whether subjects list reasons 
for and think about either their own group's choice or the 
other group's choice makes a difference in ingroup bias. 
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The means between conditions were compared to examine 
the differences in ingroup bias among conditions. The means 
of the basic condition and distraction condition were not 
significantly different (F=0.06; p=0.81). The difference 
between the basic condition and the ingroup condition was 
significant at a marginal level (F=2.89; p<0.1), and the 
difference between the basic and outgroup condition was not 
significantly different (F=0.80; p=0.38). There was a 
marginally significant difference between the ingroup and 
the distraction condition (F=3.94; p<0.06), and a 
significant difference between the ingroup and the outgroup 
(F=7.09; p<0.01). The difference between the outgroup and 
the distraction condition was not significant (F=0.43; 
p=0.51). Therefore, the ingroup and outgroup conditions 
were significantly different in ingroup bias, and also there 
were differences between the ingroup and distraction 
conditions, and between the ingroup and basic conditions at 
the marginal levels. These findings fit to the predictions. 
However, there were no significant differences in ingroup 
bias between the basic and distraction conditions, and 
between the basic and outgroup conditions, which seems 
contrary to the predictions. It may be due to big standard 
error values. 
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In terms of sex, the mean was 7.77 for males and 5.15 
for female subjects. These two means were significantly 
different from zero (t=3.94; p<0.001 and t=2.80; pfO.Ol 
respectively), but were not significantly different from 
each other according to t-tests (t=-0.97; p=0.33). Thus, 
there was no difference in ingroup bias by sex. It is 
necessary to check whether ingroup bias differs according to 
painting preferences. The mean for the Klee group (n=36) 
was 5.78, and for the Kandinsky group (n=29) was 7.17. 
These two means were not significantly different (t=-0.51; 
p=0.61), which shows that there is no difference in the 
amount of ingroup bias by art preference. In addition, 
there was no interaction effect between conditions and art 
preference. 
Because the hypothesis predicted no or reverse bias in 
the outgroup condition, no bias in the distraction 
condition, moderate ingroup bias in the basic condition, and 
the most ingroup bias in the ingroup condition, this 
ordering of ingroup bias was tested using contrast 
statements and an F-test. According to the result, the 
predicted ordering of ingroup, basic, distraction, and 
outgroup conditions was supported (F=6.74; p<0.02). The 
alternative ordering of ingroup^basic=distraction>outgroup 
was also supported (F=7.09; p<0.01), however. 
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The means of total 18 scales for ingroup and outgroup 
evaluations were calculated (Table 4). 
TABLE 4. Ingroup and outgroup evaluation scale means 
condition basic ingroup outgroup distraction total 
inmean 5.14 5.03 4.91 5.02 5.02 
s.e. 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.08 
outmean 4.82 4.37 4.77 4.74 4.66 
s.e. 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.09 
n 15 18 16 16 65 
According to Table 4, the basic condition shows the 
most favorable evaluation of the ingroup, and also the 
highest evaluation of the outgroup. Thus, the evaluation of 
the ingroup in the ingroup condition was not the most 
favorable, and the evaluation of the outgroup in the 
outgroup condition was not the highest, either. However, 
differences between both ingroup and outgroup evaluations 
across all the conditions were quite small. 
Behavioral Measure— Matrices 
The results of reward allocation matrices are shown in 
Table 5 . 
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TABLE 5. Frequency of four choice rules by condition 
condition* basic ingroup outgroup distraction total 
EQ(F) 26 33 19 15 9 3  
(%) ( 4 3 . 3 )  (45.8) (32.2) (23.4) (36.47) 
RG(MD) 2 9  27 36 37 129 
(%) (48.3) (37.5) (61.0) (57.8) (50.59) 
OG(MIP) 2 5 0 5 12 
(%) ( 3.3) ( 6.9) ( 0.0) ( 7.8) ( 4.71) 
JG(MJP) 3 7 4 7 21 
(%) ( 5.0) ( 9.7) ( 6.8) (10.9) ( 8.24) 
total 60 72 59 64 255 
EQ: equality; F: fairness; RG; relative gain; MD: 
maximum difference; OG; own gain; MIP; maximum ingroup profit; 
JG: joint gain; MJP; maximum joint profit. 
As Table 5 shows, subjects generally chose the relative 
gain distribution rule the most frequently, followed by the 
equality rule. Thus, overall, subjects showed ingroup bias 
when distributing points to ingroup and outgroup members, 
i.e., they tended to make the difference between points 
given to ingroup and those given to outgroup as big as 
possible. The tendency for equal distribution was also 
dominant, which corresponds to the results of other 
research. Subjects chose the other two rules in only about 
13% of their total choices. Thus, it is shown again that 
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own gain and joint gain are not popular choices. The 
proportion of own gain was even smaller than that of joint 
gain, which suggests that subjects do not want to maximize 
own gain but rather strongly prefer the relative advantage 
compared to the outgroup. Sacrificing own absolute profit 
for the relative gain has been the consistent finding in 
most studies. 
In contrast to the prediction, those in the basic 
condition and ingroup condition chose equality and relative 
gain almost equally, and those in the outgroup and 
distraction conditions showed a stronger tendency to select 
relative gain, i.e., stronger ingroup bias. Such a result 
was unexpected and difficult to explain. Using the 
randomization test Edgington calls a "composition test", 
there seems to be no overall difference in strategies used 
across conditions (sum of all T**2/n=26.00, p=0.31). While 
there appears to be some interesting differences between use 
of equality and relative gain, the pattern of results is 
directly opposite to predictions, since you would expect 
more use of relative gain in the basic and ingroup 




Almost all subjects had never seen the four paintings 
before. One of the predictions in this study was that as 
subjects list more reasons for their own group's choice, 
their evaluation of the ingroup would become more favorable, 
and that as they list more reasons for the outgroup's 
choice, their evaluation of the outgroup would be more 
favorable. However, the result did not support these 
predictions, i.e., there was no significant relationship 
between the number of reasons listed and evaluation of 
either the ingroup or the outgroup. 
Subjects were asked at the end of the questionnaire how 
much they thought about reasons for the ingroup's and 
outgroup's choice. Responses to these questions were 
examined in order to check whether asking subjects to list 
reasons for the groups' choices really made them think more 
about the choices. In the basic condition, the mean 
response for thinking about the ingroup's choice and for 
outgroup's choice was 3.07 and 3.07, respectively (on a 
scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning "did not think about it at 
all" and 5 "thought about it very much"). The means were 
3.28 and 2.50 in the ingroup condition, 3.50 and 3.63 in the 
outgroup condition, and 2.88 and 2.56 in the distraction 
condition. Thus, subjects in the distraction condition 
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generally thought the least about those reasons, which seems 
to show that the distraction manipulation was somewhat 
successful. Those in the outgroup condition thought the 
most about the outgroup's reasons for their choice, and 
those in the ingroup condition thought more about the 
ingroup's reasons than about the outgroup's reasons for 
choice, which seems to show that the manipulations in these 
conditions worked. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the distraction 
condition showed ingroup bias according to t-test even 
though it was at a marginally significant level. This seems 
contrary to the hypothesis. One possible reason may be the 
manipulation of distraction was not strong enough to 
distract subjects. Thus, in order to see whether those 
subjects who showed more ingroup bias were less distracted, 
subjects in this condition were divided into two groups, 
those who showed more bias than the average and those who 
showed less bias than the average. The former group 
reported thinking more about reasons for both ingroup and 
outgroup's choices than the latter (3.33 for ingroup and 
3.33 for outgroup in the former group, and 2.60 and 2.10, 
respectively, in the latter). The difference between the 
amount of reasons thought about for the ingroup's choice was 
not significantly different between those high and low in 
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ingroup bias (t=1.34; p=0.20), but the difference between 
the two groups in terms of outgroup's reasons was 
significant (t=2.37; p<0.03). When combined, the amount of 
reasons thought about for both groups' choices is 6.67 for 
the high bias group and 4.70 for the low bias group, which 
is significantly different (t=2.21; p^O.05). Thus, those 
who showed more ingroup bias seemed to think more about 
reasons than those who displayed less bias, which means that 
more ingroup bias may occur because subjects were less 
distracted and thus could think more about the reasons and 
generate arguments. 
175 
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Summary 
The study used unaquainted subjects with minimal social 
interaction between or within groups. Overall, the results 
show that even under such a situation the mere 
categorization of subjects into an ingroup and outgroup, 
based on a trivial criterion, still led to ingroup bias. 
While subjects were randomly assigned to condition, 
classification of individuals into groups in this study was 
not random because it is based on their actual painting 
preferences. However, this similarity is quite trivial, and 
thus mere categorization rather than a similarity factor can 
be regarded as the major basis for inducing ingroup bias. 
In general, ingroup bias was displayed at both the 
evaluative and behavioral levels across conditions. 
The major finding is that ingroup bias differed 
depending upon different conditions, i.e., depending upon 
whether subjects had a chance to think again about the 
choice and to list reasons for the choice made either by the 
ingroup or the outgroup. Subjects in the basic and ingroup 
conditions showed significant ingroup bias, i.e., they 
evaluated ingroup members more favorably than outgroup 
members. In contrast, those those in the outgroup and 
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distraction conditions did not display ingroup bias, i.e., 
there was no significant difference between their evaluation 
of ingroup and outgroup members. Therefore, the study 
supports the hypothesis that when subjects implicitly or 
explicitly think about reasons and/or argue for their own 
choice, they show ingroup bias. When they do not have an 
opportunity to think about reasons for their own and of the 
other group's choices and thus do not argue for either 
choice, they do not display ingroup bias. It also shows 
that when subjects argue for the outgroup's choice, they 
display no ingroup bias, even though they do not necessarily 
show reverse bias. Although the main test did not 
demonstrate reverse bias in the outgroup condition, subjects 
showed reverse bias in pretest 1 although it was not 
statistically significant. Even though both the basic and 
ingroup conditions showed significant ingroup bias, subjects 
in the ingroup condition displayed more ingroup bias than 
those in the basic condition and this difference was 
marginally significant. Thus, the first and second 
hypotheses were supported. The third and fourth hypotheses 
were also supported, i.e., both the outgroup and distraction 
conditions did not display ingroup bias. Ingroup bias 
between these two conditions was not significantly different 
from each other. There was a significant difference in 
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ingroup bias between the ingroup and outgroup conditions, 
and between the ingroup and distraction conditions, while 
there was no significant difference between the basic and 
outgroup conditions, or between the basic and distraction 
conditions. When comparing the four evaluation means (i.e., 
ingroup evaluation minus outgroup evaluation) across all 
conditions, the ingroup condition showed the highest mean, 
followed by the basic condition, distraction condition, and 
outgroup condition, which corresponds to the hypothesized 
ordering. However, the ordering of ingroup) 
basic=distraction)outgroup was also supported according to 
contrast statement. Thus, it is not certain whether the 
amount of ingroup bias between the basic and distraction 
conditions is the same or not. One possible reason can be 
due to a weak manipulation of distracting activities. The 
result did not show the evidence to support the hypothesis 
that there will be significant relationship between the 
number of reasons produced and the amount of ingroup bias. 
Overall, subjects selected "relative gain" and 
"equality" rules when allocating points (about 87% of total 
choices). Only about 13% of all choices were "own gain" or 
"joint gain" rules. More than half of the subjects (about 
51%) preferred the relative gain strategy, which 
demonstrates ingroup bias. The distribution of the four 
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choice rules by condition was not in accord with 
predictions. On the contrary, the results showed a rather 
opposite trend. Subjects in the basic and ingroup 
conditions selected both relative gain and equality rules 
almost equally, whilst those in the outgroup and distraction 
conditions chose the relative gain rule more often than the 
equality rule (about twice as often as the equality rule). 
These findings do not correspond to the results obtained 
from the evaluative measures. Therefore, the study 
demonstrates rather contradictory results. One set of 
results suggests that ingroup bias is related to thinking 
and arguing about the ingroup's position, and the other set 
suggests it is related to the absence of any thinking and 
arguing about the ingroup's position. 
Discussion 
This study demonstrates several problems in methdology. 
One of the most significant problems would be the use of 
different measures for ingroup bias. As the results 
obtained from evaluative and behavioral measures showed, 
these two measurements display rather contradictory 
findings. Some research on ingroup bias has used only 
evaluation scales while some others have used allocation 
matrices. There exists a problem concerning what kind of 
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measurement is more accurate or valid. When the results are 
different, it is difficult to interpret the findings. The 
study raises a question of whether ingroup bias at the 
evaluative level and at behavioral level have different 
characteristics or connotations. 
Few studies have used both kinds of measurement. The 
reason for that may be because of this problem. For 
instance, Brewer and Silver (1978) intended to compare the 
results from allocation matrices with that from traits 
scales, and found ingroup bias in reward allocation matrices 
but only in three out of seven traits scales. The 
correlation between total relative gain scores and 
differentiation on evaluative ratings was only 0.14. 
Hence, the contradictory findings of this study pose an 
important methodological problem which should be solved. It 
is necessary to conduct more research comparing outcomes 
from different measures of ingroup bias. Research will be 
needed in order to clarify whether the different aspects of 
ingroup bias (e.g., cognitive, evaluative, behavioral) can 
be considered as the same kind of bias. 
There are also some problems in the matrices 
measurement. It is difficult to make subjects allocate 
rewards without involving any self-interest. When a 
researcher tries to explain the reward allocation task, it 
seems hard to justify allocating rewards. A more important 
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problem is that most matrices methods have some drawbacks. 
The paper already indicated some of the problems in Tajfel's 
multiple-choice matrices. Some critiques point out data 
analysis problems and some others indicate problems in 
matrix allocation and combination (e.g., problems in 
distinguishing between strategies). Although this study 
used two-choice matrices due to such problems, two-choice 
matrices have also been criticized. Of particular concern 
is the problem of "alternation", which means that a subject 
may subvert the purpose of the forced choice measurement 
scale by, for example, taking turns in overrewarding the 
ingroup and outgroup so that both receive approximately 
equal rewards over the entire scale. Bornstein et al. 
(1983) contend that while Brewer and Silver's procedure 
appears to avoid the alternation problem since the scoring 
key is based on a variation in response patterns within a 
given two-choice matrix, this is not necessarily the case. 
For example, in matrix A, according to the scoring key the 
"0.0" response in A1 and A2 signifies equality, and this is 
true within A1 and A2. Similarly, if the subject selects 
"1.1", according to the scoring key this signifies own gain, 
and this is true within A1 and A2. However, if the subjects 
think in terms of alternation, 16 points are awarded to both 
groups and there is more equality than in the "0.0" pattern. 
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Consequently, Bernstein et al. argue that alternation 
produces a confound between the two rules. Also, they 
indicate that a further problem is that Brewer and Silver's 
joint gain strategy is actually maximum joint gain in favor 
of the other group and not maximum joint gain for own group. 
Thus, they designed their own procedure consisting of 7 
orientations, rather than 4 rules, including "maximum other 
gain", "maximum relative other gain", and "maximum joint 
other gain". As we can see in the various types of matrices 
researchers have invented, it seems difficult to make 
matrices which include all possible alternatives and 
combinations of rules. We may need a more careful, 
articulated matrix design which is easy for subjects to 
understand. The unpredicted results from matrices in this 
study may be partially due to the problems involved in two-
choice matrices. 
Another problem faced in this study is the manipulation 
of the distraction condition. As the results show, there is 
no significant difference in ingroup bias between the basic 
and distraction conditions, which does not support the 
hypotheses. Such a finding may reflect a failure in 
manipulating distraction. It seems difficult to distract 
subjects enough to prevent them from thinking about the 
division of groups and the choice of paintings. Although 
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the researcher tried to introduce strong distraction 
activities, they probably were not powerful enough. When 
distracting subjects, researchers may need to use activities 
which require and can elicit much cognitive effort on the 
part of subjects. More effective manipulation seems to be 
needed. 
It has been found to be difficult to make a cover story 
which can deceive subjects and disguise the real purpose of 
the study, especially because the evaluation part in the 
questionnaire is quite conspicuous. Two different cover 
stories were used in this research: a person perception 
study based on music and painting choice (first pretest) and 
a study of nonverbal cues based on seating arrangements 
(second pretest and main experiment). Neither were entirely 
satisfactory. The former was too vaguely defined to be very 
convincing and the latter introduced a cooperative activity 
(moving chairs together) which may have minimized condition 
differences. Furthermore, subjects were allowed to actually 
pick their favorite paintings, rather than being randomly 
assigned to the Klee and Kandinsky groups (as is done in 
other research), in order to eliminate this element of 
deception and possible source of suspicion. Data analysis 
showed no overall significant differences between the Klee 
and Kandinsky groups, but this introduced an uncontrolled 
source of variation into the experiment. Many previous 
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studies do not report how many subjects became suspicious 
about the purpose of the experiment. Those subjects who 
seemed to recognize the purpose were excluded in this study. 
Designing a cover story which sounds plausible will be 
important in this kind of study in order to minimize the 
effects of demand characteristics in the experimental 
situation. 
The sample size of each condition was not big, and this 
is probably the reason for having high standard error values 
which contribute to insignificant results. If the study had 
more subjects, it might be able to show better results. The 
ingroup and outgroup were divided based on art preferences, 
which may include some similarity factor even if it is 
trivial. In future experiments, clear separation of these 
two factors will be helpful to eliminate the current problem 
of confounding categorization and similarity factors. 
There are some plausible reasons for the finding that 
subjects in the outgroup condition did not display reverse 
bias. One of the most plausible reasons would be because 
subjects cooperated with other members of their group by 
moving their chairs together and such cooperation could 
cause some kind of group feeling. This seems especially 
plausible based on the fact that in pretest 1 which did not 
involve seating arrangements, subjects in this condition 
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showed lower evaluation of ingroup members than of outgroup 
members, even though the difference evaluation was not 
statistically significant. Thus, it may be possible to get 
better results using a different design. 
Despite these methodological issues, the study has 
important theoretical significance. It generally supports 
the hypotheses drawn from persuasive arguments theory. 
According to social identity theory, there should be no 
difference in ingroup bias across the different conditions, 
i.e., whether subjects list reasons or not should not make 
any difference in the bias. If social identity theory is 
valid, then all four conditions should show significant 
ingroup bias because categorization of groups exists in all 
conditions and consequently subjects should seek for 
relatively higher status through advantageous comparison 
with the other group in all four conditions. However, the 
results of the study show that only the basic and ingroup 
conditions produced ingroup bias. Even with categorization 
into an ingroup and outgroup, the outgroup and distraction 
conditions did not demonstrate the bias. Therefore, whether 
subjects listed reasons for the choice of paintings and 
produced new arguments made a difference in ingroup bias, 
which supports persuasive arguments theory. 
185 
The cognitive approach proposed here may be an 
alternative to social identity theory, to a motivational 
approach. The question of whether this new approach can 
replace social identity theory or can be a supplement to 
social identity theory seems to be raised. Evidence from 
the basic condition of this research suggests that social 
identity theory may be also valid. The basic condition 
showed significant ingroup bias even though subjects 
reported thinking about reasons for the outgroup's choice as 
much as for the ingroup's choice. This suggests that 
assuming subjects may implicitly think more about their own 
choice when given no instruction to do so is not correct. 
There is no evidence to show that subjects in the basic 
condition thought more about the ingroup's reasons, which 
does not support the assumption behind this condition. 
Therefore, further research to directly comparing the two 
theories is needed. The study presented here is only a 
first attempt to synthesize persuasive arguments theory into 
ingroup bias research. This paper is only a preliminary 
study. Thus, we cannot draw a decisive conclusion only 
based on this study. Considering the generally positive 
results, however, replication and/or extension of this study 
is indicated. Further investigations will contribute to 
knowledge in this area. 
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As the paper discussed earlier, the persuasive 
arguments theory of ingroup bias is a cognitive approach. 
The role of cognitive processes has been widely recognized 
in many social psychological studies. One example would be 
the study of stereotypes. Linville (1982) and Linville and 
Jones (1980) contend that more studies are needed of the 
cognitive processes underlying evaluative biases among 
groups. Linville's study (1982) supports the argument that 
a cognitive mechanism influences intergroup evaluation. She 
points out that in a typical ingroup favoritism paradigm, 
subjects are provided with little information about the 
target beyond the ingroup/outgroup status. Thus, they have 
no prior knowledge about the outgroups. With such little 
information apart from group membership, per se, on which to 
base evaluations, a group label may simply cue a bias 
associated with group membership. With richer information 
about a target person and hence a better basis for 
processing further information about the target, evaluations 
may not primarily depend upon group membership, per se. She 
contends that social evaluation is a result of a process 
that is at least partially determined by the way in which 
our information about social domains is structurally 
represented. The evaluative aspect of intergroup relations 
is tied to cognitive structure, and specifically to the lack 
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of complex interpretive mechanisms for processing 
information about outgroup members (Linville, 1982:198). 
The emphasis on information processing is typical of a 
cognitive approach. Persuasive arguments theory shares the 
same theoretical background with this kind of reasoning. 
Linville's thesis illuminates the significance of the 
cognitive approach proposed in this paper. 
As the paper indicated in its introduction, there 
exists a lack of theory on the issue of ingroup bias. This 
paper is an attempt to propose a new and better theory to 
explain the ingroup bias phenomenon. If this new theory is 
proven to have strong explanatory power through further 
research, it will open a new direction in this area. The 
study of ingroup bias constitutes an important part of group 
studies. From its beginning, social psychologists have 
recognized and investigated this topic. Sumner's study of 
ethnocentrism and Allport's study of prejudice reflect a 
long history of research. Furthermore, ingroup bias has 
more than theoretical importance since the phenomenon is 
prevalent in our everyday lives. We oftentimes are 
confronted with this problem when we interact with other 
people. Considering such prevalence of the phenomenon, more 
objective understanding of the phenomenon would be important 
not only for academic purpose but also for real life 
situations. 
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Group study has dwindled since the 1950s because of the 
increased emphasis on interpersonal relationships or 
individual processes in social psychology. However, group 
study is essential for understanding the relationship 
between the individual and larger society, because the 
social group is a mediating unit between the two. This 
paper calls for more research on groups and and on ingroup 
bias. There remain many unsolved problems or issues in this 
area. As the paper presented in its review of literature, 
it is difficult to synthesize and draw generalizations from 
the findings of the studies dealing with this topic. Also, 
there exist new, interesting areas of study, such as power 
relations between groups suggested by Ng, or bias of 
minority groups presented by Moscovici. Many unsolved 
problems and/or intriguing new issues will be stimulating 
academic curiosity and have potential to inspire interesting 
investigations. Continued research based on persuasive 
arguments theory is definitely needed to obtain more 
empirical support for the theory. 
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First of all, we would like to ask you some preliminary questions. 
How much do you consciously think about seating arrangements when you 
try to communicate with others? (Please check only one box on the line). 
do not think think about it 
about it at all very much 
Where do you typically sit in a college classroom? 
front ( ) middle ( ) rear ( ) 
When you meet a person for the first time, which of the following do you 
pay the most attention to? 
their eyes ( ) tone of their voice ( ) 
their overall posture ( ) other ( ) 
What kind of parties do you prefer? 
small, intimate gatherings ( ) large, noisy parties ( ) 
Up to how many people do you feel comfortable with in a standard-sized elevator? 
( ) persons 
How impatient do you get in traffic jam? (Check one box). 
not at all impatient very much impatient 
Some people are more sensitive to noise than others. When you are trying 
to study, how much noise do you prefer? 
no noise at all very noisy 
In your opinion what is the most comfortable temperature for a room? 
( ) F 
What is your favorite room color? 
( ) 
Please estimate how close you would stand if you were talking to: 
a good friend; ( ) feet 
a member of your family: ( ) feet 
a complete stranger: ( ) feet 
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Please state your preference (check one); 
Klee ( ) Kandinsky ( ) 
Please indicate the strength of your preference (Please check only one box on the line) 
very weak weak strong very strong 
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first transition period: 
Now we are interested in knowing the reasons people may have had for choosing 
the Klee paintings. Regardless of whether you personally chose the Klee 
paintings or the Kandinsky paintings, we want to know why a person would 
choose the Klee paintings. In other words, some people picked the Klee 
paintings. They chose it because they found something attractive in it. 
We want to know what reasons you think they had for being attracted to it. 
In the space below list as many reasons as you can think of for preferring 
the Klee paintings. 
reasons for choosing Klee 
1.  




6 .  
7. 






Among the reasons you listed above, select the three most important reasons 
for choosing the Klee paintings. List these below, ranking the very most 
important reason on line one, the second most important on line two, and 
the third most important on line three. 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
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non-verbal cues from the first seating arrangement: 
We would like to ask you about your impression of members of your own group 
(i.e., those who picked the same paintings as you did). 
Please indicate your group membership on this line (write 
either Klee or Kandinsky). 
For each of the following dimensions, please check only one box on the 
line which best describes your impression of members of your own group. 















Next, please check only one box on the line which best describes your 
impression of members of the other group (i.e., those who chose the other 
paintings you did not choose). 

















In a minute the instructor will again ask you to take a seat in a different 
arrangement. Wait for this instruction and move your seat when asked. 
213 
second transition period: 
Now once again please list as many reasons as you can think of for people 
being attracted to the Klee paintings. 
Now study the paintings more carefully, and list as many new reasons as 
you can think of. 
reasons for choosing Klee 
1 .  




6 .  
7. 






Now we want you to describe both Klee paintings as vividly as possible. 
In the space below please write a paragraph for each Klee painting which 
best describes that painting. 
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allocation cues from the second seating arrangement: 
Next semester we will conduct a similar experiment, except for the fact that 
it will involve the differential allocation of points to participants. 
Without knowing the particulars of this research, please tell us how you 
think we should allocate points to those people who chose Klee versus Kandinsky. 
For each of 8 questions, you must choose between two different allocations. 
Check which allocation you prefer: 
1. check ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 9, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 8 and Kandinsky group gets 4 
2. check ( ) Klee group gets 6 and Kandinsky group gets 4, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 10 
3. check ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 5 ,  or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 6  and Kandinsky group gets 7  
4. check ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 9, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets a  and Kandinsky group gets 12 
5 .  check ( ) Klee group gets 6 and Kandinsky group gets 8, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 3 
6. check ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 5, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 9 and Kandinsky group gets 12 
7. check ( ) Klee group gets 6 and Kandinsky group gets 4, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 7 and Kandinsky group gets 1 
8. check ( ) Klee group gets 6  and Kandinsky group gets 8, or 
one ( ) Klee group gets 5 and Kandinsky group gets 4 
In a minute the instructor will again ask you to take another seat in a 
different arrangement. Wait for this instruction and move your seat when asked. 
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third transition period: 
Once again study those paintings carefully, and think about the reasons 
people had for choosing the Klee paintings. This time, instead of asking you 
to imagine what those reasons might be, we are providing you a list of 
possible reasons. Please select and rank the 10 most important reasons 
people had for choosing the Klee paintings. In other words, on the first line 
list the very most important reason, on the second line the second most 
important reason, etc. 
list of possible reasons: organized, mellow, all-over design, regular, smooth, 
colorful, busy, unique, disorganized, harsh, abstract, symmetric, dynamic, simple, 
interesting, active, nonsymmetric, creative, original, alive, exciting, violent, 
concrete, contrasting colors, boldness, subtle, relaxing, pleasant, harmonious, 
bright, imaginative, free-style, exuberant, open, sharp, conservative 
reasons for choosing Klee 
1.  




6 .  
7. 
8 .  
9. 
10. 
Now pretend that you have been asked to convince someone to pick the Klee 
paintings over the Kandinsky ones. In the space below write the most persuasive 
paragraph you can, using the most persuasive arguments you can think of, 
for convincing a person to choose the Klee paintings. 
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non-verbal cues from the third seating arrangement: 
Once again, we would like to ask you about your impression of members 
of your own group. For each of the following dimensions, please check 
only one box. on the line which best describes your impression of members 
of your own group (i.e., those who chose the same paintings as you did). 




















Next, please check only one box on the line which best describes your 
impression of members of the other group (i,e, those who chose the other 
paintings). 












We would like to ask you questions about your general reaction to the study, 
about your use of social space, and some background questions about yourself. 
Have you seen these particular paintings by Klee before? 
Yes ( ) no ( ) 
Have you seen these particular paintings by Kandinsky before? 
yes ( ) no ( ) 
How much did you think about the reasons that your group members might 
have had for making their choice of paintings? (Check one box). 
did not think thought about it 
about it at all very much 
How much did you think about tha reasons that the other group members might 
have had for making their choice of paintings? 
did not think thought about it 
about it at all very much 
How curious were you about why your group members made the choice of 
paintings they did? 
not curious at all very much curious 
How curious were you about why the other group members made the choice of 
paintings they did? 
not curious at all very much curious 
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Did you become more certain (or less certain) about your choice of painting 
after listing reasons? 
became much somewhat somewhat became much 
less certain less certain more certain more certain 
Please indicate once again the strength of your preference of painting. 
very weak weak strong very strong 
Which seating arrangement did you like most? 
first ( ) second ( ) third ( ) 
Which seating arrangement was the most comfortable for you? 
first ( ) second ( ) third ( ) 
Did you feel comfortable when you moved your seat several times? 
yes ( ) no ( ) 
In general, do you like to be alone or to be in a crowd? 
alone ( ) crowd ( ) 
It is generally known that aspects of the physical environment affect human 
feelings. Some of those aspects are temperature, humidity, light, etc. 
Which of those aspects do you think most affects your feeling? 
( ) 
Do you consciously think about personal distance when you communicate with 
others? 
not at all very much 
What is your age? 
sex: female ( ) male ( ) 
school year; freshman ( ) sophomore ( ) junior ( ) senior ( ) 
•When you finish, turn this questionnaire over and wait for further instruction. 
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first transition period: (distraction condition) 
Un#cf#mbl# utcM four JumbiM, 
OTM ittttr to •»en •quart, to form 





^ Y > 
DELTUC 
r'\ ' r 
w 
BRUPES1 
1 Y ^ 
WILL YOU LOVE ME WHEN 
I'M OLD AND UOLY? 
Now arrangt iht circled loiter# to 
form th# surprise anewar. «s tug-
Qosttd by trw abov* canoon. 
A«wE"oF[iiiij3,nra" 
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second transition period: (distraction condition) 
instructions: Fold a paper bird and a paper hat using the squares of paper 
we've provided you. 
PAPER BIRD 
I. t. 


























third transition period: (distraction condition) 
3"bW'4l'9U'S% t3'E6'Ze"% 
instructions; 
Match the correct captions 
with these cartoons. Write 
the letter (a,b,c..) of the 
correct caption on the 
space next to the cartoon. 
When you are finished, 
determine your total score. 
The correct answer is listed 
at the bottom of the page. 
a. GlngerdecldestotakeoutMR.Talbct's 
flower bed oneo ond for OIL 
b. Here comes another big one. Roy. and 
here-we~goooooowhooooooooool" 
c. "Dadl Find out If they have cablel" 
d. "Qulelc, Abdul! Desert!-One for two?" 
e. "You have to prime it. you know." 
f' Between classes at the College 
of Laboratory Assistants 
9 • "Wendell _ I'm not content." 
h. Heyt I'm emning,rm coming-lust 
cross your legs and waitr 
i • "Mowthot desk looks tjetter. Everything's 
squared away, yessir, squoaaaaared away." 
j • "Crmon. c'mon-it's either one or the other." 
k. "Sorry to Intmde. ma'am, but we 
thought we'd come in and lust sort of 
roam around for a few minutes." 
1. "RustytTwopolntsl" 
m. "As If we oil knew where we're going." 
n. "A cat klOef? Is that the face or a cat killer? 
Cot âftosef maytM. But hey-who isn't?" 
SCORE: correct. 
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instructions; Use your imagination and fill in each balloon with a caption. 
hiiTT  ^
